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Zusammenfassung
Im Alltag passiert es uns oft, dass wir Menschen begegnen, die entgegen unseres Versta¨nd-
nisses daru¨ber, was richtig und was falsch ist, handeln. Dieses Versta¨ndnis soll hier unter
dem Begriff der Moralita¨t zusammengefasst werden. Seit vielen Jahrzehnten bescha¨ftigen
sich Wissenschaftler mit der Frage, wie wir unsere eigenen und die Handlungen anderer
hinsichtlich ihres moralischen Gehalts bewerten, und welche Verarbeitungsprozesse dabei
im Gehirn ablaufen. In ju¨ngster Zeit wurde vorgeschlagen, dass affektiven im Vergleich
zu kognitiven Prozessen eine wichtige Rolle bei moralischen Entscheidungen zukommt.
Bisher fehlt es jedoch an einem tieferen Versta¨ndnis u¨ber die zugrundeliegenden Verar-
beitungsmechanismen. Die vorliegende Dissertationsschrift, welche sich dreier Studien be-
dient, soll einen Beitrag zur Kla¨rung dieser Frage leisten. Hierfu¨r werden bereits bekannte
Paradigmen herangezogen und moralisches Sprachverstehen als Spezialfall des emotionalen
Sprachversta¨ndnisses betrachtet.
Alle drei Studien bauen auf der Vorstellung auf, dass die Verarbeitung moralischer Ver-
letzungen eine wichtige affektive Komponente besitzt. Deshalb wurde in allen Studien
neben moralischen Texten zusa¨tzlich die Verarbeitung emotionaler Texte betrachtet. In
Studie 1 wurde mittels ereigniskorrelierter Potentiale (EKPs) der Frage nachgegangen, wie
wa¨hrend des Lesens kurzer Alltagsszenarien die Verarbeitung moralischer Verletzungen im
Gehirn abla¨uft und ob diese Verarbeitung von der Art der Aufgabe abha¨ngt. Dabei lag der
Fokus auf dem zeitlichen Verlauf mentaler Mechanismen bei moralischen und bei affektiven
Urteilen. In Studie 2 wurde die Frage untersucht, ob moralische Verletzungen verko¨rper-
licht verarbeitet werden. Mittels der Messung peripherer psychophysiologischer Methoden
wurde untersucht, ob beim Lesen konkrete emotionale Zusta¨nde simuliert werden. Studie
3 untersuchte sowohl fu¨r EKPs, als auch fu¨r periphere psychophysiologische Maße die Art
der beteiligten Prozesse bei der Verarbeitung moralischer Information beim reinen Lesen.
Zusammenfassend weisen die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Studien auf eine maßgebliche
Beteiligung affektiver Prozesse bei der Verarbeitung moralischer Information hin. Dies
spiegelt sich sowohl im EKP, als auch in der verko¨rperten Verarbeitung moralischer In-
halte wider. Des Weiteren legen die Ergebnisse eine Aufgabenabha¨ngigkeit der beteiligten
Prozesse nahe. Beim Lesen und beim emotionalen Urteil wird moralische Information af-
fektiv verarbeitet, wohingegen beim moralischen Urteil kognitive Verarbeitung dominiert.
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Abstract
Every day we are confronted with other’s actions which clash with our understanding
about what is right and what is wrong. This understanding is summarised here by the
concept of morality. For many decades, scientists have been investigating how we evaluate
the morality of actions and which brain processes underlie such evaluations. For instance,
recently it has been suggested that affective as compared to cognitive processes might play
a more fundamental role in moral judgement than previously assumed. So far, however,
it is still unclear what the underlying mechanisms exactly are. This dissertation, which
is based on three studies, intends to contribute to answering this question. By using a
language comprehension approach, moral information processing is taken as a special case
of emotional information processing.
All three studies are based on the assumption that affective processes play an important
role in the processing of moral transgressions. Therefore, in addition to moral texts, the
processing of emotional texts was also considered in all studies. In study 1, event-related
brain potentials (ERPs) were used to investigate how moral transgressions are processed in
the brain during discourse comprehension of everyday scenarios and whether affective pro-
cessing is task-dependent. The focus was on the time course of mental mechanisms during
a morality and an emotional judgement task. Study 2 aimed at examining whether moral
transgressions during reading of the same everyday scenarios trigger embodied responses.
By using peripheral psychophysiological measures, we investigated whether embodied pro-
cessing takes place when participants perform an emotional judgement task. Finally, Study
3 analysed both, ERPs and peripheral psychophysiological measures to investigate the type
of processes involved in moral information processing when participants merely read for
comprehension.
In summary, the results of the studies reported in this thesis point towards the involve-
ment of affective processes in the processing of moral content. This is reflected by ERP
correlates indicating affective processing and by peripheral psychophysiological measures
suggesting the embodiment of moral content. Moreover, the results suggest a task de-
pendency of involved processes. This means that the goals with which one reads a text
influence whether moral information is emotionally salient or not. As a result, cognitive
processes dominate over affective processes when moral judgements are demanded and vice
versa when affective judgements are required or participants merely read for comprehen-
sion.
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1 Introduction
As social animals, humans are confronted with incoming information about the actions
of others. This information must be rapidly evaluated and the meaning as well as con-
sequences must be processed. For instance, we sometimes find ourselves in situations in
which we hear about a person violating a prevailing moral norm (a woman having an abor-
tion) or breaching the law (evading taxes). Often, we experience such actions that violate
our sense or our knowledge of rightness and wrongness aversively and spontaneously tend
to judge such actions as bad, unsocial, or immoral.
Moral values are standards that an individual or a group holds and on the basis of
which we judge what is right or wrong, good or evil. Moral standards regulate the actions
of individuals and make social life possible in the first place. In brief, morality is about
protecting individuals within a social world (Haidt, 2007). Moreover, when interacting
with others, in order to avert threat to the individual, it is important to quickly evaluate
others’ actions and to identify persons who intend to harm us. This reflects a fundamental
aspect of human moral cognition which will be examined in the present thesis. Here, I will
adopt a more general concept of morality including moral principles (e.g., “You should not
kill.”) as well as social conventions (e.g., “As a man you use the men’s restroom.”).
The primary aim of investigating moral judgement behaviour is to understand how peo-
ple judge what is right or wrong (Waldmann, Nagel, & Wiegmann, 2012). Over time, var-
ious theories have been developed which emphasise different aspects of moral judgement.
The starting point for the systematic experimental investigation of moral judgement can be
dated back to the 1980s when Kohlberg first presented his approach of moral development
(Kohlberg, 1981). He proposed that moral judgements are grounded in highly elaborated
reasoning processes, whereas current approaches propose that spontaneous moral judge-
ments are grounded in affective and intuitive processes (Haidt, 2001). In addition, as
research of social cognition demonstrated again and again the importance of emotions for
a wide range of everyday evaluations and judgements (Forgas, 2012), it is likely that emo-
tions are involved in moral judgement as well. Nevertheless, the exact role of emotions in
moral judgement is still debated (cf., Waldmann et al., 2012; Avramova & Inbar, 2013).
Moreover, it remains to be investigated whether moral evaluations and judgements are
based on domain-specific mechanisms and potentially involve an innate morality module
in the human brain, or whether moral evaluations use the same domain-unspecific mech-
anisms as other social judgements (e.g., reasoning and decision making).
In addressing these questions, current research on moral judgement nowadays combine
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behavioural and neuroscientific approaches and methods to reveal the underlying mental
processes. For instance, psychophysiological methods offer the opportunity to examine
brain processes and other unconscious and automatically triggered bodily responses which
are associated with (embodied) affective processing. In the following, I will describe var-
ious accounts that discuss the interplay of emotional and cognitive processes in moral
cognition. The number of theories and approaches are illustrative for the complexity of
the topic. Also, recent studies in other research domains provide convincing evidence for
the assumption that emotional and cognitive processes do not work as independent and
potentially antagonistic but rather as interacting systems (Lai, Hagoort, & Casasanto,
2012; Pasto¨tter, Gleixner, Neuhauser, & Ba¨uml, 2013). To reveal the elementary mental
mechanisms underlying moral judgements it is in my view crucial not only to examine the
occurrence but also the precise time-course of affective and cognitive processes.
The primary aim of the present doctoral thesis is to reveal the covert affective and
cognitive mental mechanisms and embodied responses involved in the processing of moral
and emotional contents. Three studies will be reported using explicit and implicit tasks and
behavioural as well as psychophysiological methods to address this topic. All three studies
are inspired by the assumption that emotions play an important role in the processing
of moral content during discourse comprehension. In order to elaborate the specificity of
processing moral content, it is important to also investigate the processing of emotional
content. To this end, a new set of moral and emotional text materials was constructed
and pre-tested. These materials include short scenarios describing either moral or immoral
actions and neutral or negative situations.
In the following section, first, I will discuss different theories of moral judgement and
conceptual and methodological changes this research area underwent. Then I will discuss
possible functions of emotions in moral cognition by considering recent studies and will end
with highlighting the suitability of psychophysiological methods in addressing this issue.
1.1 Developmental theories of moral judgement
Initial theories of moral judgement originated in developmental and differential psychology.
Researchers were interested in how and when children acquire moral beliefs, as well as in
the reasons for why individuals’ act inconsistently across different situations (Duska &
Whelan, 1975). In these theories, moral development is described as the transformation of
cognitive structures, which depends on the cognitive development in general and reflects a
child’s ability to adapt to its social environment. For decades, Jean Piaget was one of the
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leading researchers of children’s cognitive development, who considered moral cognition
as a part of social cognition (Piaget, 1932). In general, he was interested in how the
mind comes to respect rules in an attempt to regulate social interaction. According to
Piaget, morality is a system of rules that also relies on perspective-taking abilities and
that depends on social relationships that are characterised by mutual respect, cooperative
activity, and developing autonomy.
Kohlberg’s (1981) theory of moral development is grounded in Piaget’s social devel-
opmental account and emphasises, in contrast to Piaget, that the development of moral
cognition is a domain-specific aspect of cognitive development which already starts in in-
fancy. According to his rationalist theory, moral judgements reflect the result of higher
cognitive and elaborated reasoning processes of what is right and wrong. In a broad lon-
gitudinal study starting in 1963, Kohlberg (1981) interviewed 50 male pupils and young
adults ranging in age from 10 to 28. He used moral dilemmas to examine moral judgement
behaviour in order to uncover reasons for their decisions. Over 18 years, every participant
had been invited every three years to assess their moral reasoning. Kohlberg found that all
participants went through the same sequence of developmental stages. He differentiated
six hierarchical stages at three distinct levels that include different moral dictums and prin-
ciples varying with the processes of role- and perspective taking. It is worth noting that
the rate of moral development differed between individuals of the same age, therefore, age
could not be taken as sine qua non. Although moral development is positively correlated
with cognitive development, individuals’ moral orientation and the ability of moral reason-
ing differs. The pre-conventional level typically occurs in pre-adolescence when the labels
good/bad and right/wrong and the underlying rules are adapted from the authorities who
are also the source of punishment when breaking these rules. On this level, children have
an egocentric perspective and good behaviour is defined as obeying the rules in order to
avoid negative hedonistic and physical consequences for oneself rather than to consider the
psychological interests of others. On the conventional level, the perspective changes to the
self in relation to others of the group to which the individual belongs. This usually happens
when children get in contact with their peers, for example in kindergarten or preschool.
The individual realises its social affiliation and expects reciprocal commitment to rules.
Good behaviour is no longer motivated for personal reasons but by how well it fulfills the
order and expectations of the group. Finally, on the post-conventional level moral deci-
sions are defined by rights, values, or principles that are agreeable to all individuals and
have validity and application apart from an authority or the individual’s own identification
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with a group. At this level, a conflict between the own moral principles and these of the
prevailing legal form and social society could arise when they differ (Kohlberg, 1981). The
sixth stage is the highest level of development in moral reasoning and involves universal
principles of justice, reciprocity, and the equality of human rights and the respect for the
dignity of human beings (Duska & Whelan, 1975).
There are some limitations of Kohlberg’s theory. First, the sixth stage is grounded in
a hypothetical and abstract assumption based on philosophical and ethical rules such as
the golden rule or Kant’s categorical imperative rather than on empirical research (Duska
& Whelan, 1975). Second, Kohlberg does not provide any explanations for the context-
dependancy and variability of moral reasoning within an individual (Waldmann et al.,
2012). For instance, whether lying is morally fine appears to depend on the situation.
Third, his cognitive developmental account gives conscious and stage-dependent reasoning
a central place in moral judgement. He neither believes in an innate moral entity nor in the
influence of affective and intuitive processes. Finally, Kohlberg developed his theory and
the assumption of six stages of moral development on empirical studies testing only western
male students. It is therefore plausible to assume that his theory is subject to cultural and
gender biases (Baumrind, 1986). Together, given these limitations, researchers questioned
the assumptions of Kohlberg and put forward alternative theories of moral judgement.
1.2 Current moral theories of social psychology and cognitive
neuroscience
While rationalist theories dominated research on moral judgement for a long time, the
adoption of a social-psychological rather than a developmental approach and the use of
neuroscientific methods provided new insights regarding the affective and cognitive pro-
cesses underlying these judgements. Thus, social psychological accounts assume a central
role for emotions and affective processing in moral cognition. According to Haidt (2001),
automatic intuitions rather than moral reasoning underlie moral judgements. In his social
intuitionist model (SIM), a moral judgement is understood as a social process and not as
a private act of cognition (Haidt, 2001, 2007). Haidt conducted a number of experiments
where he asked participants to morally judge stories describing taboo violations (e.g., de-
scribing sexual abnormalities, incest, or eating pets), for example, “A 25-year-old man likes
to masturbate while his dog willingly licks his owner’s genitals and seems to enjoy it.”, and
give reasons for their decisions (cf. Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993).
Crucially, participants were able to quickly judge the behaviour as morally unacceptable,
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but they were unable to provide justifications or reasons for their decisions. Haidt and
colleagues call this phenomenon “moral dumbfounding”, which is defined as the stubborn
and puzzled maintenance of a moral judgement without supporting reasons. The speed
and automaticity of judgements and the fact that justifications are very time consuming
leads to the assumption that spontaneous affective evaluations are of key importance in
moral judgements.
Hence, Haidt (2001) concludes that people base their judgements on valence-laden and
holistic moral intuitions which are automatic and rapid processes. More specifically, an ini-
tial evaluative feeling of good/bad, like/dislike about a person’s actions or character takes
place and provides the grounds for the moral judgement. This is followed by a slow and
controlled reasoning process, in support of the construction of justifications for intuition-
based judgements and actions after a judgement has been made (Haidt, 2001). The major
claim of the SIM then is that moral intuitions - and not reasoning - directly determine
moral judgements. Later, Haidt and Joseph (2007) advanced the theory by addressing the
question what the moral intuitions are like and where they originate from (see also Haidt
& Joseph, 2004, for a review, see Graham et al., 2013). Haidt and Joseph identified five
categories of human’s moral intuitions or so-called moral foundations: harm/care, fair-
ness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. More recently,
researchers have added a sixth foundation, liberty/oppression, focusing on concerns about
domination and coercion (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). Crucially, it is
emphasised that every foundation is linked to a specific emotional state, for example purity
violations are associated with disgust feelings. In sum, the moral foundation theory is an
approach to explain both the universality and the inter- and intra-individual variability of
moral judgements across situations and cultures.
Moral psychology received another push around the year 2000 from research in cog-
nitive neuroscience that aimed at identifying brain regions which are involved in moral
judgements. For instance, Greene and his colleagues used functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to examine the brain processes underlying people’s moral judgement be-
haviour with regard to moral dilemma situations that differ in their degree of personal
immediacy (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Greene, Nystrom,
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Think of the classic example: you are to save five people
working on a track from being run over by an out-of-control trolley. There are two possible
scenarios. One, you could hit a switch to detour the trolley and save the five people, at
the same time though kill another person on the other track. Two, you could push a man
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off a bridge onto the track to stop the trolley, very well knowing that this action would
kill him. These two scenarios offer illustrative examples of the extent to which moral
dilemmas can engage us in diverging ways. Due to the physical contact, it is obvious that
pushing a man off a footbridge is emotionally more salient than hitting a switch (Greene
et al., 2001). Although, you would actually kill a person in both cases, your decision would
presumably differ depending on the personal immediacy and the emotional engagement of
the dilemma situation. That is why these two types of dilemmas are commonly used to
reveal the underlying processes in moral dilemma judgements.
Figure 1. Mean reaction time as a function of condition and response type in Experiment
2 of Greene et al. (2001). Error bars indicate two standard errors of the mean.
(Figure taken from Greene et al. (2001) with permission from Springer Link.)
Actually, this is what Greene et al. (2001) found. They asked participants to indicate
whether they judged the action to kill a person in order to save others to be “appropriate”
or “inappropriate”. First, in an impersonal dilemma scenario, participants were very
likely to act and thereby kill a person (“appropriate”-judgement, utilitarian decision). In
a personal scenario, however, participants were very likely not to act in order to avoid
killing a person (“inappropriate”-judgement, deontological decision). Second, in personal
dilemmas deontological decisions were faster then utilitarian decisions, whereas, there was
no such difference in response time for impersonal dilemmas (see Figure 1). Crucially,
fMRI results showed different activation patterns between the two types of dilemmas. For
personal dilemmas, brain areas associated with emotion processing (i.e. medial frontal
gyrus, posterior cingulate gyrus, angular gyrus) were more active, whereas for impersonal
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dilemmas the results showed increased activation in brain areas that are related to working
memory operations (i.e. right middle frontal gyrus, bilateral parietal lobe).
Based on the fMRI and behavioural results, the authors proposed a dual-process theory,
which assumes both automatic emotional processes and controlled cognitive processes to
contribute to moral judgements. According to this theory, there are two dissociable and
antagonistic systems, with emotional processes being faster and finishing earlier than cog-
nitive processing under some circumstances (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). The authors did
not specify what exactly triggers emotional processing, but their results suggested that
material-specific aspects matter. That is, personal dilemmas trigger emotional and imper-
sonal dilemmas trigger cognitive processing. Still, the role of affective processing in moral
judgement has not yet been satisfactorily supported (Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2009).
In contrast, there is substantial evidence for controlled cognitive processes in utilitarian
moral judgements. For instance, in a study of Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, and
Cohen (2008), in which cognitive load was manipulated, the proportion of deontological
compared to utilitarian responses increased only for personal dilemmas under high load
conditions. The same pattern was found, when using a task where participants had time
pressure for their decisions, suggesting that controlled rational processing has less impact
for fast responses (Suter & Hertwig, 2011).
A dual-process theory of moral judgement seems plausible based on Greene and col-
leagues’ data (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). Nevertheless, this theory and the pre-
sumed impact of emotions on moral judgement has been criticised for theoretical and
material-specific reasons (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014; Schaich Borg,
Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Ka-
hane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015; McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, & Macken-
zie, 2009). First, the theoretical foundation of the utilitarian and deontological principle
suffers an important drawback (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). In Greene et al.’s study
participants had to select one principle by rejecting the other one. This is only accept-
able if they are inversely related. Conway and Gawronski (2013) argue that everyone has
both a utilitarian and a deontological inclination which are independent dimensions and
differ in their dominance, i.e., the influential strength could be balanced or unbalanced. If
dominance differs, participants’ responses could be attributed to an increase of one incli-
nation, although it might reflect a decrease of the other one, or both are equally increased
or decreased. The authors propose that variations in moral judgements are attributed to
variations in the strength of a single moral inclination. Second, from the perspective of
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language comprehension research, it is necessary to take a closer look at the moral dilem-
mas that have been used in Greene’s studies. This will be discussed in more detail later
(cf. Section 1.2.2).
In summary, Haidt’s SIM and Greene’s dual-process theory both assume an important
role of emotions in moral judgements but the two theories differ with regard to the time
point and the circumstances under which emotions become relevant. For Haidt, moral
intuitions are grounded in emotions, form our moral judgements, and always precede cog-
nitive processing, whereas for Greene emotions influence moral judgements mainly when
the moral content is emotionally salient. At present, the role emotions play in moral
judgement is still debated as will be briefly outlined in the following section.
1.2.1 The role of emotions in moral cognition
Evidence such as those provided by Haidt (2001) and Greene et al. (2001) supports the
notion that emotions are involved in moral judgements. Their exact function, extent, and
specificity is still in the focus of ongoing scientific research.
Regarding specificity, predominately negative emotions are repeatedly reported when
participants observe a moral transgression. For instance, it is assumed that anger, con-
tempt, or disgust are felt if someone else did something bad (Chen & Bargh, 1999) and
self-referred emotions like shame and guilt are felt if I did something bad myself (Haidt et
al., 2003). In general, it is emotionally arousing to violate social and moral rules (Prinz,
2006). Concerning the actual emotions triggered by Greene’s moral dilemmas, the off-line
rating study of Choe and Min (2011) yielded important results. They examined emotions
evoked by Greene et al.’s (2001) personal dilemmas by asking participants to report the ma-
jor emotion felt during their judgement. Guilt was reported most frequently (about 50%),
followed by sadness, disgust, anger, empathy, and anxiety. This was supported by a rating
study of Kunkel (unpublished) which found guilt (17.9%), anger (16.3%) and contempt
(16.1%) as most frequently reported emotions for both personal and impersonal moral
dilemmas. Disgust seems to be an important emotion in moral judgement (Rozin, 2008).
Recent behavioural studies illustrated that disgust feelings induced by different methods
(olfactory, visual, imaginative) increases the severity of moral judgements (Schnall, Haidt,
Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Ugazio, Lamm, & Singer, 2012; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005).
Avramova and Inbar (2013) critically evaluate three claims regarding the function and
the extent of emotions within moral information processing. The first function assumes an
epiphenomenogical role of emotions that are only the consequence of a moral judgement.
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Under this assumption, the controlled and cognitive evaluation of someone’s behaviour
is followed by an emotional response. Thus, the emotional response is a by-product and
does not influence the moral judgement in any way. This is in contrast to the second
claim that proposes a causal role of emotions (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Pasto¨tter
et al., 2013; Schnall et al., 2008; Ugazio et al., 2012). Accordingly, an affective response
is triggered while moral information is processed, hence preceding and determining the
moral judgement. The third claim discusses the moderating role of emotions on moral
information processing. An individual’s moral judgement varies depending on the current
emotional state, even if emotions are of the same valence (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp,
2009; Polman & Ruttan, 2012; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). The idea is that different emo-
tional states evoke opposing motivational tendencies which influnece moral judgements, for
example feelings of anger are taken to motivate approach tendencies and to decrease the
severity of moral judgements, whereas feelings of disgust are assumed to trigger withdrawal
tendencies and to increase the severity (Ugazio et al., 2012).
There are different accounts that consider emotional and cognitive processing in general.
The affective primacy assumption proposes a dominance of emotional over cognitive pro-
cesses (Zajonc, 1984). Emotional stimuli have a facilitated and prioritised access, avoiding
extensive and effortful cognitive processing. This is based on the assumption that emotions
of different valence differentially relate to the brains’ motivational appetitive/approach and
aversive/avoidance systems (Bradley & Lang, 2000). In an evolutionary context, the affec-
tive motivational system evolved to ensure the survival of organisms by quickly identifying
negative or dangerous situations that threaten their lives. Even today, negative stimuli
are known to capture our attention (Hajcak, MacNamara, Foti, Ferri, & Keil, 2013; for a
review see Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010) and to be processed faster (Ito, Larsen,
Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998).
The more recent affect-as-information hypothesis of Clore and colleagues (2001; Clore
& Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; see also Clore et al., 2001; Pasto¨tter et al., 2013; Schnall et al.,
2008; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) proposes that an emotional response, which is experienced
as a reaction to what is being judged, serves as information during the decision process
and shapes our judgement. More precisely, the momentary affective state directs one’s
attention to what is a plausible cause for our current feelings and is used as information to
evaluate an object. Moreover, it is assumed that emotions of different valence are linked
to particular cognitive styles; a positive affect tends to reinforce relational processing like
cognitive, interpretive, category-level and global processing, whereas negative emotions
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inhibit this tendency and lead to referential processing like perceptual, item-level, and
local processing (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 2009). This hypothesis is in line with the
causal and moderating role discussed by Avramova and Inbar (2013).
However, other approaches assume that the primacy of affect does not hold universally
(e.g., Lai et al., 2012). According to Lai and colleagues, the primacy of either affective or
cognitive processing of the same stimulus varies depending on the global context in which
they occur and neither on the stimulus per se nor on the task participants perform. The
primacy of affect is only given if a stimulus is presented within an affective context.
1.2.2 Criticism of Greene’s moral dilemmas
From the perspective of language comprehension, it is necessary not to forget the limita-
tions of the moral dilemmas that have frequently been used in other studies, but have never
been validated or tested in regard to their material specific effects. McGuire and colleagues
(2009) reanalysed Greene’s data by repeating their analysis after removing nine items that
have a very low percentage of subjects judging the behaviour to be appropriate. They
performed two additional analyses where items instead of subjects were taken as random
factor, first, with all and, second, without these nine“bad” items. An analysis with items
as random factor reveals whether an effect is based on the experimental manipulation or
rather driven by specific items and hence item specific aspects. McGuire et al.’s results
show that the important interaction between dilemma type (personal versus impersonal)
and response (appropriate versus inappropriate), which was found in the subject analysis
with all items, was absent in the same analysis without the“bad” items. Furthermore,
all effects of the by-subject analysis were absent in both item analyses. Based on these
results, it appears that response time findings of Greene et al. (2001) are driven by just a
few particular dilemmas with extremely fast inappropriate responses to personal dilemmas
(McGuire et al., 2009).
Schaich Borg et al. (2006) criticised the language used in personal versus impersonal
dilemmas. Personal dilemmas are described using a more emotive and colourful language
and often reference to family members or friends, both as confounding factors explain-
ing greater emotional activation. Also Bauman et al. (2014) doubt the generalisation of
results, which emerge from sacrificial moral dilemmas, since they are unrealistic and unrep-
resentative. The authors further criticise the poor plausibility of the dilemmas which are
more amusing than shocking. Hence, they do not elicit the same psychological processes
as other moral situations would do. Moreover, Kahane et al. (2015) assumed that ordinary
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responses to sacrificial dilemmas tell us little about moral judgement behaviour because
of the assumption that dilemmas are too complex, far-fetched, and convoluted.
Greene accepted the criticism regarding his text stimuli (Greene, 2009) which were
frequently used by researchers in this field. Current studies use standardised, revised, and
newly constructed moral dilemmas with lists of factors that are controlled for including
intentionality, involvement of family members, or the number of harmed people among
others (cf., Christensen, Flexas, Calabrese, Gut, & Gomila, 2014; Kahane et al., 2012;
Lotto, Manfrinati, & Sarlo, 2014).
It is obvious that moral research typically involves quite complex text materials. Nev-
ertheless, from the perspective of language processing research, the limitations of text
materials can ideally be overcome if word- or sentence-based effects are minimised. Mate-
rials need to be very well constructed and controlled by some important linguistic aspects
including an extensive description of target words (i.e., word class, word length, number
of syllables). Moreover, rating studies should be used to reveal the characteristics of ma-
terials with regard to cloze probability and plausibility, and also the semantic relatedness
of target words in relation to a given context or sentence should be analysed. It is also
important to have valid morality as well as valence and arousal ratings for each item.
2 Emotional language comprehension
As outlined earlier, moral research typically involves the presentation of complex text stim-
uli including an agent, a social situation, and a potential moral conflict. To get an idea
about the implicit mechanisms during discourse comprehension of moral text stimuli, it
appears promising to use a language comprehension approach. A typical research question
would be, how and when exactly individuals have processed the meaning of (im-)moral
content during the reading process. There are many theories about how language is pro-
cessed and understood. It is not the intention of the present thesis to go into detail of
the various language comprehension models (e.g., Van Dijk, Kintsch, & Van Dijk, 1983;
Gernsbacher, 2013). In the following section, I will give a brief overview of underlying
theories in order to understand the assumptions of the present studies.
According to the construction-integration model of Kintsch (1988) a text is interpreted
at three distinct levels of mental representations. The least abstract representation is a
mere phrase structure that captures the exact wording of the original text and is the so-
called surface model. For the next level of abstraction, the surface model is converted into a
mental representation that describes the text in propositions. A proposition is a predicate
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with its arguments, forming the basic unit of meaning that can be assigned a truth value
and which is linked to other propositions (Kintsch, 1974). For example, the meaning of
the sentence “The cat sits under the table.” would be represented by the proposition with
the following form: sit [cat, table, under]. Propositional representations form the so-called
text-base which also includes information that is not explicitly mentioned in the text but
inferred from it. At the last level, propositions will be integrated into a situation model
that describes the ideas that the text is about. It is generally assumed that comprehenders
encode various text dimensions such as time, space, causation, as well as the intentions
and emotions of story characters in these situation models (e.g., Kintsch, 1988; Zwaan
& Radvansky, 1998). Situation models provide a coherent mental representation of the
people, objects, and events being described in the text. For example, emotional states of
the described characters as well as anticipated future events or consequences are inferred
from the situation model while reading or listening.
That the meaning of conversations and texts is given by propositional structures that
could be combined to form higher-order complexes is a very abstract and disembodied
view of language comprehension (Gibbs, 2003). In contrast to the symbolic cognitive
model described above, recently, simulation models of language comprehension suggest
that linguistic meaning is related to real-world referents (for a review, see Barsalou, 2010).
This view emphasises the importance of perception and action in people’s understanding
of linguistic meaning. Comprehension involves reactivation of experienced-based, mental
representations which are grounded in perception and action. In contrast to the idea that
text comprehension involves the representation of amodal propositions, simulation mod-
els assume a key role of different modal, experience-based representations (e.g., motor,
sensory). Therefore, reading a word is not only accompanied by an activation of lexi-
cal, grammatical, or phonological representations but also by emotional and perceptual
represenations which are based on previous experiences (Zwaan, 2004).
Language provides a set of cues, which the reader integrates and uses to construct a
coherent mental representation and simulation of the described situation. It is assumed
that in discourse processing, different types of constraints, such as phonology, semantics,
and syntax are very quickly taken into consideration during listening and reading (Hagoort,
2003; Hagoort, Brown, & Osterhout, 1999). The activation of previous experiences helps
the reader to quickly comprehend linguistic input, for instance, when the processing of
incoming emotional information activates a previously experienced emotional feeling.
In the following section, I will describe studies using various psychophysiological mea-
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sures that investigated brain and embodied processing of emotional linguistic input. Sub-
sequently, I will describe a new set of text materials which is used for the present doctoral
thesis to overcome the limitations with previously used text materials (cf. Section 1.2.2).
2.1 Emotional language comprehension at the level of brain processes
fMRI is ideally suited to identify the brain regions involved in emotional comprehension
(e.g., Greene et al., 2001) because this method provides high spatial resolution. Due to
its relatively low temporal resolution, however, fMRI is not appropriate for the purpose of
identifying the millisecond by millisecond timing of mental processes. For instance, Greene
et al. (2001) assumed that automatic emotional processes are involved in moral judgements.
Based on their fMRI data, their precise timing, that is whether these automatic processes
precede or follow the moral decision, could not be clarified. It turns out that other methods
are needed to measure the nature and timing of mental processes triggered by incoming
moral information.
In contrast to fMRI, the electroencephalogram (EEG) is a direct and non-invasive mea-
sure of neural activity. The EEG has a high temporal resolution, although at the expanse
of a limited spatial resolution (Bartholow & Amodio, 2009; Amodio, Bartholow, & Ito,
2013; Luck, 2014). It represents the summation of post-synaptic potentials from popula-
tions of synchronously active neurons, that is, mainly pyramidal cells of the cortex. These
summated potentials form an electrical field which is strong enough to be measured with
electrodes placed on the surface of the scalp. The event-related brain potential (ERP)
reflects the neural activity associated with the processing of a specific event like the pre-
sentation of a stimulus, a mental event, or a response. The ERP waveform is a voltage
by time function and is characterised by a series of peaks and troughs. These individual
deflections differ with regard to their polarity, latency, and distribution at the scalp. Cru-
cially, individual deflections are modulated by experimental manipulations which allows to
distinguish them with regard to this functional significance of the ERP. That is, individual
ERP deflections can be related to theoretical components which are characterised in differ-
ent ways. There are three major classes of ERP components: exogenous, endogenous, and
motor components (Luck, 2014). Motor ERP components accompany the preparation and
execution of a motor response. Exogenous components are triggered by the presentation of
a stimulus and reflect automatic and obligatory sensory processes which can be modulated
by top-down processes (e.g., selective attention). Endogenous components reflect cognitive
processes and mechanisms which are task-dependent. Usually, they have a longer latency
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than exogenous components, occurring typically 200-300 ms after stimulus onset.
A number of ERP studies investigated brain processes underlying emotional language
comprehension (for a reviews see Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNa-
mara, & Foti, 2012). In the following, I briefly summarise relevant ERP findings in this
research area. The N400 is a language-related component which was firstly described
by Kutas and Hillyard (1980). The N400 amplitude has been shown to respond to the
predictability of a word within a given constraining context. Kutas and Hillyard (1980)
presented sentences that were either correct (e.g., “I take coffee with cream and sugar.”)
or violated a semantic expectancy (e.g., “I take coffee with cream and socks.”). They used
the rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of individual words to present the critical sen-
tences. That is, by presenting the sentence word by word, participants were controlled in
their reading time. Importantly, the RSVP procedure allowed to time-lock the ERP to the
critical word (sugar/socks), thereby capturing the brain’s on-line responses to the semantic
match versus violation. The ERP results showed that after presenting the critical word,
there was a negative deflection over centro-parietal regions peaking after 400 ms. The
N400 was larger for the word socks than sugar, which is the semantically inappropriate
word in the given context.
This N400 effect reflects the anomaly in semantic processing at the sentence level, for
example the eliciting word mismatches the meaning of the sentence context (Kutas &
Hillyard, 1980; Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, & Murre, 2009). Moreover,
later studies found that world knowledge violations also produce a larger N400 than in-
formation consistent with world knowledge (e.g., Filik & Leuthold, 2008; Hagoort, Hald,
Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004; Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 2015). Based on
such findings, it is generally assumed that the N400 reflects the processing cost of mean-
ing construction or the reprocessing of anomalous information (Brown & Hagoort, 1993;
Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992; for a review see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). The worse the
semantic fit between a word and its context, the more enhanced is the amplitude of the
N400 (Osterhout, 1997).
Other studies have shown that the N400 is not only found for semantic anomalies but also
when discourse-level expectancies are violated (Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999).
As concerns emotional discourse comprehension, Leo´n, Dı´az, de Vega, and Herna´ndez
(2010) presented emotional stories describing a protagonist in an emotional situation (e.g.,
a young writer, who was going to the premiere of his first theatre play, and the next
day, critics write that he might be a new theatre talent), followed by a target sentence
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(“Today Hector felt totally fulfilled/failure.”). The emotion implied by the target sentence
was either consistent or inconsistent with the preceding context. The results showed,
that inconsistent target sentences elicited a larger N400. Leuthold, Filik, Murphy, and
Mackenzie (2012) used scenarios where a context describes an agent in a social situation
(e.g., doctor-patient interaction) that was followed by a target sentence ending with the
agent’s socio-emotional response. The described response either matched or mismatched
what one might typically expect from the given situation. In contrast to Leo´n et al.
(2010), the critical word was identical and only the context varied between the conditions.
Hence, resulting ERP effects could be attributed to discourse-based processing, ruling
out an explanation in terms of word-based emotional effects. The results indicated that
when the critical word mismatched the participant’s expected feelings, again, a larger
N400 was elicited. Therefore, according to Leuthold et al. (2015) the emotional salience
of an identical word can modulate the process of meaning construction depending on the
discourse context.
Another ERP component is the P300, which is a positive-going, parietally distributed
ERP component peaking at about 300 ms or later after stimulus presentation. It is elicited
by unpredictable, infrequent changes in stimuli, for example, when presenting tones that
differ with regard to pitch and loudness as compared to a series of standard tones (Squires,
Squires, & Hillyard, 1975). Importantly, for present purposes, Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson,
and Coles (1993) described a P300-like positivity with a longer latency than typically
reported in P300 research, which they named late positive potential (LPP). Cacioppo and
colleagues took this component to indicate a categorisation process which was associated
with an evaluatively inconsistent stimulus in a sequence of stimuli of opposing valence
(e.g., a negative stimulus embedded in positive stimuli). This LPP effect was also found
for emotional pictorial stimuli with a larger amplitude for negative affect (Cacioppo et al.,
1993; Crites, Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1995; Crites et al., 1995).
Also, the LPP has been repeatedly reported in response to emotional words, sentences,
and texts (for a review see Citron, 2012). The LPP amplitude has been found to be
sensitively modulated by various variables, including arousal which reflects the strength of
emotional content (extremity, intensity), valence (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Holt, Lynn, &
Kuperberg, 2009; Ito et al., 1998), discourse context (Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013;
Fields & Kuperberg, 2016) and task demands (Gable, Adams, & Proudfit, 2015). For
instance, it was found in explicit and implicit categorisation tasks (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000)
as well as in a pure reading task when no affective judgement was demanded (Leuthold
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et al., 2015). The LPP has been also found to be sensitive to evaluative inconsistencies
(Herring, Taylor, White, & Crites Jr, 2011). For instance, Holt et al. (2009) presented
two-sentence scenarios, where the critical word was either negative, positive, or neutral,
within a nonconstraining context (e.g., “Nancy’s son ended up just like his father. He
was already a husband/millionaire/criminal by age 25.”). The results showed no N400
effects, indicating the absence of semantic processing difficulties, but instead an LPP
amplitude which was positively correlated with items’ arousal and valence ratings. Hence,
the authors assume that the LPP reflects physiological arousal induced during affective
language processing of emotional content.
Extending Holt et al. (2009), Delaney-Busch and Kuperberg (2013) compared the effects
of valence congruity of emotional words with the effects of semantic congruity of neutral
words to a given constraining context. They presented two-sentence scenarios like “Colin
saw a stunning/horrifying object on the ground. He realised it was a snake/diamond right
away.”, for the emotion condition, and “Colin saw a small object on the ground. He realised
it was a button/giraffe right away.”, for the semantic condition. Like in other studies,
emotion-congruent compared to incongruent conditions elicited an N400 if a neutral rather
than an emotional context preceded the target sentence. A novel finding in this study was
that for emotional words the N400 was followed by an LPP which was not modulated by
discourse congruity. According to the authors, the LPP indicated the emotional salience
(to arousal and valence) of incoming emotional words while reading the scenarios. Overall,
the LPP indicates an evaluation of incoming stimuli, which apparently depends on affective
aspects.
In sum, ERPs measure the temporal dynamics of mental activity, therefore, it is a
straightforward method to infer the precise time course of hidden mental mechanisms un-
derlying the processing of incoming information. Most of the ERP studies of emotional
language comprehension employed materials for which an emotional critical word of a
target sentence differed across emotional discourse contexts (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Ku-
perberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009; Leo´n et al., 2010). Hence, the N400 varies with the degree
of discourse-level expectations and is taken to indicate cognitive processing of incoming
linguistic information. In contrast, the LPP varies with arousal and valence ratings of
either the whole text stimulus or single target words and is therefore taken to indicate
affective processing. With regard to the objectives of the present doctoral thesis, the
question then is, whether incoming moral information elicits the same general processes in
participants’ brains as emotional information does or whether there is a domain-specific
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activation pattern.
2.2 Emotional language comprehension at the level of peripheral
measures
Damasio (1994) stated that repeated experiences in the world can trigger emotional re-
sponses of the brain that involve bodily changes and feelings which occur whenever a
similar situation arises. Imagine, you are walking along the sidewalk and step into a pile
of dog poop. You try to clean your shoe with a tissue. You see the colour, the consistence,
you smell it, and you might feel disgusted. The different modality-specific representations
of this experience will be stored in the brain. The next time you walk along a sidewalk you
probably prioritised your attention to brown spots on the ground. If you see dog poop,
you will quickly access the stored multimodal representation which in turn will increase
processing speed in the current situation. The interpretation would be “That’s disgust-
ing”, and your leg muscles will be innervated to immediately step aside. Moreover, only
thinking about excrements may reactivate the same representation of disgust. So, the as-
sociated knowledge will be activated (brain) and simulated (body), even if the particular
entity is not present, for example thinking of disgusting things involves the re-experiencing
of neural states that occurred when one felt that emotion before.
Peripheral psychophysiological methods like measuring heart rate, skin conductance
responses and muscle activity are straightforward measures to identify these embodied ef-
fects. Phasic electrodermal activity (EDA) provides an index of sympathetic arousal of the
underlying sudomotor nerve activity (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). Changes in heart
rate are an index of changes in the balance between sympathetic and parasympathetic
influences on the emotional state, indicating individual differences in regulated emotional
responding (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Facial EMG reveals involuntary facial muscle
movements, which are related to the expression and hence simultion of specific emotions
(Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). More specif-
ically, fEMG activity from the levator labii superioris muscle (wrinkling) and corrugator
supercilii muscle (frowning) is taken to indicate negative affect (disgust, anger), whereas
zygomaticus major (smiling) activity indicates positive affect (e.g., Larsen, Norris, & Ca-
cioppo, 2003; Tan et al., 2012).
Embodied simulation accounts of language processing also postulate an important role
of embodied processing in the understanding of words, phrases, and texts (Barsalou, 1999;
Glenberg & Robertson, 1999; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski,
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Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010; Niedenthal et al., 2009). Studies concerned with language
comprehension show that emotional information processing involves the automatic and
unconscious reactivation and simulation of already experienced, and implied emotions
which are relevant to the particular present emotional meaning (Niedenthal, 2007). The
knowledge of a specific emotion is assumed to be grounded in ordinary past experiences
involving different modalities (sensory, motori, affective) (Niedenthal et al., 2009). Past
experiences influence attention, processing speed, and the interpretation of incoming emo-
tional meaning. This assumption fits very well with research in social psychology on the
affect-as-information hypothesis of Clore et al. (2001). More precisely, the activated affec-
tive state directs one’s attention, shapes perceptions, and serves as information in language
comprehension.
Nevertheless, the exact role of embodied simulation during language comprehension is
still unclear (Barsalou, 1999; Filik, Hunter, & Leuthold, 2015; Glenberg & Robertson,
1999; Gibbs, 2003; Havas et al., 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2009 Glenberg, Webster, Mouilso,
Havas, & Lindeman, 2009 for a review). There are a number of studies that measured
embodiment in the processing of emotional words and sentences. For instance, embodied
effects were showen for isolated emotional words (Niedenthal et al., 2009). Niedenthal and
colleagues presented negative (e.g., murder, vomit) and positive (e.g., smile, sun) target
words eliciting anger, disgust and joy. Participants either indicated whether the word was
written in capital or small letters or whether it was associated with an emotion. Only in
the emotion-focused task, embodied responses of facial muscles were observed. Moreover,
if the ability of activating corresponding muscles was inhibited, accuracy in judgements
suffered. However, Niedenthal and colleagues (2009) suggested that embodied simulation
of emotions is involved in the processing of emotional laden words but only if the task
demands their affective evaluation.
With regard to discourse comprehension, behavioural studies demonstrated embodied
effects for sentences with emotional content (Havas et al., 2007, 2010). Havas et al. (2007)
presented sentences describing emotionally laden events (e.g., “The police car rapidly pulls
up behind you, siren blaring.”) or target words (e.g., embrace, exam) and measured re-
sponse time in a lexical decision task. They manipulated emotional states with a procedure
developed by Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) in which participants hold a pen in the
mouth to produce either a smile (holding the pen using only the teeth) or a frown or
pout (holding the pen using only the lips and not the teeth). It was only for sentences
only that emotion simulation influenced the response time of participants. The authors
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assumed that emotion simulation during language comprehension appears only at the level
of phrases or sentences and not as a general lexical-level phenomenon. By using fEMG,
Havas et al. (2010) demonstrated that involuntary facial expressions facilitate the process-
ing of emotional language. They presented sentences with angry, sad, and happy content
(e.g., “You hold back your tears as you enter the funeral home.” for a sad sentence) in
a reading-for-comprehension task and measured participants reading time. They inhib-
ited activation of the corrugator by injecting botulinum toxin-A (a neurotoxin that causes
temporary muscular denervation). Results showed that the inhibition of muscle activ-
ity necessary for expressing the negative emotion evoked by the sentences slowed reading
time. This provides evidence for a causal role of embodied emotions in the processing of
emotional language.
Most of the studies examined embodied processing by using affective-laden target words.
To my knowledge, only one study so far investigated embodied processing in discourse com-
prehension. The study of Thompson, Mackenzie, Leuthold, and Filik (2016) investigated
the influence of context on emotion simulation when participants read scenarios with ironic
content. They presented short scenarios like “Susie texted Linda to say that she hadn’t
been to the gym at all that week. Linda texted her back to say: You’re so motivated.”
while recording fEMG and EDA. They found evidence for reduced frowning (corrugator
activity) and enhanced smiling (zygomaticus activity) for ironic compared to literal crit-
icism, but enhanced frowning and reduced smiling for ironic compared to literal praise,
suggesting that irony weakens the emotional impact of language input.
Together, evidence supports the assumption that emotion simulation facilitates emo-
tional language comprehension. Psychophysiological methods are also suited to test as-
sumption whether emotional information processing involves embodied representations of
language comprehension. There is less evidence whether emotion simulation takes place
in discourse comprehension of emotional scenarios and whether this is dependent on the
task like for words (Niedenthal et al., 2009).
2.3 Moral language comprehension
In the last decade, morally loaded language processing has been taken as a special case of
emotional language processing (Van Berkum et al., 2009). In the following section, I will
illustrate how ERPs and peripheral psychophysiological methods were used to investigate
moral language processing and which questions have not yet been answered.
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2.3.1 Event-related brain potentials
So far, only a few ERP studies investigated the neural mechanisms of moral cognition in an
attempt to establish the time course of moral information processing. Chen, Qiu, Li, and
Zhang (2009), for instance, were to my knowledge the first to investigate neural correlates
associated with processing of moral dilemmas. Approximately one month after the Sichuan
earthquake in 2008 they invited volunteers who have experienced it. They presented two
kinds of word pairs consisting either of relatives (e.g., father-mother, sister-brother), or of
strangers (stranger A-stranger B). Participants were asked to choose as quickly as possible
between one of the two persons which to rescue from the earthquake. After half of the
blocks participants were informed by the experimenter that there would be an aftershock
after a few hours. When choosing between relatives rather than between strangers, the
results showed a larger P2 amplitude for relatives compared to strangers. According to
the authors, this indicates conflict detection during early stimulus evaluation (Chen et al.,
2009). Furthermore, only after hearing the aftershock warning, a larger positivity between
350 and 450 ms and a longer reaction time was found in connection to the choice between
relatives as opposed to strangers. The authors related this late positivity to the P300
component and suggested that when making decisions, for example, between mother and
father a stronger dilemma conflict affects the resolution processes indicated by the larger
P300. In my view, stronger emotional arousal would be an alternative interpretation of
Chen et al.’s P300 results because the participant’s relation to the victim described in
the dilemma influences the emotional impact of the situation (Schaich Borg et al., 2006;
Christensen et al., 2014).
Similarly, Sarlo et al. (2012) used moral dilemmas adapted from Greene et al. (2001)
and Cushman, Young, and Hauser (2006) and measured the temporal dynamics of emo-
tional and cognitive processing in participants’ decisions. The moral dilemmas were cat-
egorised into two types of dilemmas depending on the agent’s intention to harm another
person. The first category included dilemmas for which the death of one or more persons
was instrumentally used to save the lives of many others. For the second category, the
death of one or more persons was a foreseen but unintended, incidental side effect of the
agent’s action. After presenting the dilemma scenarios, two action options were presented
successively on different screens: one in which the main character let the people die (non-
utilitarian); and another one in which the main character kills one individual to save these
people (utilitarian). On the following screen, participants were asked to choose a utili-
tarian or non-utilitarian option while decision time was limited. ERPs were time-locked
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to the decision screen. ERP results showed, first, that instrumental dilemmas elicited a
larger positivity over anterior electrodes (P260) than incidental dilemmas, whereas a later
posterior positivity slow wave between 600 and 750 ms was larger for incidental rather
than for instrumental dilemmas. Sarlo et al. (2012) suggested that the late positive slow
wave reflects the allocation of attentional resources and working memory load. Second, self
reported emotional experience indicated that incidental dilemmas were perceived as less
unpleasant than instrumental dilemmas. According to the authors, this suggests that the
decision for incidental dilemmas seems to require more cognitive effort for a cost-benefit
computation and appears to be unrelated to emotional activation, because there is no
correlation between slow wave amplitudes and affective ratings. In contrast, the correla-
tion analysis showed that cognitive processing of instrumental dilemmas is modulated by
emotional intensity, indicated by a larger P260 amplitude. It is important to note, that
arousal ratings did not differ between the two types of dilemmas, but correlated positively
with the LPP amplitude across all dilemmas.
The studies of Chen et al. (2009) and Sarlo et al. (2012) do not give satisfiable evidence
for affective processes involved in moral judgement. In my view, this resulted from an
inappropriate interpretation of the late positivity observed in both studies. There is an
alternative interpretation for the late positivity in terms of arousal differences of materi-
als that are reflected in ERPs. Unfortunately, the authors do not report the emotional
characteristics of materials (cf. arousal and valence rating)
A key ERP study for the present thesis is that of Van Berkum and colleagues (2009) be-
cause they used a language comprehension approach to examine moral information process-
ing. Especially, they examined whether and when individual values influence the linguistic
analysis of meaning. Participants were selected from members of two political parties with
opposing value systems (Christians vs. non-Christians). They were asked to rate their
agreement to critical statements like “I think euthanasia is an unacceptable/acceptable
course of action.” with the critical word acceptable being consistent to non-Christians and
inconsistent to Christians, and vice versa for the critical word unacceptable. Van Berkum et
al. (2009) used the RSVP paradigm described earlier. They found that value-inconsistent
words initially elicited a larger, broadly distributed positivity between 200 and 250 ms
(P200), followed by a standard centroparietal negativity peaking at 400 ms (N400), and
finally a broadly centroparietally distributed late positivity (LPP) between 500 and 650
ms, peaking approximately 600 ms after stimulus onset.
Van Berkum and colleagues interpreted their P200 findings to indicate the affective
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salience of the value-based critical word which leads to its enhanced semantic analysis.
Moreover, they took the N400 findings to indicate that readers immediately and automat-
ically evaluate incoming information with respect to their personally held values, giving
rise to rapid, valence-based influences on meaning construction. They further speculated
that this N400 effect cancels a single sustained LPP effect with an earlier onset than the
N400, therefore emerging as a larger P200 and LPP for value-inconsistent than value-
consistent statements, an ERP signature they take to reflect the activation of the affect
system.
Van Berkum et al.’s study has two major limitations. First, the statements were only
usable in order to test members of two political parties of opposing value systems rather
than general held moral values. Second, they used explicit moral topics (e.g., euthanasia,
abortion, divorce), which are highly dependent on personally held moral values. This
constrains participants’ (implicit) expectations regarding the likely sentence endings. The
critical word in value-inconsistent conditions is less expected and, hence elicits a larger
N400 than the value-consistent word. Therefore, Van Berkum et al.’s interpretation of the
N400 effect is questionable, because it may reflect a consistency effect regarding highly
expected critical words rather than the immediate and automatic evaluation of incoming
information with respect to the personally held values.
In conclusion, despite the potential limitations of previous ERP studies, the record-
ing and analysis of ERPs is perfectly suited to produce insights in the time course and
mechanisms underlying moral judgements. That is, ERPs give access to covert processes
at different levels, which manifest themselves in distinct ERP components reflecting, for
example, the attentive processing of incoming information (P200), the construction of
meaning (N400), and the implicit affective evaluation of input (LPP).
2.3.2 Embodied cognition
With regard to the potential impact of affective simulations during the processing of moral
information, less is known about embodied responses in moral cognition. Recent studies
mostly induced specific emotions rather than measuring embodied responses triggered by
moral information and they used only behavioural methods. Hence, these studies provide
only indirect evidence and do not allow making assumptions about the precise time course
of embodied responses (e.g., Schnall et al., 2008; Ugazio et al., 2012; Wheatley & Haidt,
2005).
Cannon, Schnall, and White (2011) were the first to investigate embodiment by using
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peripheral psychophysiological measures in response to short audible statements describ-
ing either moral or immoral actions. The moral content of statements varied as defined
by the moral foundation theory of Haidt and Joseph (2007). Participants were asked to
listen to the statements and make a moral judgement (“How negative or positive was this
behaviour?”), while the fEMG of three muscles was recorded. fEMG results varied depend-
ing on the moral foundation, which let the authors conclude that the muscle activation
depends on the specific emotional response elicited by a given statement. Stronger levator
activation (nose wrinkling) was found with statements describing purity and fairness trans-
gressions indicating disgust, whereas harm statements elicited stronger corrugator activity
(frowning) indicating anger. For authority and ingroup transgressions, the fEMG activity
was not modulated by valence. Together, the authors related both increased levator and
corrugator muscle activity to the processing of moral transgressions. Their data suggest
that although spontaneous facial affect predicted the extremity of moral judgements, there
was no unique pattern of fEMG activity in relation to specific moral foundations (Cannon
et al., 2011).
Recently, Krumhuber, Tsankova, and Kappas (2018) presented socio-cultural norm vi-
gnettes describing, for example, hygiene, gender equality, or personal space violations. The
vignettes described the action of an agent in situations where he acted against or outside
of a social/cultural norm. Krumhuber and colleagues measured fEMG at two time points:
when participants read the vignettes and when participants imagine that they were the
recipients of the agent’s action. Only the levator muscle was sensitive to violations com-
pared to neutral vignettes during both reading and imaging. The authors assumed that
their results are in line with the assumption that the feeling of disgust is highly correlated
with moral violations. Therefore, they suggested that socio-cultural violations involve a
moral component.
Despite this evidence for embodied effects elicited by moral or socio-cultural content, it
remains to be investigated whether written moral information is immediately affectively
evaluated during reading. Moreover, it is still unclear whether moral information process-
ing requires domain-specific mechanisms or whether it is processed in the same way as
emotional content.
2.4 Interim summary
Theories of moral cognition suggest an important role of emotions in moral judgement.
Researchers aim to disclose the occurrence and precise time course of cognitive and affective
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processes. So far, however, there is no convincing evidence that emotions matter during
moral information processing. Reasons for this are that previous research used unrealistic
dilemma situations, differing emotional target words, or constraining contexts that describe
explicit emotional states. Crucially, it is still unclear whether everyday moral text materials
trigger emotional processes and whether moral judgements are simply a special case of
domain-general cognitive processes.
A language comprehension approach appears useful to shed light on some of these open
research questions, especially when combined with an on-line measurement of the process-
ing of moral and emotional content. To this end, psychophysiological and measures with
high temporal resolution, such as ERPs and fEMG promise to allow inferences about the
precise time course of unconscious mechanisms underlying moral cognition. With regard
to ERPs, there are two components that have been related to different mental processes
during comprehension: the N400 indicating cognitive-semantic processing and the LPP
indicating affective processing. With regard to peripheral psychophysiological measures,
there are only a few studies on affective simulation during on-line moral and emotional
language processing.
3 The processing of moral transgressions: Investigating the
role of affective evaluations using everyday scenarios
It is the goal of the present doctoral thesis to investigate the time course of affective
processing in discourse comprehension using newly constructed morality and emotion ma-
terials and different psychophysiological methods. In the following section, I will describe
first the text materials, the methods, and finally the exact research questions.
3.1 New moral stimuli
The text materials of previous studies concerned with moral processing (e.g., moral dilem-
mas of Greene et al., 2001) are not suitable when adopting a language comprehension
approach, as used in the present work. This is because dilemma materials were not con-
structed in such a way as to control for important linguistic aspects in order to minimise
material-specific effects. Often, the materials lacked for an extensive description of their
linguistic characteristics (i.e., word class, word length, cloze probability/semantic relat-
edness of target words), and other descriptive ratings (plausibility, valence, arousal). To
overcome these limitations, first, materials need to be designed well and control for some
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Table 1
Example socio-normative and general world knowledge materials (critical word in
bold). (adapted from Leuthold et al., 2015)
Socio-Normative
Morally-acceptable
Context
Tinas Opa leidet an Krebs und wird bald sterben. Zu
seinem 85. Geburtstag hat er ein großes Fest geplant und
wu¨nscht sich vor allem, dass alle seine Kinder und Enkel
kommen. [Tina’s grandfather suffers from cancer and will
die soon. For his 85th Birthday he has planned a big party
and wishes nothing more than that all his children and
grandchildren attend.]
Morally-unacceptable
Context
Tinas Chef macht schon seit einer Weile eindeutige An-
spielungen. Nun hat er sie zu einem Essen in ein teures
Restaurant eingeladen. Sie weiß, dass er seit 20 Jahren
verheiratet ist und drei Kinder hat. [Tina’s boss has been
making explicit innuendos for some time. Now he has in-
vited her out for dinner to an expensive restaurant. She
knows that he has been married for 20 years and is the
father of three children.]
Target sentencea Sie hat die Einladung angenommen. [She has the invitation
accepted.]
World Knowledge
Knowledge-consistent
Context
Bei einem Frankreichaustausch isst Frau Lehmann eine
bekannte franzo¨sische Delikatesse. [During a France ex-
change Mrs. Lehmann eats a famous French speciality.]
Knowledge-inconsistent
Context
Frau Lehmann geht in ein schwa¨bisches Restaurant und
bestellt eine lokale Spezialita¨t. [Mrs. Lehmann goes to a
Schwabian Restaurant and orders a local speciality.]
Target sentencea Sie erha¨lt als Gericht einen Teller voller Schnecken und
Weißbrot. [She receives as dish a plate full of snails and
white bread.]
a Note that target sentences are translated word by word to indicate the position of the
critical word, hence disregarding the appropriate word order in English.
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important linguistic aspects. Furthermore, previous studies used procedures for which it
was unclear when on-line processes were triggered. For instance, ERPs were measured
during the decision phase (e.g., Sarlo et al., 2012) after reading, when automatic processes
could already be gone. Appropriate methods and task procedures are hence crucial to give
access to processes as they unfold in real time after their elicitation.
In a first study, Leuthold et al. (2015) addressed these aspects by using a language com-
prehension paradigm and word-by-word presentation of the critical target sentence. They
constructed a new set of moral materials describing single everyday moral transgressions
with an agent acting either morally or immorally (cf. Table 1). Assuming that the pro-
cessing of moral transgressions corresponds to that of world knowledge violations, they
expected an N400 for immoral than for moral behaviour. As a control and in order to test
the N400’s sensitivity regarding moral violations, they further constructed short scenarios
that describe either violations or matches of world knowledge (cf. Table 1). Both text
materials were constructed in a way that the meaning needed to be inferred while read-
ing. The moral meaning of identical target sentences, and hence identical critical words
(cf. Table 1), should be processed differently depending on the moderately constraining
contexts. That is, the ambiguous situation set up by the context was resolved by the final
critical sentence, which was presented using RSVP. Participants merely read the scenarios
for comprehension while ERPs were measured.
The ERP pattern for world knowledge violations compared to matches was similar to
that of Van Berkum et al. (2009), showing a larger P200, N400, and LPP amplitudes.
The larger P200 and N400 amplitudes for world knowledge violations were taken to re-
flect enhanced (perceptual) processing and increased demands for meaning construction,
respectively. In contrast, immoral as opposed to moral scenarios did not trigger an N400
effect but a larger positivity starting at already 320 ms after the critical word. Leuthold
et al. (2015) related this early ERP positivity to the LPP component reflecting an im-
plicit, affective evaluative categorisation process (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000; Van der Cruyssen,
Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos, & Van Overwalle, 2009). Crucially, this evaluative categorisa-
tion process is specifically engaged during the on-line processing of moral transgressions.
The ERP results of Leuthold et al. (2015) indicated that readers process incoming in-
formation of either world knowledge or moral transgressions differently. They provided
first evidence for discourse based effects during the processing of immoral as opposed to
moral scenarios. Still, the assumption that the LPP reflects an implicit, affective eval-
uative process during discourse comprehension would need to be further substantiated.
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One possibility to achieve this would be to investigate if a discourse-based emotional effect
indicated by the LPP is also apparent for emotional scenarios that are constructed in the
same way as moral scenarios.
3.2 Comparing moral and emotional information processing
For the present three studies, we were interested in how everyday moral transgressions
are processed. Leuthold et al.’s morality scenarios are suitable for our purpose and meet
the requirements regarding language comprehension research. These materials provide
examples of everyday moral situations rather than relatively unrealistic moral dilemmas.
I slightly modified them and added newly constructed short emotion scenarios which were
not related to any moral content. Looking at the rating data, valence for moral scenarios
was rated as neutral or even slightly positive. Therefore, neutral scenarios suited better
to compare them to moral scenarios than positive ones. Emotion scenarios were taken to
reliably indicate emotional processing like in previous text comprehension studies. That
is, using emotional-negative and neutral contexts, emotion-related processing differences
as indicated by the LPP were expected to critical words of the identical target sentences.
For both material sets, items are constructed in a way that moral and emotional content
must be inferred from the context. For a given item, the context varies between the re-
spective material-specific conditions followed by the identical target sentence. The critical
word of the target sentence is embedded in a meaningful context and disambiguates the
situation in a moral or immoral and neutral or negative way. Like previous studies, the
RSVP procedure for the critical sentence was used in the present studies (cf., Van Berkum
et al., 2009; Leuthold et al., 2015). Crucially, one major advantage of the present approach
is that resulting ERP effects reflect discourse-based influences on information processing
rather than influences related to the target word.
To study emotional processing and its response diversity, we followed the recommen-
dations of Bradley and Lang (2000) to use an exhaustive measurement and not a single
method. Consequently, we collected behavioural data (response time, explicit judgement
behaviour), used ERPs to produce insights in the mental mechanisms underlying moral
language comprehension as well as peripheral psychophysiological measures to indicate
autonomic arousal (ECG, EDA) and involuntary facial expressions (fEMG) to indicate
valence.
The main research questions are:
1. Does moral information undergo affective processing?
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2. Does moral content of incoming linguistic information trigger embodied processing?
3. Does moral information processing differ from the processing of emotional informa-
tion?
Study 1
The first study serves to investigate brain processes and the time-course of underlying ele-
mentary mechanisms and (affective) states when participants perform different judgement
tasks after reading the morality and emotion scenarios. In two experiments, participants
were asked to explicitly judge the moral acceptability of morality scenarios and the emo-
tionality of emotion scenarios (Experiment 1), or only the emotionality of both materials
(Experiment 2). Brain processes are measured by using ERPs. Based on the results of
Leuthold et al. (2015), in Study 1 it was assumed that moral acceptability will be inferred
from the context and involve the affective evaluation of linguistic input as indicated by the
LPP. It is now important to assess whether similarly constructed emotion materials, which
are not related to moral content also elicit the same LPP effect indicating the affective
evaluation of incoming emotional linguistic information. In the light of evidence suggest-
ing that the processing of incoming information depends on the task, it was expected that
when explicit moral judgements are required, semantic-cognitive analysis of incoming in-
formation should dominate, whereas affective processing should dominate for emotional
judgements (Lai et al., 2012; Sevinc & Spreng, 2014). Accordingly, if incoming moral and
emotional information is affectively processed alike, then affective processing should also
dominate for morality judgements, that is independent of the task. By contrast, if the
processing of moral information depends on the task, there should be different processing
patterns for moral and emotional content.
Study 2
If moral transgressions elicit affective evaluations as Study 1 suggests, there emerges an-
other issue worth investigating, namely, whether the same materials trigger embodied
responses, indicating affective responses outside conscious awareness of (alleged) affect-
evoking test stimuli. During discourse comprehension of morality and emotion scenarios,
the emotional salience of incoming linguistic information is measured by using three periph-
eral psychophysiological methods: (1) facial EMG, (2) EDA, and (3) ECG. Participants
are asked to perform the same emotional judgement task as in Study 1. An additional
control experiment measured the sensitivity of all three methods with stimuli that usu-
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ally evoke psychological and physiological emotional reactions. To this end, we presented
emotional-negative compared to neutral pictures and words.
Study 3
Study 3 was conducted to examine whether the same brain processes and embodied re-
sponses are still present if participants merely read for comprehension rather than perform
an explicit judgement task. Study 1 and 2 are modified in a way that morality and emo-
tion materials are presented intermixedly in a passive reading-for-comprehension task. In
two separate experiments we measure ERPs (Experiment 1), as well as fEMG and EDA
(Experiment 2).
3.3 Studies
The following chapters were written as separate manuscripts. This is why they differ
from the rest of the monography in layout and style. Overlapping contents between the
introduction and empirical chapters are therefore the case.
3.3.1 Study 1: Kunkel, A., Filik, R., Mackenzie, I.G., & Leuthold, H. (2018).
Task-dependent evaluative processing of moral and emotional content
during comprehension: An ERP study
Copyright Notice
Reproduced with kind permission from Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience,
from Kunkel, A., Filik, R., Mackenzie, I.G., & Leuthold, H.. Task-dependent evaluative
processing of moral and emotional content during comprehension: An ERP study. doi:
10.3758/s13415-018-0577-5, Copyright 2018, with permission from Springer Link; permis-
sion conveyed through Copyright Clearance Center, Inc.. The official citation that should
be used in reference to this material is:
Kunkel, A., Filik, R., Mackenzie, I. G., & Leuthold, H. (2018). Task-dependent evalu-
ative processing of moral and emotional content during comprehension: An ERP study.
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 18, 389-409. doi: 10.3758/s13415-018-
0577-5
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 Abstract 
Recently, we showed that when participants passively read about moral transgressions 
(e.g., adultery) they implicitly engage in the evaluative (good–bad) categorization of 
incoming information, as indicated by a larger event-related brain potential (ERP) 
positivity to immoral than moral scenarios (Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 
2015). Behavioral and neuroimaging studies indicated that explicit moral tasks prioritize 
the semantic-cognitive analysis of incoming information but that implicit tasks, as used 
in Leuthold et al. (2015), favor their affective processing. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether an affective categorization process is also involved when participants perform 
explicit moral judgments. Thus, in two experiments, we used similarly constructed 
morality and emotion materials for which their moral and emotional content had to be 
inferred from the context. Target sentences from negative vs. neutral emotional 
scenarios and from moral vs. immoral scenarios were presented using rapid serial visual 
presentation. In Experiment 1, participants made moral judgments for moral materials 
and emotional judgments for emotion materials. Negative compared to neutral 
emotional scenarios elicited a larger posterior ERP positivity (LPP) about 200 ms after 
critical word onset, whereas immoral compared to moral scenarios elicited a larger 
anterior negativity (500-700 ms). In Experiment 2, where the same emotional judgment 
to both types of materials was required, a larger LPP was triggered for both types of 
materials. These results accord with the view that morality scenarios trigger a semantic-
cognitive analysis when participants explicitly judge the moral content of incoming 
linguistic information but an affective evaluation when judging their emotional content.  
 
Keywords: Moral judgment, emotion judgment, affective evaluation, LPP, anterior 
negativity  
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We often find ourselves in situations in which a person is violating a prevailing social 
norm or moral value. For instance, if we find out that someone cheats in an exam or is 
telling a lie, we tend to spontaneously judge such behavior as bad or immoral. This 
reflects a fundamental aspect of human moral cognition and it has been proposed that 
such judgments are based on affective or intuitive processes (Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). In line with this view, a recent event-
related brain potential (ERP) study demonstrated that when participants passively read 
about everyday moral transgressions, they implicitly categorize the described behaviors 
as good or bad as early as about 320 ms after the presentation of the critical word (cf. 
Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 2015), which was argued to be reflected by a late 
posterior positivity (LPP). However, there is also evidence in the literature suggesting 
that the semantic-cognitive analysis of incoming information dominates when explicit 
morality judgments are required, whereas the affective analysis is prioritized when 
emotion judgments are demanded (cf. Lai, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2012; Sevinc & 
Spreng, 2014). Therefore, it remains unclear whether such a rapid evaluation process, 
as indicated by the LPP during a passive reading task, indeed would be found for explicit 
moral judgments as well. In addition, we aim to provide further support for the proposal 
that the LPP reflects affective processing of incoming information by also investigating 
whether an LPP is elicited by similarly constructed everyday emotional scenarios 
without a moral component. To this end, we will record ERPs that are elicited by 
scenarios describing moral transgressions and emotional events, to see whether, and to 
what extent, cognitive and affective processes are involved during discourse 
comprehension when explicit moral or emotional judgments are required. 
 Van Berkum, Holleman, Nieuwland, Otten, and Murre (2009) are to our 
knowledge the first to use a text comprehension approach to reveal the ERP correlates 
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of moral cognition. Specifically, they investigated whether and how rapidly an 
individual’s values influence the online linguistic meaning analysis of moral statements 
when explicit judgments were required. Male participants with two opposing value 
systems (members of a Dutch strict-Christian party vs. voters of parties with opposite 
moral-ethical programs, referred to here as non-Christians) were asked to rate their 
agreement with critical statements such as, "If my child were homosexual, I’d find this 
hard/easy to accept". The individual words forming these statements were presented 
using rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), affording the measurement of immediate 
ERP responses to the critical word. They found that value-inconsistent compared to 
value-consistent critical words (e.g., easy vs. hard for strict-Christians and hard vs. easy 
for non-Christians, respectively) initially elicited a larger broadly distributed positivity 
between 200 and 250 ms (P200), followed by a larger centroparietal negativity between 
375 and 425 ms (N400), and finally a larger LPP between 500 and 650 ms.  
 N400 amplitude has been shown to respond to the predictability of a word 
within a given context (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 1984), to semantic anomalies at the 
discourse level (Van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999), as well as to violations of 
world knowledge (e.g., Filik & Leuthold, 2008; Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & 
Petersson, 2004), reflecting the demands of meaning construction (for a review, see 
Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Thus, Van Berkum et al. (2009) interpreted, their N400 
findings as indicating that readers immediately and automatically evaluate incoming 
information with respect to their personally held values, giving rise to a rapid value-
based influence on meaning construction. They further speculated that this N400 effect 
overlaps with that of a single sustained ERP positivity that has an earlier onset than the 
(overlapping) N400, therefore emerging as a larger P200 and LPP for value-inconsistent 
than value-consistent statements. Van Berkum and colleagues ruled out a cognitive, 
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decision-related account of this LPP effect for two reasons. Firstly, it has been 
demonstrated that self-referential (true vs. false) statements that are unrelated to a 
person's value system do not elicit such an effect (Fischler, Bloom, Childers, Arroyo, & 
Perry, 1984). Secondly, negative compared to positive and neutral stimuli tend to elicit 
a larger LPP - reflecting a negativity bias in affective processing (e.g., Ito, Larsen, Smith, 
& Cacioppo, 1998) - even in language studies where participants either merely read for 
comprehension or made explicit decisions to critical emotion words (e.g., Holt, Lynn, 
& Kuperberg, 2009). Therefore, Van Berkum et al. took their LPP effect to reflect the 
automatic activation of the affect system, in accord with the view that the LPP relates to 
the implicit evaluative processing of motivationally salient stimuli (cf. Hajcak, 
MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010). 
 However, in Van Berkum et al.'s (2009) study, the values held by the 
participants may have constrained their (implicit) expectations regarding the likely 
sentence endings. For instance, when persons holding strict Christian values read a 
statement (taken from their Table 1) beginning with "In a bad marriage, divorce is an 
...", based on their personal beliefs, they would not expect it to be continued with the 
word "acceptable". Hence, similar to N400 effects driven by discourse- or world-
knowledge-based expectations (e.g., Filik & Leuthold, 2008; Hagoort et al., 2004; Van 
Berkum et al., 1999), it is conceivable that the larger N400 elicited by value-inconsistent 
than value-consistent statements reflects an (implicit) emotional congruity effect that 
depends on the relation between the emotional features of the preceding context and the 
critical word.1 Crucially, a larger N400 to emotion words that were incongruent rather 
than congruent with the preceding context has been shown not only in studies using 
                                                      
1 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the issue of emotion congruity as 
compared to emotion effects on ERP amplitudes. 
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sequential prime-target tasks (e.g., Eder, Leuthold, Rothermund, & Schweinberger, 
2012; Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003; Zhang, Lawson, Guo, & Jiang, 2006; but 
see Herring, Taylor, White, & Crites, 2011) but also in discourse comprehension studies 
using strongly constraining emotional contexts, for instance, when someone is described 
as being happy in a context which outlines either a positive or a negative event (e.g., 
León, Díaz, de Vega, & Hernández, 2010; Leuthold, Filik, Mackenzie, & Murphy, 
2012). Accordingly, the N400 effect might reflect the more intense lexical or semantic 
processing for incongruent than congruent moral statements, that is, a morality-
unspecific language-related effect. If this conjecture would hold true, Van Berkum and 
colleagues' interpretation of the P200 and LPP effect in terms of an affective evaluation 
of statements could be challenged as well. That is, the P200 effect reported might be 
attributed to the enhanced visual processing of incongruent or very unexpected linguistic 
inputs (e.g., Bohan, Leuthold, Hijikata, & Sanford, 2012; Ferretti, Singer, & Patterson, 
2008; Leuthold et al., 2015), and the larger LPP following incongruent statements might 
reflect a P600-like semantic effect that is found in response to various types of semantic 
anomalies (for a review, see Kuperberg, 2007) and has been related to a continued 
reanalysis of linguistic input following a semantic processing conflict (cf. Kuperberg, 
2007; Van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Chwilla, & Vissers, 2009).  
 A recent text comprehension study by Leuthold et al. (2015) used a different 
approach to examine the implicit rather than explicit evaluative processing of everyday 
(fictional) scenarios that involved descriptions of moral transgressions (e.g., cheating on 
one's partner). Specifically, participants read the scenario context followed by the RSVP 
of the target sentence containing the critical word (cf. Table 1). The context determined 
whether the target sentence described a moral or an immoral event. As a control, 
participants read materials in which the target sentence was either consistent or 
 43 
inconsistent with their knowledge of the world, to assess the ERP correlates elicited by 
the linguistic processing of moral-neutral world knowledge violations (e.g., a target 
sentence of “She receives as a dish a plate full of snails and white bread.”, following a 
context that would make this statement either consistent with the participants’ 
knowledge of the world, e.g., “During a France exchange Mrs. Lehmann eats a famous 
French specialty.” or inconsistent, e.g., “Mrs. Lehmann goes to a Schwabian restaurant 
and orders a local specialty.”). Morality and world knowledge materials were randomly 
interleaved and no explicit judgments were required.  
 Crucially, a larger P200 amplitude was found both for moral transgressions 
and for world knowledge violations, indicating domain-unspecific, enhanced attentive 
processing of materials conflicting with the discourse context. Subsequently, a large 
posterior N400 was found for general world knowledge violations only. In accord with 
previous studies from our lab (e.g., Filik & Leuthold, 2008; 2013) and with the N400 
literature in general (cf. Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), this was taken to reflect the 
increased semantic memory demands involved in retrieving and integrating conceptual 
information during meaning construction when knowledge-based expectations are 
violated (e.g., Filik & Leuthold, 2008; Hagoort et al., 2004). By contrast, moral 
transgressions did not trigger a larger N400 but only a larger central-maximal ERP 
positivity after about 320 ms. Leuthold and colleagues took this finding to reflect an 
LPP effect, proposing that incoming socio-normative information is, during a first step, 
implicitly evaluated and categorized as good or bad (see also Cunningham & Zelazo, 
2007). This is in line with theoretical views that assume a central role of emotional-
intuitive processes for moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001).  
 More generally, the ERP study of Leuthold et al. (2015) demonstrates the 
practicality of approaching the (implicit) mechanisms contributing to moral cognition 
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by having participants read fictional scenarios with moral content. In contrast to Van 
Berkum et al. (2009), a passive reading task was used in which the moral versus immoral 
nature of the (identical) target sentences had to be inferred depending on the discourse 
context. That is, the materials did not involve incongruent moral statements but instead 
described scenarios that participants in a pre-test had judged as either clearly morally 
good versus bad, which would explain the absence of an N400 (congruity) effect. Also, 
since no explicit moral judgments were required, we consider it more likely that the LPP 
effect reported by Leuthold et al. reflects the implicit (affective) evaluation of morality-
related materials. Emotion effects on the ERP waveform are known to depend on the 
emotional features of the critical item (e.g., valence, arousal), with emotional stimuli 
such as positive or negative words, pleasant and unpleasant pictures, and arousing 
stimuli reliably eliciting larger LPP amplitudes than neutral or less arousing stimuli, and 
this effect is more pronounced when participants judge the emotional content (e.g., in 
an affective judgment task) rather than an emotion-irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g., 
in a semantic classification or passive reading task) (for reviews, see Citron, 2012; 
Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012). Hence, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the LPP elicited in the Leuthold et al. study reflects an 
emotion effect. 
 As stated above, the study conducted by Leuthold et al. (2015) did not involve 
any explicit judgment task. However, there is behavioral evidence suggesting that task 
demands influence whether an affective versus semantic-cognitive analysis is prioritized 
(e.g., Lai et al., 2012). Importantly, for the present purposes, evidence from functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies corroborates this conjecture for the 
processing of moral content. That is, fMRI studies consistently indicate that brain areas 
concerned with both cognitive and emotional processing are activated during moral 
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judgment tasks using dilemma scenarios (e.g., Greene et al., 2001) and socio-normative 
scenarios (e.g., Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002). Crucially, in a 
meta-analysis of a total of 40 fMRI studies (Sevinc & Spreng, 2014), brain areas 
concerned with cognitive processing were more strongly activated than areas linked to 
emotional processing in studies using explicit moral judgment tasks, whereas the reverse 
pattern of brain activation was found in studies using implicit (e.g., reading) tasks. In 
line with these findings, evidence from social cognition research suggests that the impact 
of automatic evaluations is reduced when participants deliberately rather than implicitly 
process incoming information (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Of 
course, given the limited temporal resolution of fMRI, the precise time course of task-
dependent emotional versus cognitive influences on moral judgments is not yet 
completely understood (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). Thus, it is essential to investigate 
this issue using a combined behavioral and ERP approach in order to test whether an 
explicit moral judgment task would enforce a semantic-cognitive analysis of morality 
materials as indicated by the N400. We will address this issue by conducting an 
experiment in which participants read the materials used by Leuthold et al., but in the 
context of an explicit morality judgment task. 
 If one assumes that moral acceptability is inferred from the context and 
involves the affective evaluation of linguistic input, it is important to assess whether 
similarly constructed emotional materials without moral content also elicit an LPP 
effect. At present, we are not aware of any published ERP studies investigating the 
processing of materials where target sentences are identical across conditions, and the 
emotional meaning of the target needs to be inferred from the context in which it 
appears. Specifically, previous ERP studies examining discourse-based emotion effects 
used contexts that were strongly constraining (e.g., León et al., 2010; Leuthold et al., 
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2012) or employed materials for which the critical words differed across emotion 
conditions (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009; León et al., 
2010). For example, Delaney-Busch and Kuperberg found a larger N400 (300-500 ms) 
for incongruent than congruent neutral words following a neutral context, and this 
congruity effect was larger over anterior than posterior midline electrodes. Crucially, 
when an emotional discourse context preceded valence congruent or incongruent 
emotion words, no congruity effect was observed in N400 amplitude. Rather, a larger 
LPP (500-700 ms) to pleasant and unpleasant emotion words was elicited irrespective 
of the valence of the preceding emotional discourse context. In accordance with the 
affective primacy hypothesis (Storbeck & Clore, 2007), these findings led Delaney-
Busch and Kuperberg to suggest that for emotional contexts, the processing of incoming 
information is dominated by the analysis of their motivational (e.g., approach vs. 
avoidance) rather than semantic significance. It is therefore unclear whether emotion 
materials for which the target sentences and the critical (emotion) words are identical 
across conditions, and hence the emotional meaning has to be inferred from the 
discourse context, elicit an LPP effect as well. Thus, it is also a major aim of the current 
work is to close this research gap concerning our understanding of emotional language 
processing, and this is suited to strengthen the interpretation of the LPP as reflecting the 
affective evaluation of linguistic input during discourse comprehension. 
 
Objectives of the present study 
 In summary, it remains to be investigated first whether the rapid affective 
evaluation of descriptions of moral transgressions during text comprehension (i.e., when 
there is no explicit judgment task), as inferred from the LPP effect by Leuthold et al. 
(2015), is also observed when participants perform explicit moral judgments. If such an 
 47 
LPP effect but no N400 effect would be present, this outcome would lend support to the 
view that incoming linguistic information undergoes an implicit (or task-independent) 
affective evaluation. By contrast, if these task conditions enforce a semantic-cognitive 
analysis of morality materials, a larger N400 to immoral than moral items should be 
triggered. Second, it is crucial to investigate the electrophysiological correlates of 
discourse-based emotion comprehension, specifically, whether an LPP effect is also 
elicited when the emotional meaning is inferred from the discourse context. The 
assumption that the LPP indicates the discourse-dependent affective processing of 
linguistic input, as assumed in the moral ERP study of Leuthold et al. (2015), would be 
corroborated by showing that for the same participants, discourse-dependent negative 
compared to neutral (or positive) items elicit a similar LPP effect to discourse-dependent 
immoral compared to moral items. Therefore, we created novel emotion materials that 
were similar to the morality materials with regard to critical dimensions such as the cloze 
probability of the critical words, their semantic relatedness to the discourse context, 
critical word frequency, as well as their emotionality in terms of valence and arousal (cf. 
Methods). Of course, since morality and emotion materials differ with regard to the 
wording of the critical sentences and hence are not matched regarding all potentially 
relevant word-level or discourse-level dimensions, this allows only an indirect 
comparison of the ERP effects triggered by these materials.  
 We recorded ERPs in two experiments to investigate task-related influences 
on the online processing of scenarios describing everyday moral compared to emotional 
situations and the nature of the underlying, potentially affective, processes. Thus, our 
setup was identical to that of Leuthold et al. (2015) except that (a) instead of world 
knowledge violations, we used emotional scenarios without moral content as a control 
condition, and (b) that participants performed explicit judgments of the materials. More 
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specifically, we used prototypical scenarios for which the protagonists and situations 
were introduced by the context sentences (for an example, see Table 1).  
 For morality materials, the target sentence either described a morally 
acceptable or unacceptable (that is, moral vs. immoral) action, and for emotion 
materials, the target sentence described either a relatively neutral versus a negative 
event, which was determined by the context for both materials.  
 We used RSVP for the final critical sentence, with participants performing 
their judgment response (yes/no) after the presentation of the final word. We chose a 
binary judgment task in line with recent moral dilemma and moral judgment studies 
(e.g., Greene et al., 2001). In Experiment 1 participants made moral judgments for 
morality materials (i.e., “Is the behavior morally acceptable?”) and emotional 
judgments for emotion materials (i.e., “Are  you emotionally moved by the text?”). 
Experiment 2 required emotional judgments for both of material.  
 Generally, we hypothesized that linguistic input is affectively evaluated, that 
is, independently of the specific content of the materials (cf. Bargh et al., 1996; 
Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). It is then reasonable to assume that moral actions and 
neutral (or mildly positive) events are evaluated as potentially "good" and immoral and 
negative events as potentially "bad". Since such differential affective evaluations are 
taken to be reflected by the LPP component (cf. Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Hajcak et al., 
2012), LPP amplitude should be larger for both immoral and negative compared to moral 
and neutral (or mildly positive) scenarios. We further reasoned that if these evaluations 
are automatic in the sense that they are produced by a fast-operating process that is 
independent from task goals, qualitatively the same LPP effects should be observed in 
the two experiments for immoral versus moral scenarios. However, if the requirement 
to judge the moral content prioritizes the semantic-cognitive processing of linguistic 
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input in Experiment 1, a larger N400 rather than a larger LPP might be elicited for 
immoral than moral items. 
Experiment 1 
Participants were presented with morality and emotional scenarios in separate blocks of 
trials. In the case of a morality scenario, they judged whether someone’s behavior was 
acceptable or not. Here, we predicted that immoral compared to moral scenarios would 
be judged as less acceptable, hence producing fewer yes-responses. For emotion 
materials, participants judged whether they were emotionally moved by the text or not. 
We predicted that negative compared to neutral scenarios are more moving and therefore 
would produce more yes-responses.  
 It is important to note that we performed rating studies (see method section for 
details) to assess the moral acceptability of morality items as well their plausibility, 
valence, and arousal value and that the same dimensions were assessed for emotion 
materials (except their moral acceptability). Based on these results, the morality items 
were classified as either moral or immoral while the emotion items were classified as 
either neutral or negative. This procedure guarantees that the respective materials are 
neatly matched across conditions. To examine whether item-specific arousal and 
valence characteristics, as obtained from the rating studies, contribute to present binary 
emotion and morality judgments in addition to condition-specific effects, a logistic 
regression approach was used.2 
  Moreover, since binary morality and emotion judgments (yes- versus no-
response) are required in the present experiments, it is conceivable that participants may 
apply decision criteria that lead, at least sometimes, to judgments that are inconsistent 
                                                      
2 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the logistic regression analysis and also 
for his most helpful comments regarding the judgment-dependent analysis of ERP amplitudes. 
 Table 1. Example for Moral Materials with Context for Moral and for Immoral Items, for Emotional Materials with Context for Neutral and for Negative Items, 
as well as the respective Target Sentences Containing the Critical Word (in italics). 
Morality  Emotion 
Moral Immoral  Neutral Negative 
Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem 
Chemiekonzern. Seit einigen Wochen gibt 
es Sicherheitsprobleme aufgrund 
fahrlässigen Verhaltens von Kollegen, 
sodass Menschenleben gefährdet sind. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works at a chemical 
company. For several weeks, there have 
been safety issues caused by colleagues’ 
careless behavior, putting human lives at 
risk.) 
 
Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem 
Chemiekonzern als Sachbearbeiter in der 
Personalabteilung. Er ist ehrgeizig und 
will rascher aufsteigen als seine Kollegen. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works in human 
resources of a chemical company. He is 
ambitious and aims at being promoted 
faster than his colleagues.) 
 
Sarah trainierte den ganzen Nachmittag 
im Fitness-Studio und geht zum 
Abschluss in die Sauna, wonach sie sich 
wohlig gut fühlt. 
(Sarah had been at the gym all afternoon 
before completing her work out with a 
visit to the sauna, after which she feels 
pleasantly well.) 
Sarah hat einen sehr anstrengenden Job. 
Sie muss dafür seit mehreren Monaten 
jeden Tag um 5 Uhr aufstehen und den 
ganzen Tag hart arbeiten. 
(Sarah has a very demanding job. For 
several months she has been getting up at 
5 am and working very hard all day.) 
Im monatlichen Gespräch berichtet er seinem Chef deren Fehler. 
(In a monthly commitment talk he points out to his boss their mistakes.) 
 Sie ist sehr erschöpft. 
(She is very exhausted.) 
 
Ben ist wegen sexueller Belästigung 
angezeigt worden. Er war an dem 
fraglichen Nachmittag bei einem Freund. 
Dieser Freund wird von der Polizei 
befragt. 
(Ben was sued for sexual harassment. The 
day in question he was at a friend’s. This 
friend is questioned by the police.)  
Ben ist wegen sexueller Belästigung 
angezeigt worden. Er behauptet an diesem 
Nachmittag bei einem Freund gewesen zu 
sein, was jedoch gelogen ist. Sein Freund 
wird nun befragt.  
(Ben was sued for sexual harassment. He 
claims that he was at a friend’s, which is a 
lie. This friend is questioned by the 
police.) 
 
 
Dominik fliegt mit seinen Freunden im 
Hochsommer nach Südspanien. Sie gehen 
lieber an den Strand als die Stadt zu 
besichtigen.  
Dominik beeilt sich das Essen für seine 
wartenden Gäste zu servieren. Ohne zu 
überlegen greift er in den Kochtopf mit 
den Eiern, die noch im Wasser 
schwimmen.  
 
  
Er verschafft ihm das Alibi. 
(He is his alibi.) 
 Es ist zu heiß. 
(It is too hot.) 
 
Erik studiert Mathematik. Für die 
Übungsaufgaben hat er sich die Lösungen 
einer besonders kniffligen Aufgabe beim 
Professor besorgt. Dieser hat ihn darum 
gebeten, aus Fairness die Lösungen an die 
anderen Studierenden weiterzureichen. 
(Erik majors in math. He asked the 
professor for the answers to a particularly 
tricky homework problem. As a matter of 
fairness, the professor asked him to pass 
on the answers to his fellow students as 
well.)  
 
Erik studiert Mathematik. Für die 
bevorstehende Klausur hat er sich bei 
einem Freund des höheren Semesters die 
Lösung besorgt. Dieser hat ihn allerdings 
darum gebeten die Lösungen nicht 
herumzureichen, weil er sonst 
exmatrikuliert werden könnte.  
(Erik majors in math. He got the answers 
for an upcoming exam from a friend, who 
is already a senior. The friend asked him 
not to pass on the answers to anyone else, 
otherwise he would get in trouble and have 
to leave the school.) 
 
Herr Meier hat Streit mit seiner Frau und 
rennt wütend aus dem Haus. Noch voller 
Zorn, achtet Herr Meier nicht auf die 
Straße und sieht den heranfahrenden 
PKW nicht. (Mr. Meier has an argument 
with his wife and storms out of the house 
in anger. Still upset, he does not mind the 
traffic and overlooks the approaching 
car.) 
Herr Meier recht den Rasen, während sein 
Sohn dort mit dem ferngesteuerten 
Spielzeugauto spielt. (Mr. Meier rakes the 
lawn, while his son plays there with a 
remote-controlled toy car.) 
Er hat den anderen die Lösungen gegeben. 
(He passed on the answers to them. ) 
 Herr Meier wird von dem Auto angefahren. 
(Mr. Meier is hit by the car.) 
 
Frau Bauer möchte zum Abteilungsessen 
gehen und sucht einen Babysitter. Sie 
erhält die Anfrage einer Frau, von der man 
weiß, dass sie gegenüber Kindern bereits 
handgreiflich wurde. (Mrs. Bauer is 
looking for a babysitter because she wants 
to attend the company dinner. A lady 
contacts her, of whom it is known that she 
beat children in the past.) 
 
Frau Bauer möchte zum Abteilungsessen 
gehen und sucht einen Babysitter. Sie 
erhält die Anfrage einer jungen Studentin, 
die am Telefon sehr sympathisch wirkt, 
aber mit ausländischem Akzent spricht. 
(Mrs. Bauer is looking for a babysitter 
because she wants to attend the company 
dinner. A young student girl contacts her 
who sounds very friendly but speaks with 
a foreign accent.) 
  
Magda überrascht ihren Freund, da sie 
soeben eine Last-Minute-Reise gewonnen 
hat und diese gerne mit ihm verbringen 
möchte. (Magda has won a last-minute 
trip and surprises her boyfriend by 
inviting him to join her.)  
Magda hat wiederholt einen heftigen 
Streit mit ihrem Freund, der bereits beim 
letzten Mal drohte sie zu verlassen und 
aus der Wohnung auszuziehen. Der 
Disput eskaliert. (Magda and her 
boyfriend have a serious fight again. The 
last time he already threatened to leave 
her and move out. The fight went out of 
control.) 
 
Sie hat der Babysitterin abgesagt. 
(She has not invited the babysitter to work for her.) 
 Er stürmt ins Zimmer und packt den Koffer. (He goes and packs his bags.) 
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with the rating-based morality or emotion classification of the materials. That is, some 
items pre-classified as moral might be judged as morally unacceptable, or some items 
pre-classified as negative might be judged as neutral and vice versa. Therefore, we 
performed additional ERP amplitude analyses in waveforms averaged for moral items 
that were judged as appropriate (yes-response) and for immoral items judged as 
inappropriate (no-response). Likewise, such judgment-dependent ERP analyses were 
also conducted for neutral items that were judged as not moving (no-response) and 
negative items judged as moving (yes-response). 
 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-two native German speakers from the University of 
Tübingen received course credits or payment for participating. Data from four 
participants were excluded due to excessive alpha activity. For all analyses, we used the 
dataset from the remaining 28 participants (M = 24.5 years, 19 females). 
 Materials and design. Morality materials were taken from Leuthold et al. 
(2015) and modified.3 These materials consisted of a total of 160 items, resulting from 
the combination of 80 identical target sentences each with two different discourse 
contexts, thereby creating 80 moral and 80 immoral items. The 160 emotion materials 
were newly generated and analogously constructed (see Table 1 for examples; the full 
set is available from the first author). Both morality and emotion materials were pre-
tested (see below).  
 All scenarios consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of two or three 
sentences describing the context, and the second part was the target sentence containing 
                                                      
3 The original morality materials were changed in order to disambiguate the meaning of some items and 
to consistently present critical words towards the end of the target sentence. As a result, two items were 
replaced. 52 discourse contexts were slightly shortened or the protagonist’s name changed. Of the 80 
target sentences, 15 were shortened and for eight target sentences the critical word was replaced.  
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the critical word. In order to eliminate possible sentence-level and word-based effects, 
the same target sentence was used for moral and immoral conditions and the same held 
true for neutral and negative emotional conditions (with the context varying across 
conditions, see Table 1). The critical word was always presented towards the end of the 
target sentence, most frequently as the sentence-final word (84.4%). Critical words were 
predominantly verbs describing a certain behavior (e.g., to borrow, to report, to mention, 
to swap) and nouns (e.g., acceptance, alibi, verdict, tumor).  
 Morality materials described actions that would be perceived as either moral 
or immoral, whereas emotion materials would describe a neutral or a negative event. 
Finally, 40 neutral filler items were constructed which contained no moral or emotional 
content as well as no inconsistencies, and were similar in length to the experimental 
items (e.g., Context sentence: "Herr Krüger hat kein aktuelles Telefonbuch. Er braucht 
die Nummer seines Hausarztes." Target sentence: "Er ruft bei der Auskunft an, um an 
die Nummer zu gelangen." [Context sentence: Mr. Krüger does not possess an up-to-
date phone book. He needs the telephone number of his general practitioner. Target 
sentence: He calls the directory enquiries service to find out the number.]). Following 
the presentation of the final word, for the morality blocks, the following question was 
displayed on the screen: “Ist das Verhalten moralisch akzeptabel?” [“Is the behavior 
morally acceptable?”], and for the emotion blocks: “Berührt dich das Gelesene?” [“Are 
you emotionally moved by the text?”].4 Participants indicated their response (“Ja” 
[“Yes”] versus “Nein” [“No”]) by pressing the left or right arrow key on the computer 
keyboard.  
                                                      
4 There is no one-to-one translation of the German word "berührt" that would match its emotional 
connotation, yet in our view "emotionally moving" comes close. Note that in contrast to the rating study 
described below, this term was not explicitly related to the state of arousal. 
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 The randomization of items and conditions across participants was performed 
in the following way. The two different types of scenario (morality vs. emotion) were 
presented in the first versus second half of the experiment, and their order was counter-
balanced across participants. For two consecutive participants, two lists were randomly 
generated such that each morality scenario appeared across the two lists either in the 
moral or the immoral condition, and each emotion scenario appeared either in the neutral 
or the negative condition. That is, the two participants received the same target sentence 
but with a different context in order to manipulate either the morality condition (moral 
vs. immoral) or the emotion condition (neutral vs. negative). Thus, for each participant, 
the 200-item list consisted of 40 moral and 40 immoral items, 40 neutral and 40 negative 
items, as well as 40 neutral filler items. The fillers were included in order to keep the 
procedure as similar as possible to the study of Leuthold et al. (2015) and to reduce a 
potential influence of extended local runs of immoral and negative items on ERPs. For 
instance, after the description of several immoral behaviors, participants might relax 
their judgment criteria and view immoral acts as more acceptable, which could 
potentially reduce the N400 effect (cf. Baetens, Van der Cruyssen, Achtziger, 
Vendekerckhove, & Van Overwalle, 2011).  
 Pre-test of materials. For the newly created emotion scenarios, we used a web-
based questionnaire to assess the plausibility, valence, and arousal ratings of the 
materials. Altogether, we recruited 293 undergraduate students from the University of 
Tübingen (M = 23.6 years, 204 females). The 160 scenarios (80 items each with two 
conditions neutral/negative) were arranged in four lists each containing 40 randomly 
arranged scenarios plus the target sentence; each list was rated by no less than 66 
participants. Participants were asked to rate on scales from 1-8 (a) how plausible they 
found the scenario (“Die beschriebene Situation ist ...” [The scenario described is ...]:  
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1 = sehr unrealistisch [very unrealistic] to 8 = sehr realistisch [very realistic]), (b) their 
“Erregungszustand” [arousal] in terms of how much they were emotionally moved by 
the scenario (1 = nicht ergreifend [not moved at all] to 8 = stark ergreifend [strongly 
moved]), and (c) the valence of the materials (1 = sehr negativ [very negative] to 8 = 
sehr positiv [very positive]). Two-tailed t-tests (cf. Table 2) showed that neutral and 
negative items were rated as being equally plausible (M = 6.01 vs. 6.14), t(79) = 0.98, p 
= .33. Furthermore, negative items were rated as being more negative (M = 2.39 vs. 
5.07), t(79) = 20.02, p < .001, and more moving than neutral items (M = 5.00 vs. 3.51), 
t(79) = 9.70, p < .001.  
 For the morality materials, pre-tests for plausibility and morality were carried 
out using a web-based questionnaire (N = 55 participants). On a scale from 1 (sehr 
unmoralisch; sehr unrealistisch [very immoral; very unrealistic]) to 8 (sehr moralisch; 
sehr realistisch [very moral; very realistic]), moral items were rated as being morally 
more acceptable than immoral items (M = 5.99 vs. 2.52), t(79) = 25.93, p < .001, and 
also as being slightly more plausible (M = 6.21 vs. 5.15), t(79) = 3.88, p < .001. 
 Additionally, valence and arousal ratings for the morality materials were 
collected from a fresh group of participants (N = 40). On a scale from 1 (sehr negativ; 
nicht ergreifend [very negative; not emotionally moving]) to 8 (sehr positiv; ergreifend 
[very positive; emotionally moving]), moral items were rated as more positive (M = 5.44 
vs. 2.60), t(79) = 16.35, p < .001, and less moving (M = 3.79 vs. 4.34), t(79) = 3.20, p < 
.01, than immoral items. 
 To compare valence, arousal, and plausibility scores across the two sets of 
materials, these rating scores were separately analyzed using ANOVAs with factors 
material and condition. Given the above-reported analysis of condition effects, 
significant results will only be reported for the main effect of material and the interaction 
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Table 2. Characteristics and rating data of morality and emotion materials.    
 
 Morality Emotion 
 Moral (SE) Immoral (SE) Neutral (SE) Negative (SE) 
Cloze 43 % (4 %) 38 % (4 %) 40 % (4 %) 47 % (4 %) 
Semantic Relatedness 0.46 (0.01) 0.45 (0.01) 0.40 (0.01) 0.41 (0.01) 
Word Frequency 59.46 (9.72)  58.31 (6.98)  
Word length 8.66 (0.21)  7.51 (0.19)  
Plausibility 6.21 (0.03) 5.15 (0.04) 6.14 (0.11) 6.01 (0.11) 
Valence 5.44 (0.13) 2.60 (0.09) 5.07 (0.12) 2.39 (0.07) 
Arousal 3.79 (0.13) 4.34 (0.11) 3.51 (0.13) 5.00 (0.12) 
Morality 5.99 (0.04) 2.52 (0.03)   
     
Note. Means and standard errors (in brackets) of the rating data were calculated for each material 
and condition. Plausibility, valence and arousal ratings concern the whole scenario inclusive 
target sentence with 1 (= very unrealistic, very negative, not touched, very immoral) to 8 (= very 
realistic, very positive, strongly touched, very moral). Only morality materials were rated for 
the degree of morality with 1 (= very immoral) to 8 (= very moral). Word frequency (per million) 
and word length concern the critical words, cloze probability (as percentages) and semantic 
relatedness was calculated for the critical word in relation with a context.  
  
of material and condition. For plausibility, the main effect of material, F(1, 316) = 15.05, 
p < .001, and the Material x Condition interaction were significant, F(1, 316) = 23.88, p 
< .05, as both neutral and negative emotion items were more plausible than immoral 
items, all ps < .001, but were not more plausible than moral items, all ps > .21. For 
arousal ratings, the Material x Condition interaction was significant as well, F(1, 316) = 
14.34, p < .001, indicating a stronger condition effect for emotion than morality 
materials. Finally, for valence ratings, the main effect of material was significant, F(1, 
316) = 7.48, p < .01, due to a lower valence score for emotion compared to morality 
items. 
 Moreover, all materials were analyzed with regard to critical word frequency, 
cloze probability, and semantic relatedness. For calculating word frequencies, we chose 
the SUBTLEX-DE corpus (Brysbaert et al., 2011). Two words were not listed in the 
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corpus. The frequencies (per million) of the remaining critical words did not differ 
between materials (morality vs. emotion: M = 59.46 vs. 58.31), t(314) = 0.10, p = .92.  
 To determine cloze probability, participants were presented with both the 
context and the target sentence without the critical word, which they were asked to fill 
in. Due to an error, no cloze probability scores were obtained for two moral items and 
one immoral item. Cloze probability did not reliably differ between the moral (M = 0.43) 
and the immoral condition (M = 0.38), t(155) = 1.04, p = .30, and also not between the 
neutral (M = .40) and the negative condition (M = 0.47), t(158) = 1.36, p = .18. There 
were also no significant differences in cloze probability for the critical words of morality 
materials (M = .40) and of emotion materials (M = 0.43), t(315) = 0.73, p = .46.  
 Finally, we calculated semantic relatedness as the cosine similarity between 
the context and the critical word with the LSAfun package in R and the German 
dewak100k_lsa corpus as semantic space (Günther, Dudschig, & Kaup, 2015) based on 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998). Seven critical 
words of the morality materials and five critical words of the emotion materials were 
not listed in the corpus. In a separate analysis of semantic relatedness scores for the two 
sets of materials, there was no significant difference between moral (M = 0.46) versus 
immoral (M = 0.45) sentences, t(144) = 0.09, p = .93, and also not between neutral (M 
= 0.40) versus negative (M = 0.41) sentences, t(148) = 0.83, p = .41. However, the 
comparison between materials revealed a higher semantic relatedness score for morality 
than emotion materials (M = 0.45 vs. 0.40), t(294) = 3.44, p < .001.  
 Procedure. After electrode application, participants were seated in an 
electrically shielded booth in front of a 21-in. computer monitor (60 Hz) at a viewing 
distance of 65 cm (maintained by a chin rest). Experimental materials (context, words) 
were presented at the center of the screen in white 16-point Helvetica font on a black 
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background using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 
2007; Pelli, 1997) running under MATLAB (2012b), on an Apple Mac Mini (OS 10.7.). 
Participants were instructed to avoid any eye, head, and jaw movements and to maintain 
fixation at the center of the screen during word-by-word presentation. Furthermore, they 
were instructed to read the stories attentively, and to perform the respective judgments 
by pressing the appropriate response key.  
 For each of the morality and emotion materials, a practice block containing 
three trials preceded the experimental items that were presented in a total of four blocks 
of 25 items each. Blocks were separated by a short break that was controlled in its 
duration by the participant. Participants started a trial block by pressing the space bar. 
Then, the context was displayed for a minimum duration of 1,500 ms. When participants 
had read the context sentences, they initiated the word-by-word presentation of the target 
sentence by pressing the space bar, which started with the presentation of a fixation point 
for 1000 ms. Then, each word was displayed centrally for 300 ms, with a 200-ms blank 
interval between successive word presentations. After the offset of the final word and a 
blank interval of 1,100 ms, the presentation of the decision screen followed, stating the 
mapping of judgments (yes-no) to response keys. This mapping was constant within a 
given participant but counterbalanced across participants. 
 Electrophysiological measures. Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was 
recorded continuously without online low-pass filtering from 72 Ag-AgCl electrodes 
using a BIOSEMI Active-Two DC-amplifier system with a sampling rate of 512 Hz for 
EEG and electrooculogram (EOG). All EEG/ERP analyses were performed using 
available MATLAB toolboxes (EEGLAB: Delorme & Makeig, 2004; FieldTrip: 
Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011) and custom MATLAB scripts (for details, 
see Dudschig, Mackenzie, Strozyk, Kaup, & Leuthold, 2016). The analysis epoch started 
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200 ms prior to the onset of the critical word and lasted for 1,700 ms. For preprocessing 
purposes, signals from all EEG channels were off-line recalculated to an average 
reference and high-pass filtered (Butterworth filter, 0.1 Hz, 12 dB/oct). (Ocular) artifacts 
were then removed and EEG data were corrected (for a similar procedure, see Nolan, 
Whelan, & Reilly, 2010). As in Dudschig et al., a predefined z-score threshold of ±3 
was used to identify outliers relating to channels, epochs, independent components, and 
single-channels in single-epochs. Firstly, epochs containing extreme values in single 
electrodes (e.g., amplifier blockings, values larger ±1000 µV in any electrode) were 
removed, as were trials containing values exceeding ±75 μV in multiple electrodes that 
were unrelated to eye movements. Secondly, z-scored variance measures were 
calculated for all electrodes, and noisy EEG electrodes (z-score > ±3) were removed if 
their activity was uncorrelated to EOG activity. Thirdly, a spatial independent 
components analysis (ICA) based on the infomax algorithm (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) 
was performed on the "cleaned" EEG data set and ICA components reflecting ocular 
activity (blinks and horizontal eye movements) were removed from this data set 
(M[removed components] = 3.4). Fourthly, previously removed noisy channels (M = 
2.35, range = 0 to 5) were interpolated in the ICA-cleaned EEG data set using the 
average EEG activity of adjacent uncontaminated channels within a specified distance 
(4 cm, ~ 3-4 neighbours per electrode) in order to ensure a full electrode array for each 
participant. The mean number of trials remaining (M = 36.75 out of 40; range = 21-40, 
median = 38.0) per condition was not reliably different across conditions, all ps > .40.  
 Data analysis. For artifact-free trials, the signal at each electrode site was 
averaged separately for each experimental condition, time-locked to the onset of the 
critical word, and low-pass filtered (Butterworth filter, 30 Hz, 36 dB/oct). In addition, 
all EEG channels were recalculated to an average mastoid reference as in Leuthold et al. 
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(2015) and aligned to a 200-ms baseline prior to the onset of the critical word. To 
facilitate comparison across studies, similar to previous moral and emotion 
comprehension studies, mean ERP amplitudes were determined for the following time 
ranges: 200 to 250 ms (P200; as in Leuthold et al, 2015; Van Berkum et al., 2009), 300 
to 500 ms (N400; as in Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Leuthold et al,, 2015), and 
500 to 700 ms (LPP, as in Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009; and 
similar to Van Berkum et al., 2009). Since P200 effects are typically larger over anterior 
midline electrodes (e.g., Bohan et al., 2012; Leuthold et al., 2015), whereas N400 and 
LPP effects usually show a more pronounced centroparietal distribution (e.g., Delaney-
Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009; Leuthold et al., 2015; Van Berkum et al., 
2009), midline electrodes were pooled to form an anterior (AFz, Fz, FCz) and a posterior 
region-of-interest (ROI; CPz, Pz, POz).  
 Statistical analyses of reaction times and ERP amplitudes were performed by 
means of repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA). The analysis of the binary 
yes-no judgments were analyzed using a logit model as recommended by Jaeger (2008), 
implemented via the glmer function within the lme4 R-package (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Separate glmer model fitting procedures were implemented 
for morality and emotion materials. The model was specified with fixed effects of 
condition, valence, and arousal with random intercepts for participants and items (i.e., 
answer ~ condition + valence + arousal + (1|participants) + (1|items)). For all statistical 
analyses, the significance level was set to alpha = .05.  
 Complementing the standard, condition-dependent ERP analysis, judgment-
dependent ERP analyses were conducted as mentioned in the introduction. That is, we 
measured ERP amplitudes in waveforms averaged for moral items that were judged as 
acceptable (yes-response) and for immoral items judged as unacceptable (no-response) 
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as well as for neutral items that were judged as not moving (no-response) and negative 
items judged as moving (yes-response). It is worth mentioning that a possible limitation 
of this judgment-dependent analysis relates to the fact that, in contrast to the standard 
analysis, items might not be perfectly matched (i.e., in terms of contexts and critical 
words presented) across the respective experimental conditions. The ANOVA 
performed on these ERP amplitude data will be reported after the standard ERP analysis. 
 
Results 
Behavioral measures  
Separate logistic regression analyses were performed for the emotion and morality 
materials to determine the impact of condition, valence, and arousal for the respective 
binary judgments. Moral items were more often judged as acceptable than immoral 
items (84.91 vs. 17.77%, p <.001), and negative items were judged more often as being 
emotionally moving than neutral items (68.03 vs. 34.29%, p <.001). For moral materials, 
there was a significant effect of condition (β = -3.23, SE = 0.28, Wald Z = -11.53, p < 
.001) and valence (β = 0.38, SE = 0.08, Wald Z = 4.69, p < .001). These results suggest 
that the likelihood of yes-responses ("acceptable") decreased for immoral items, and 
increased for more positively rated items. 
 For emotion materials, there was a significant effect of condition (β = -0.48, 
SE = 0.23, Wald Z = -2.06, p < .05), valence (β = -0.30, SE = 0.07, Wald Z = -4.19, p < 
.001) and arousal (β = 1.15, SE = 0.07, Wald Z = 17.15, p < .001), indicating that the 
likelihood of yes-responses ("moving") decreased for neutral items and for more 
positively rated items but mainly increased for more arousing items.  
 The separate ANOVAs performed on reaction time (RT) data yielded faster 
responses to immoral than moral items (1370 vs. 1603 ms), F(1, 27) = 6.43, p < .05, ηp2 
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= .19 for the morality materials. For emotion materials, there was a trend for faster 
responses to negative than neutral items (1010 vs. 1127 ms), F(1, 27) = 3.80, p = .06, 
ηp2 = .12.  
Electrophysiological measures - condition-dependent ERP results.  
ERP waveforms averaged according to the rating-based item classification (as 
determined by the pre-tests discussed above) are shown in Figure 1. For the ERP data, 
we performed separate ANOVAs for morality and emotion materials on mean ERP 
amplitudes at midline electrodes with factors condition (moral vs. immoral or emotional-
neutral vs. negative) and ant-post (anterior vs. posterior) ROI.  
 For both types of materials, analyses of mean ERP amplitudes coincided with 
an overall main effect of ant-post, indicating an anterior positivity for the early P200 
time window (200-250 ms), and a posterior positivity for the subsequent time windows 
(300-500 ms, 500-700 ms). For the sake of brevity, we refrain from reporting the 
respective main effects of ant-post (all Fs(1, 27) < 5.77, all ps < .05) in the following. 
 200-250 ms (P200). In this time window, there were no reliable condition 
effects neither for morality materials, all Fs < 1.07, ps > .31, nor for emotion materials, 
all Fs(1, 27) < 2.39, ps > .13. 
 300-500 ms (N400). Mean ERP amplitudes for morality materials yielded a 
Condition x Ant-Post interaction, F(1, 27) = 5.51, p < .05, ηp2 = .17, reflecting a trend 
for a more negative-going ERP waveform for immoral than moral items over anterior 
electrodes (3.43 vs. 4.54 V), F(1, 27) = 3.87, p = .06, but not over posterior electrodes 
(4.93 vs. 4.90 V), F(1, 27) = 0.01, p = .94.  
 For emotion materials ERP amplitudes were more positive-going for negative 
than neutral items (6.33 vs. 4.17 V), F(1, 27) = 13.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .33, but the 
Condition x Ant-Post interaction was not significant, F(1, 27) = 2.84, p = .10.  
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 500-700 ms (LPP). In this time window, the reliable Condition x Ant-Post 
interaction for morality materials, F(1, 27) = 6.46, p < .05, indicated a more negative-
going waveform for immoral versus moral items for the anterior ROI (4.97 vs. 6.19 V), 
F(1, 27) = 4.61, p < .05, but not for the posterior ROI (7.20 vs. 7.30 V), F = 0.03, p = 
.86. 
 Finally, mean ERP amplitudes for emotion materials yielded a significant 
Condition x Ant-Post interaction, F(1, 27) = 5.71, p < .05, ηp2 = .17. Further testing 
indicated a larger positivity for negative than neutral items for the posterior ROI (10.04 
vs. 8.11 V), F(1, 27) = 7.26, p < .05, but not for the anterior ROI (6.36 vs. 6.12 V), F 
= 0.09, p = .77. 
Judgment-dependent ERP results.  
ERP waveforms averaged corresponding to the judgment-dependent analysis are shown 
in Figure 2. Again, for both types of materials, the analyses of mean ERP amplitudes 
showed main effects of ant-post (all Fs(1, 27) < 6.36, all ps < .05), indicating an anterior 
positivity for the early P200 time window, and a posterior positivity for the later time 
windows.  
 200-250 ms. For morality materials, the ANOVA of mean judgment-
dependent ERP amplitudes with variables answer (yes vs. no) and ant-post (anterior vs. 
posterior) produced no significant effects, all Fs(1, 27) < 1.53, ps > .22. 
 The ANOVA for emotion materials showed a trend for the main effect of 
answer, F(1, 27) = 3.91, p = .058, ηp2 = .13, but no interaction effect, F < 0.01, p > .97, 
due to a more positive-going ERP waveform for no-responses than yes-responses (6.44 
vs. 5.19 V). 
 300-500 ms. For morality materials, the Condition x Ant-Post interaction was 
significant, F(1, 27) = 7.06, p < .05, ηp2 = .21, indicating a trend towards a more negative- 
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Figure 1. Upper panel: Condition-dependent grand average ERP waveforms elicited at anterior 
and posterior midline electrodes time-locked to the onset of the critical word for morality and 
emotion materials in Experiment 1. Positivity is plotted upwards. Lower panel: Spline-
interpolated topographic map of mean ERP difference waveform for the 200-250 ms, 300-500 
ms, and 500-700 ms time window in Experiment 1. Top panel: emotion condition (negative 
minus neutral). Bottom panel: morality condition (immoral minus moral).  
 
 65 
 
going ERP waveform for no-responses than yes-responses for the anterior ROI (3.55 vs. 
4.72 V), F(1, 27) = 3.55, p = .07, but not for the posterior ROI (5.13 vs. 5.48 V), F = 
0.04, p = .84.  
 For emotion materials, the ERP positivity was larger for yes-responses than 
no-responses (7.63 vs. 4.17 V), F(1, 27) = 14.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. The answer effect 
tended to be stronger over posterior than anterior electrodes as indicated by the trend for 
the Condition x Ant-Post interaction, F(1, 27) = 3.73, p = .064, ηp2 = .12 (cf. Figure 2). 
 500-700 ms. For morality materials, the Condition x Ant-Post interaction was 
significant, F(1, 27) = 8.32, p < .01, ηp2 = .24, indicating a trend for a more negative-
going ERP waveform for no-responses than yes-responses for the anterior ROI (5.22 vs. 
6.53 V), F(1, 27) = 3.96, p = .057, but not for the posterior ROI (7.91 vs. 7.71 V), 
F(1, 27) = 0.11, p = .73. 
 For emotion materials, the Answer x Ant-Post interaction was significant, F(1, 
27) = 6.85, p < .05, ηp2 = .20, due to a reliably larger positivity for yes-responses than 
no-responses for the posterior ROI (10.73 vs. 7.61 V), F(1, 27) = 9.19, p < .01, but not 
for the anterior ROI (6.05 vs. 5.10 V), F(1, 27) = 1.44, p = .24. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1 participants performed different judgments depending on material type, 
either focusing on the moral acceptability of someone’s behavior for morality scenarios 
or whether they were emotionally moved by the described emotion scenarios. In line 
with our expectations, behavioral data showed that moral items were very frequently 
judged as acceptable and immoral items as unacceptable, with less than 18 % of the 
items being judged by participants in a way that was inconsistent with the classifications 
that were based on the results of the pre-test (e.g., judging an item of the immoral con- 
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Figure 2. Upper panel: Judgment-dependent grand average ERP waveforms elicited at anterior 
and posterior midline electrodes time-locked to the onset of the critical word for morality and 
emotion materials in Experiment 1. Positivity is plotted upwards. Lower panel: Spline-
interpolated topographic map of mean ERP difference waveform for the 200-250 ms, 300-500 
ms, and 500-700 ms time window in Experiment 1. Top panel: emotion condition (yes minus 
no). Bottom panel: morality condition (yes minus no). 
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dition as morally acceptable). Crucially, the logistic regression analysis indicated that, 
in addition to the pre-classified condition variable, also valence influences morality 
judgments, in line with views that emotional aspects of the scenarios contribute to moral 
decision making (e.g., Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001). For emotion items, subjective 
judgments of items did accord slightly less well with the pre-classified neutral vs. 
negative item classification (about 67%). A possible reason for this lower consistency is 
suggested by the logistic regression analysis results, which indicated that mainly rating-
based arousal scores and to a lesser extent valence scores for each item were influencing 
the affective yes-no judgments in addition to the pre-classified condition variable. This 
is also plausible given the rating results for emotion materials, indicating that some 
neutral scenarios received positive valence ratings. There was also a moderately positive 
correlation indicating increasing arousal ratings with positive valence for these neutral 
items (r = .32). Finally, another reason could be that some of the sentence final emotional 
words were valenced, and thus yes-responses to neutral items might also reflect a word-
based valence effect.  
 The finding of shorter RTs for immoral and negative items indicates that these 
items were more salient than moral and neutral items, as also suggested by the rating 
study results. In addition, we observed faster responses for emotional than moral 
materials, suggesting that moral judgments involve a more time-consuming decision 
process. However, based on this result alone, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
affect-related processes contribute to moral judgments. In summary, the behavioral data 
clearly indicate that participants performed the different judgment tasks appropriately. 
 In terms of the ERP results, a first key finding relates to the ERP analysis for 
emotion materials, which showed a larger posterior than anterior ERP positivity from 
300-700 ms, as expected. Given its topographic distribution and time-course, and the 
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fact that its amplitude was larger for negative than neutral materials, we take this 
positivity to reflect the LPP. It is worth noting that the judgment-dependent analysis of 
ERP amplitudes produced the same results as the standard analysis of ERP amplitudes. 
Hence, we take the larger LPP to negative than neutral items to reflect an emotion effect. 
This inference seems justified given the pre-test results for emotion materials. That is, 
negative and neutral emotion items differed with respect to their valence and arousal but 
not regarding their linguistic features (cloze probability, semantic relatedness, critical 
word frequency). Similar to Van Berkum et al. (2009), we view it as unlikely that the 
present LPP emotion effect reflects a decision-related P300 effect; we return to this issue 
in the General Discussion. Together, and in line with similar reports in the literature 
(e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009), we therefore take the 
present LPP findings as reflecting stronger affective processing of negative than neutral 
items during discourse comprehension. 
 Crucially, and in contrast to our hypothesis that morality items undergo an 
implicit affective evaluation as indicated by an LPP effect (cf. Leuthold et al., 2015), no 
reliably enhanced ERP positivity was observed for immoral as compared to moral items. 
Rather, a more negative-going ERP amplitude for immoral than moral scenarios 
appeared from 500-700 ms (cf. Figure 1). Although the direction of this amplitude effect 
is in line with the centroparietal N400 effect reported by Van Berkum et al. (2009), its 
topographic distribution is not. That is, the present morality effect in the 500-700 ms 
time window showed an anterior rather than the classic centroparietal N400 distribution, 
it occurred later, and was also more sustained. In the General Discussion, we will 
evaluate possible explanations for this anterior ERP negativity effect. 
 In summary, the ERP findings from Experiment 1 indicate that evaluative 
processing of immoral items elicited a larger anterior ERP negativity than moral items, 
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whereas negative emotional items triggered a larger LPP than neutral items, suggesting 
that the different materials differ with regard to their cognitive versus affective 
processing. This difference in processing might be attributed to the fact that participants 
performed different tasks to the two types of materials. In the following experiment, we 
will therefore test whether the evaluation of moral content, as indicated by the anterior 
negativity, is task-dependent by asking participants to perform emotional judgments for 
morality materials as well.  
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, participants saw the same morality and emotional scenarios as in 
Experiment 1, but in this case judged all materials as to whether they were emotionally 
moved by them. We reasoned that focusing on the evaluation of the emotional content 
of morality materials might change their online processing in such a way that their 
affective analysis is prioritized (e.g., Lai et al., 2012; see also Holt et al., 2009). Like in 
Experiment 1, we analyzed the binary yes-no judgments using logistic regression 
analyses. This also allowed us to examine whether task demands influence the 
processing of morality materials and whether emotion judgments for both morality and 
emotion materials take into account the same affective item dimensions. In this case, a 
larger LPP should be elicited by both immoral and negative emotional items compared 
to moral and neutral emotional items. That is, the larger anterior negativity observed for 
morality materials in Experiment 1 should be absent.  
 
 
Methods 
 Participants. Thirty right-handed native German speakers from the University 
of Tübingen participated for course credits or payment. Data from one participant were 
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excluded from the analyses due to less than 30% of trials per condition remaining after 
artifact rejection and from one participant due to excessive alpha activity. Because one 
behavioral data set was lost due to a technical problem, 27 participants entered the 
behavioral data analysis and 28 participants (M = 23.0 years, 20 females) contributed 
data to the ERP analysis. 
 Materials, procedure, and design. Experiment 1 was identical to Experiment 
2 concerning all methodological aspects except that participants now performed yes-no 
responses to both moral and emotion materials with regard to the question: “Berührt Sie 
das Gelesene?” [“Are you emotionally moved by the presented text?”]. 
 Data analysis. During EEG preprocessing, the number of ICA components 
removed for cleaning the EEG data set was M = 3.9, and the number of previously 
removed noisy channels that were interpolated in the ICA-cleaned EEG data set was M 
= 1.7 (range = 0 to 5). Following artifact rejection, the mean number of trials remaining 
per condition (M = 37.50 trials out of 40; range = 27-40, median = 39.0) was not reliably 
different across conditions, all ps > .29.  
 Binary yes-no judgments were analyzed using a logistic regression analysis 
identical to Experiment 1. Also, in addition to the standard ERP analysis, we measured 
ERP amplitudes in waveforms averaged for moral and neutral items that were judged as 
not emotionally moving and for immoral and negative items judged as moving. These 
judgment-dependent ERP results are reported at the end of the results section. 
 
Results 
Behavioral measures 
As in Experiment 1, separate logistic regression analyses were performed for the binary 
emotion judgments to emotion and morality materials. For morality materials, immoral 
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items were more often judged as emotionally moving than moral items (71.85 vs. 44.30 
%, p <.001). There were significant effects of condition (β = 0.83, SE = 0.22, Wald Z = 
3.71, p < .001), valence (β = -0.15, SE = 0.06, Wald Z = -2.28, p < .05) and arousal (β = 
0.94, SE = 0.08, Wald Z = 11.13, p < .001). These results suggest that the likelihood of 
yes-responses ("moving") increased for immoral items and for more arousing items but 
slightly decreased for more positively rated items.  
 For emotion materials, negative items were more frequently judged as moving 
compared to neutral items (72.69 vs. 35.13 %, p <.001). There was a significant effect 
of valence (β = -0.18, SE = 0.08, Wald Z = -2.17, p < .05) and arousal (β = 1.34, SE = 
0.08, Wald Z = 16.77, p < .001), indicating that the likelihood of yes-responses 
("moving") slightly decreased for more positively rated items but mainly increased for 
more arousing items. 
 The ANOVA performed on RT yielded no reliably faster responses to immoral 
than moral items (1044 vs. 1157 ms), F(1, 26) = 2.82, p = .11, ηp2 = .10. For emotion 
materials, RT was faster for negative than neutral items (953 vs. 1054 ms), F(1, 26) = 
6.15, p < .05, ηp2 = .19. 
Electrophysiological measures - condition-dependent ERP results.  
ERP waveforms averaged according to the rating-based item classification are shown in 
Figure 3. For both types of materials, the waveform was characterized by an anterior 
P200 (200-250 ms), and a broadly distributed positivity between 300-500 ms that tended 
to be posteriorly distributed in the late LPP time window (500-700 ms). As before, main 
effects of topography will not be discussed in the following.   
 200-250 ms (P200). Mean ERP amplitudes for morality materials in this time 
interval were not reliably influenced by experimental conditions, all Fs < 0.31, ps > .58. 
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 For emotion materials, the Condition x Ant-Post interaction was significant, 
F(1, 27) = 4.81, p < .05, ηp2 = .15, indicating a larger positivity for negative than neutral 
items for the posterior ROI (4.32 vs. 2.75 V), F(1, 27) = 13.87, p < .001, and as a trend 
for the anterior ROI (7.03 vs. 6.28 V), F(1, 27) = 3.33, p = .08. 
 300-500 ms (N400). Mean ERP amplitudes for morality materials yielded a 
Condition x Ant-Post interaction, F(1, 27) = 5.88, p < .05, ηp2 = .18. Further testing 
indicated a trend for a more positive-going ERP waveform for immoral than moral items 
for posterior ROIs (5.63 vs. 4.91 V), F(1, 27) = 3.73, p = .06, but no reliable effect for 
anterior ROIs (4.85 vs. 4.46 V), F < 0.01, p = .98. 
 For emotion materials, the significant Condition x Ant-Post interaction, F(1, 
27) = 20.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .43, indicated that the condition effect was more pronounced 
for the posterior ROI. However, the ERP positivity was reliably larger for negative than 
neutral items over both anterior (6.69 vs. 5.67 µV) and posterior midline electrodes (7.84 
vs. 4.88 µV), all Fs(1, 27) > 6.57, p < .05. 
 500-700 ms (LPP). For the morality materials, in this time window only the 
interaction of Condition x Ant-Post was significant, F(1, 27) = 5.72, p < .05, ηp2 = .17, 
but further testing revealed no reliable effects, all Fs(1, 27) < 2.93, ps ≥ .10. 
 Finally, analyses of emotion materials showed a significant Condition x Ant-
Post interaction, F(1, 27) = 26.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, due to a larger positivity for 
negative than neutral items for the posterior ROI (10.09 vs. 7.57 V), F(1, 27) = 35.50, 
p < .001, but not for the anterior ROI (7.98 vs. 7.80 V), F(1, 27) = 0.20, p = .66. 
Judgment-dependent ERP results. 
ERP waveforms averaged according to the judgment-dependent classification are shown 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3. Upper panel: Condition-dependent grand average ERP waveforms elicited at anterior 
and posterior midline electrodes time-locked to the onset of the critical word for morality and 
emotion materials in Experiment 2. Positivity is plotted upwards. Lower panel: Spline-
interpolated topographic map of mean ERP difference waveform for the 200-250 ms, 300-500 
ms, and 500-700 ms time window in Experiment 2. Top panel: emotion condition (negative 
minus neutral). Bottom panel: morality condition (immoral minus moral).  
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 200-250 ms. The ANOVA for judgment-dependent ERPs of morality materials 
revealed no reliable condition effects, all Fs(1, 27) < 1.69, ps > .20. For emotion 
materials, there was a trend for a larger positivity for yes-responses vs. no-responses 
(5.25 vs. 4.43 V), F(1, 27) = 3.09, p = .09.  
 300-500 ms. In this time window, ERP amplitudes of morality materials 
yielded a larger positivity for yes-responses than no-responses (5.68 vs. 4.45 V), F(1, 
27) = 4.66, p < .05, ηp2 = .15.  
 For emotion materials, the Answer x Ant-Post interaction was significant, F(1, 
27) = 11.79, p < .01, ηp2 = .30, due to an enlarged positivity for yes-responses than no-
responses for the posterior ROI (7.65 vs. 4.27 V), F(1, 27) = 38.38, p < .001, compared 
to the anterior ROI (6.33 vs. 4.91 V), F(1, 27) = 5.16, p < .05. 
 500-700 ms. ERP amplitudes in this subsequent time window were not 
influenced by experimental condition for morality materials, all Fs(1, 27) < 2.35, ps > 
.13. 
 For emotion materials, the Answer x Ant-Post interaction was significant, F(1, 
27) = 13.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .34; further testing an enlarged positivity for yes-responses 
than no-responses for the posterior ROI (9.74 vs. 7.49 V), F(1, 27) = 7.75, p < .01, but 
not for the anterior ROI (7.66 vs. 7.53 V), F = 0.04, p = .85.  
 
Discussion 
The behavioral data analysis showed that as in Experiment 1, responses were faster for 
negative than neutral items, again lending support to the conclusion that the former items 
are emotionally more salient. In addition, the RT analysis indicated that moral and 
immoral items did not reliably differ with regard to the speed of emotion judgments, 
whereas they did for morality judgments in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 4. Upper panel: Judgment-dependent grand average ERP waveforms elicited at anterior 
and posterior midline electrodes time-locked to the onset of the critical word for morality and 
emotion materials in Experiment 2. Positivity is plotted upwards. Lower panel: Spline-
interpolated topographic map of mean ERP difference waveform for the 200-250 ms, 300-500 
ms, and 500-700 ms time window in Experiment 2. Top panel: emotion condition (yes minus 
no). Bottom panel: morality condition (yes minus no). 
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Importantly, response behavior differed with regard to the pre-classified item category 
for morality and emotion materials. Therefore, as in Experiment 1, ERP amplitudes were 
analyzed dependent on the pre-classified item categories (standard analysis) and 
dependent on the actual judgments.  
 First, however, it is important to note that the logistic regression analysis 
results for morality materials indicated that affective judgments were influenced not 
only by condition but mainly by rating-based arousal scores and to a smaller extent by 
valence scores for each item. Thus, in conjunction with the logistic regression analyses 
results for emotion materials, it appears that emotion judgments are strongly influenced 
by arousal and less so by valence. It is hence understandable that moral as compared to 
neutral items were judged more frequently as moving (44.30 vs. 35.13 %; p < .001). 
This finding is plausible given the fact that arousal rating results for morality materials 
indicated a smaller difference between moral and immoral items than neutral and 
negative items, which might also account for the absence of a reliable RT effect for the 
morality materials.  
 In the standard ERP analysis, replicating the LPP findings from Experiment 1, 
there was a larger posterior positivity for negative than neutral items from 300-700 ms, 
which we again take to reflect the LPP. This finding is consistent with the earlier 
conclusion that the LPP effect reflects the (affective) evaluation of motivationally 
significant stimuli (e.g., Hajcak et al, 2012). Moreover, rather than an anterior negativity 
(500-700 ms) as observed in Experiment 1, immoral compared to moral items tended to 
elicit a larger ERP positivity in the 300-500 ms time window over posterior midline 
electrodes. Importantly, corroborating this LPP effect, the judgment-dependent ERP 
analysis revealed a larger posterior positivity in the 300-500 ms time window for both 
immoral and negative items judged as moving as compared to moral and neutral items 
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judged as non-moving. Thus, LPP findings from Experiment 2 indicate that the affective 
evaluation of incoming linguistic information occurs not only for emotion materials but 
also morality materials.  
 
General discussion 
In two ERP experiments we investigated the nature and time course of evaluative 
processing of short morality (moral vs. immoral) and emotion (neutral vs. negative) 
scenarios using a discourse comprehension paradigm. Participants judged whether they 
found the described moral situation either morally acceptable or not and the emotional 
situation as moving or not (Experiment 1), or made emotional judgments to both types 
of scenarios (Experiment 2). Assuming that affective evaluations are triggered by both 
morality and emotion materials, we expected that critical words would trigger an early 
enhanced LPP (starting at ~300 ms) for immoral compared to moral scenarios and for 
negative compared to neutral emotion materials, irrespective of the judgment task. 
However, if performing moral judgments (Experiment 1) shifts the focus to the 
cognitive-semantic processing of moral content, we assumed that an N400 effect might 
instead be triggered by morality materials. 
 Crucially, we obtained behavioral evidence for the task-dependent processing 
of morality materials and also that the specific emotional characteristics (valence, 
arousal) of emotion and morality materials influenced participants' judgments. 
Specifically, moral acceptability judgments were slower for moral than immoral items, 
whereas the speed of emotional judgments did not reliably differ. The latter judgments 
were also performed faster than the morality judgments. On the one hand, this outcome 
suggests that a more complex and hence time-consuming cognitive decision process 
underlies moral than emotional decision making, at least for the materials used in this 
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study. On the other hand, it also indicates that the way readers process information about 
the persons and events described in the text, that is, which information they focus on and 
evaluate, depends on their specific goals. The additional finding of faster judgment 
responses to emotionally negative and immoral items than neutral and moral items in 
Experiment 1 might be attributed to the fact that the former items are more salient. 
Finally, in both experiments participants answered the respective judgment questions as 
expected, in the majority of cases. That is, immoral items were judged as less acceptable 
(Experiment 1) and more moving (Experiment 2) than moral ones and negative items 
were judged as emotionally more moving than neutral ones. Still, binary judgment 
behavior differed as compared to the pre-classified item category for both morality and 
for emotion materials. These findings suggest that participants adopted response criteria 
that did not fully accord with the rating-based classification of items. Whereas the rating 
study suggested that immoral compared to moral items have higher mean valence and 
mean arousal scores, it is clear that there is no perfect separation of moral and immoral 
conditions with regard to these emotion dimensions at the level of individual items as 
outlined earlier. Moreover, deciding whether a scenario is morally acceptable or not as 
well as being either moving or not might involve the processing of stimulus aspects 
different from those defining their moral content alone. This assumption is supported by 
logistic regression analysis results. That is, moral judgments were influenced by valence 
but not arousal, whereas emotion judgments were mainly driven by differences in 
arousal rather than valence for both morality and emotion materials. Together, 
behavioral findings indicate that participants followed task instructions and, more 
importantly, that processing was influenced by the task and the specific moral and 
emotional content of materials, which is why ERP amplitudes were also analyzed 
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dependent on both the pre-classified item categories (standard analysis) and dependent 
on the actual judgments. 
 A first key ERP finding concerns the larger LPP for negative than neutral 
emotional scenarios, starting after about 300 ms and lasting at least up to 700 ms after 
the onset of the critical word. It is also important to note that this LPP effect replicated 
across two independent experiments using the same materials and tasks. Crucially, target 
sentences were identical for negative and neutral items and the discourse contexts were 
only moderately constraining regarding the critical word. Hence, the observed LPP 
effects reflect a discourse-based influence, and are not the result of mere lexical 
differences between target words or expectancy-driven processes that would be 
indicated by the N400 or the P300 components. In accord with similar previous research 
(e.g., Fields & Kuperberg, 2012; Holt et al., 2009; see also Fischler & Bradley, 2006), 
we therefore take this long-lasting LPP effect to indicate the more intense affective 
evaluation of negative than neutral items.  
 In this respect, the present work extends previous ERP studies examining 
discourse-based emotion effects using contexts that were either strongly constraining, 
and hence presumably triggered emotion congruity effects as indicated by the N400 
(e.g., León et al., 2010; Leuthold et al., 2012), or varied the critical words across emotion 
conditions (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Fields & Kuperberg, 2016; Holt et 
al., 2009; León et al., 2010). For instance, Delaney-Busch and Kuperberg (2013) found 
a larger LPP (500-700 ms) to pleasant and unpleasant emotion words irrespective of the 
valence of the preceding emotional discourse context, whereas the N400 effect was 
absent. They interpreted this finding in terms of the affective primacy hypothesis 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007) and proposed that for emotional contexts the affective 
processing of incoming information dominates over semantic processing. The present 
 80 
LPP effect in conjunction with the absence of an N400 effect accords with this view, 
suggesting that participants focused on the processing of the emotional rather than the 
semantic content in the present affective judgment task (e.g., Lai et al., 2012). Together, 
the present ERP findings for emotion materials narrow the identified research gap 
concerning the investigation of emotional language comprehension by demonstrating 
that an LPP indicating more intense affecting processing is also observed when 
discourse contexts determine the emotional meaning of identical critical (emotion) 
words in target sentences. However, the functional interpretation of the LPP as reflecting 
the affective processing of linguistic input is still a matter for further research (see 
below). 
 Importantly, we reasoned that if evaluative-affective categorization (as 
indicated by the LPP) contributes to moral judgments, then we should also see a larger 
LPP for immoral than moral items, as in previous studies using a similar approach 
(Leuthold et al., 2015; Van Berkum et al., 2009). In fact, such an enhanced LPP for 
immoral compared to moral items was present over posterior electrodes from 300-500 
ms in Experiment 2. However, before discussing potential implications of this ERP 
effect, it is important to consider the alternative possibility that it reflects an N400 effect. 
In this case, one would have to assume that a larger N400 to moral than immoral items 
overlaps with the positive-going ERP waveform, thereby producing a larger ERP 
positivity to immoral than moral items. For instance, Holt et al. observed in their study 
a larger N400 to negative and positive words compared to neutral words, but only if 
participants passively read for comprehension. When they evaluated the emotional 
content, however, this N400 amplitude modulation was obscured by the overlapping 
LPP. This possibility would require that moral as compared to immoral items produce a 
cost at the level of lexico-semantic processing or when accessing semantic memory, as 
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it is typically the case for incongruent items with low cloze probability or low LSA 
scores. Yet, the present materials used identical target sentences, which precludes the 
influence of word-based effects. Moreover, an N400 effect due to material differences 
at sentence- and discourse-level is not supported, since moral and immoral items did not 
differ with regard to cloze probability and LSA scores. Also, Leuthold et al. (2015) 
found an LPP effect and no sign of an N400 when using a passive text comprehension 
task for which Holt et al. (2009) found an N400 effect to context-incongruent emotion 
materials. Together, we view it unlikely that the present ERP effect is due to N400 
component overlap and rather reflects a genuine LPP effect. Thus, it appears that 
participants not only judged immoral items as emotionally more moving than moral ones 
but also that these items underwent more intense affective processing. However, we did 
not find a larger LPP for immoral than moral items when moral judgments were required 
in Experiment 1. This finding accords with other discourse comprehension studies in 
that the LPP, and hence affective processing of linguistic input, is modulated by various 
variables, including the specific discourse context and task demands (e.g., Delaney-
Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Fields & Kuperberg, 2016; Holt et al., 2009; Xiang & 
Kuperberg, 2015).  
 Critically, the moral judgment task had an impact on online processing, as 
suggested by the ERP findings of Experiment 1, in which an anterior negativity (rather 
than the LPP), differed in amplitude across morality conditions.5 Before discussing the 
                                                      
5 When analyzing the present judgment-dependent midline ERP amplitudes for moral materials in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for the 300-500 ms time window, the ANOVA with the between-
subjects factor Task (moral judgment vs. reading) and the repeated measurement factors condition 
(moral vs. immoral) and ant-post (anterior vs. posterior) revealed a significant Task x Condition 
interaction, F(1, 54) = 4.67, p < .05, which was also significant for the anterior ROI, F(1, 54) = 4.52, p < 
.05. Moreover, analysis of midline ERP amplitudes for moral materials in Experiment 1 in combination 
with those of Leuthold et al. (2015) for the 300-500 ms time window, the analogous ANOVA with the 
between-subjects factor Task (moral judgment vs. reading) and the repeated measurement factors 
condition and ant-post revealed a significant Task x Condition interaction, F(1, 54) = 6.47, p < .05. This 
was due to the fact that ERP amplitudes were more negative-going for immoral than moral items in the 
moral judgment task but a reverse amplitude effect in the reading task of Leuthold et al. (2015). This is 
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possible functional significance of this negative ERP deflection in more detail, it is 
helpful to first rule out a possible alternative explanation in terms of ERP component 
overlap. Specifically, since N400 and LPP effects are known to be similarly distributed 
over the scalp, there remains a possibility that simultaneously triggered LPP and N400 
effects attenuate each other, with the N400 effect showing up only over anterior 
electrodes. However, we consider this rather unlikely for the following reasons. First, 
the present anterior negativity effect was more sustained than typical N400 effects. 
Second, there were only relatively small LPP effects for morality materials in 
Experiment 2, despite the fact that emotional judgments were required, which are known 
to increase LPP effects in comparison to a passive comprehension task (e.g., Holt et al., 
2009). Third, cloze probability for critical words and the target sentence (as well as 
semantic similarity) was the same for moral and immoral items, thereby minimizing 
possible (predictive) sentence-level and word-based effects on information processing 
which are known to trigger a posteriorly distributed N400 effect. Finally, what mattered 
in our materials were the moral implications of the events being described, whereas the 
posterior N400 effect in Van Berkum et al.'s (2009) study was triggered by explicit 
moral statements that were value-incongruent rather than congruent. 
 We observed that the present immoral compared to moral items elicited a 
tentatively larger negative-going deflection over anterior electrodes from roughly 300 
to 700 ms after critical word onset. Of course, since this morality effect on the anterior 
negativity was unexpected, it is important to replicate this ERP effect in future studies 
and to elaborate its potential functional interpretation. In the following, we present such 
a possible interpretation based on other discourse comprehension studies that also found 
                                                      
an interesting result since it also indicates that the ERP amplitude effect to moral items depends on the 
task. 
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an anterior negativity (Baggio, van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2008; Xiang & Kuperberg, 
2015). In these studies, the anterior negativity was taken to index language-related 
working memory demands, that is, when alternative but likely text inferences have to be 
simultaneously maintained or integrated within the discourse or situation model (cf. 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Specifically, we therefore speculate that when explicit 
moral judgments are required, this might impact on the processing of scenarios and the 
updating of the discourse model in such a way that readers maintain in working memory 
for a short while after critical word input both the moral and immoral action (for a similar 
reasoning, see Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015). Put differently, it is possible that working 
memory load and the demands on integrating linguistic information into the discourse 
model is higher in the case of immoral than moral items, giving rise to the enlarged 
anterior negativity. 
 Certainly, assuming that the present anterior negativity effect might relate to 
working memory functions would imply that cognitive-semantic processing plays a role 
when explicit moral judgments are required. By contrast, when participants merely read 
the same moral materials for comprehension instead of performing an explicit moral 
judgment task (Leuthold et al., 2015), a larger LPP was elicited by immoral than moral 
items, which we took to reflect the affective evaluation of morality materials.6 Thus, it 
is evident that discrepant ERP patterns result, indicative of cognitive (anterior 
negativity) and affective processing (LPP), when explicit moral judgments are required 
rather than when the moral content is implicitly processed. Such a task-dependent 
impact on moral information processing is in line with fMRI evidence indicating that 
cognitive processes are more dominant when the task requires explicit moral judgments 
                                                      
6 We would like to note that in a current text comprehension study (in preparation) using the same 
materials but a passive reading task, we replicated the larger LPP in the 300-500 ms time interval for 
immoral than moral items and also for negative than neutral items. 
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than merely the passive processing of moral content and vice versa (Sevinc & Spreng, 
2014).  
Open issues  
 An open issue concerns the question of whether, and in which way, the LPP is 
related to the P300 component. For instance, it is known that the amplitude of the 
centroparietal P300 is inversely related to the prior and also the subjective probability 
of a given stimulus event, task demands, and the significance of stimulus input (e.g., 
Johnson, 1988. With regard to ERP studies using emotional discourse contexts to study 
person perception (Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt, 2001; Van 
Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2007), it is interesting to note that a larger 
centroparietal ERP positivity has been found to sentence-final words describing a trait-
consistent (‘[...] gave his wife a slap’) than a trait-inconsistent behavior (‘[...] gave his 
mother a kiss’) following a short passage of text describing a person (e.g., as being 
hostile). Assuming that readers construct a situation model in working memory about 
the persons and events described in the text, in line with theories about the mental 
processes reflected by the P300 (cf. Donchin & Coles, 1988; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, 
& Cohen, 2005), one might then assume that a larger P300 (or LPP) is triggered if this 
model needs updating, as in the case of inconsistent language input. With regard to the 
impact of emotional stimulus characteristics, the more recent locus coeruleus (LC)-P300 
theory (e.g., Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) might provide an integrative framework for the 
interpretation of the P300 and the emotion-related LPP, since it assumes that the 
centroparietal positivity reflects a phasic, LC-mediated enhancement of cortical activity 
not only after unexpected but also after motivationally relevant and salient stimuli. 
 It is also an open issue whether the integration of linguistic information into 
the discourse or situation model is reflected by ERP negativities rather than ERP 
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positivities. Thus, the N400 has also been related to the demands of integrating linguistic 
input into a situation model (e.g., Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006; Filik & Leuthold, 
2008, 2013). Moreover, we speculated above that the present anterior negativity might 
also reflect such integration demands. Together, it remains an important task to further 
examine the cognitive and affective processes that are more specifically reflected by 
various ERP components (P300, LPP, N400, and anterior negativity) typically observed 
in discourse comprehension studies. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the present study provides evidence for the assumption that the processing 
of morality scenarios depends on the specific task performed by participants. 
Specifically, for explicit moral judgments, immoral items elicited a larger anterior 
negativity than moral items, indicating the enhanced cognitive processing of moral 
content. By contrast, an LPP effect similar to that observed for negative compared to 
neutral emotional items was elicited for emotion judgments, indicating the affective 
categorization of incoming information during discourse comprehension. Future 
research would need to take into account the potential impact of task demands when 
elucidating the nature of the potential cognitive and affective processes contributing to 
moral evaluations and decisions. 
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Abstract 
Recently, we showed that when participants read about daily moral transgressions or 
emotional events a larger late positive potential (LPP) was found, which was taken to 
indicate the increased affective processing of immoral than moral as well as negative 
than neutral scenarios (Kunkel, Filik, Mackenzie, & Leuthold, 2018; Kunkel, 
Mackenzie, Filik, & Leuthold, under review). Using facial electromyogram (fEMG) and 
electrodermal activity (EDA), Kunkel et al. (under review) examined whether the same 
emotion and morality scenarios trigger embodied responses if participants read them for 
comprehension. Results showed no reliable fEMG differences in either corrugator or 
zygomaticus activity and also not in phasic EDA responses. Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon and Vermeulen (2009) suggested that embodied processing is task-dependent 
and only apparent if required by an emotion-related task. Therefore, the present 
experiment examined whether fEMG, EDA, and the electrocardiogram (ECG) were 
influenced by the same scenarios if participants perform an emotional judgment task. 
Despite participants showing clear fEMG effects to standard emotional pictures and 
words, emotion materials elicited no reliable fEMG effects in all three muscles. For 
morality materials, fEMG corrugator, levator, and zygomaticus activity was reliable 
influenced by immoral compared to moral scenarios indicating negative affect. Changes 
in heart rate of the ECG were only differentially influenced by negative compared to 
neutral scenarios but not for morality materials. EDA was completely insensitive to the 
present stimuli. We conclude that for the present materials, affective simulation takes 
place only in facial muscle responses when an explicit, emotional-related task is 
performed. 
Keywords: Moral, emotion, affective evaluation, embodiment, discourse 
comprehension, fEMG, EDA, ECG  
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Language is a powerful tool to induce emotions (cf. Sanford & Emmott, 2012). For 
instance, we might experience emotions when reading in a narrative about a character 
who is tortured or who falls in love. But which mental processes underlie these 
emotional responses while reading a passage of text? One answer to this question builds 
on the grounded cognition framework (for a review, see Barsalou, 2008), assuming that 
comprehending a piece of emotional text involves the simulation and reactivation of 
previously experienced emotions (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007). Recent text comprehension 
studies using materials that describe emotional events (e.g., “You and your lover 
embrace after a long separation.”, Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007) provided behavioral 
evidence in accord with this view (see also Filik, Hunter, & Leuthold, 2015; Havas, 
Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010). However, whereas reading of short 
scenarios describing emotional events or daily moral transgressions elicit implicit 
affective evaluations as indicated by event-related brain potential (ERPs) (e.g., 
Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, & Filik, 2015, Kunkel, Filik, Mackenzie, & Leuthold, 
2018), it remains unclear whether such materials also trigger embodied responses that 
are reflected by peripheral psychophysiological measures. Therefore, we will record the 
facial electromyogram (fEMG), the electrocardiogram (ECG), and electrodermal 
activity (EDA) as indices of embodied responses during emotional and moral discourse 
comprehension. 
Previous studies suggest that affective embodiment depends on the salience and 
task-relevance of the emotional content (Havas et al., 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). For instance, Niedenthal et al. (2009) used fEMG 
recordings from different facial muscles to reveal embodied responses to isolated 
emotional words, building on the fact that the fEMG captures subtle facial muscle 
movements that are related to specific emotional expressions (cf. Dimberg, 1990; Van 
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Boxtel, 2010). That is, positive stimuli typically elicit stronger activation in the 
zygomaticus major (happiness) and negative stimuli elicit stronger activation in the 
corrugator supercilii (anger, fear) and the levator labii superioris (disgust) (Larsen, 
Norris, & Cacioppo, 2003; Niedenthal et al., 2009; Tan et al., 2012).1 Crucially, 
Niedenthal and colleagues demonstrated specific embodied responses in facial EMG 
activity depending on the specific emotional word category (joy, anger, disgust, neutral), 
but only when the task required accessing the emotional word meaning.  
Yet, when readers are presented vignettes that are enriched with contextual 
information, embodied responses might also occur in passive reading for comprehension 
tasks. Thus, in a study of Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt (2001), 
participants were asked to form (intentional) trait inferences about a protagonist who 
was briefly described in the context (e.g., someone being friendly and courteous versus 
rude and hostile). Early corrugator activity (100-300 ms) was stronger to target sentences 
final emotion words that described trait-inconsistent than trait-consistent negative 
behavior (e.g., “Pheldar gave his wife a slap.”), whereas such an fEMG effect was absent 
for target sentences describing positive behaviors (e.g., “Pheldar gave his mother a 
kiss.”). It appears that embodied responses are rapidly elicited when readers evaluate an 
emotionally salient negative behavior of another person. Thompson, Mackenzie, 
Leuthold, and Filik (2016) showed that the comprehension of both criticism and praise 
differentially influenced fEMG responses triggered by critical emotion words at the end 
of a literal versus ironic utterance. They presented short scenarios like "Susie texted 
Linda to say that she hadn’t been to the gym at all that week. Linda texted her back to 
say: You’re so motivated.". Corrugator (frowning) activity was reduced and 
zygomaticus (smiling) activity enhanced for ironic compared to literal criticism, 
                                                 
1 In the following, we refer to theses facial muscles as zygomaticus, corrugator, and levator, respectively. 
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whereas reverse fEMG effects were observed for ironic compared to literal praise. 
Moreover, phasic EDA activity, providing an index of sympathetic arousal of the 
underlying sudomotor nerve activity (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007), was stronger 
when an emoticon was present than not. Thus, negative and positive (language) inputs 
elicited embodied responses. However, since the studies of Bartholow and colleagues 
(2001) and of Thompson et al. (2016) both used emotional target words, it remains 
unclear whether embodied responses are also observed when the specific discourse 
context determines the emotional meaning of a relatively neutral critical word in the 
target sentence.  
It is noteworthy that evidence in favor of embodied affective responses during 
linguistic comprehension has also been provided in studies concerned with the 
processing of moral transgressions. For example, Cannon, Schnall and White (2011) 
recorded the fEMG to short auditory statements describing either moral or immoral 
behavior as defined by moral foundation theory (cf. Haidt & Graham, 2007; e.g. harm-
bad: “Someone tortured a stray cat” vs. harm-good: “Someone volunteered at a soup 
kitchen”). Participants were asked to rate item morality on a 7-point scale (“How 
negative or positive was this behavior?”), which in our view reflects an emotional 
valence rather than a morality rating. fEMG activity varied depending on the specific 
moral foundation (harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, authority/respect, ingroup/loyalty, 
purity/sanctity) and valence (good vs. bad) of the statement. Crucially, corrugator 
activity was found to be stronger for bad behaviors described in harm statements which 
the authors took to indicate anger, whereas levator activity was stronger for statements 
including purity and fairness transgressions, indicating disgust. In accord with the view 
that different moral foundations elicit specific moral emotions (Haidt & Graham, 2007), 
Cannon et al. concluded that facial muscle activation indicates the specific emotional 
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response elicited by a given statement. In accord with this conclusion, Krumhuber, 
Tsankova, and Kappas (2018) reported stronger levator activity during the reading of 
vignettes describing social-cultural norm violations as compared to neutral vignettes, 
whereas corrugator activity and EDA showed no reliable experimental effects. The 
authors took levator activity to indicate disgust when participants read about the 
described behavior, suggesting that norm transgressions entail an moral, and therefore, 
an emotional component. However, since participants were asked to rate the items for 
their emotionality, it is reasonable to assume that participants actively processed the 
emotional content of items while reading them. Together, based on the fEMG results of 
Cannon et al. (2011) and Krumhuber et al. (2018), it appears that embodied responses 
are triggered by the moral content of text materials, at least, if participants are asked to 
focus on the emotional meaning of the linguistic input. 
Most recently, Kunkel, Mackenzie, Filik, and Leuthold (under review) took a 
different approach to investigate the brain processes and embodied responses elicited by 
daily moral transgressions as well as emotional events. They presented prototypical 
morality and emotion scenarios that introduced a protagonist situated in either immoral 
or moral and negative or neutral circumstances. Crucially, only the moderately 
constraining contexts varied between the respective material-specific conditions, 
whereas the word-by-word presented target sentences were identical. Here, the critical 
word disambiguated the situation in terms of an either moral versus immoral behavior 
or a neutral (or mildly positive) versus negative event. This procedure allowed Kunkel 
et al. to control for word-based effects that might have played a role in previous studies 
reviewed above, while examining in separate experiments the affective processing of 
moral and emotional content within the brain and the body’s periphery. In the first 
experiment, the ERP was characterized by a larger late posterior positivity (LPP) to 
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immoral than moral as well as to negative than neutral scenarios. This replicated similar 
LPP effects when participants explicitly judged the emotional content as inferred from 
the discourse context (Kunkel et al., 2018) and when they merely read the respective 
moral scenarios (Leuthold et al., 2015). As in these previous studies, Kunkel and 
colleagues (under review) took the LPP effect to indicate the increased affective 
processing of incoming moral and emotional linguistic information in discourse 
comprehension. In the second experiment of Kunkel et al. (2018), fEMG and EDA were 
recorded while participants read the same morality and emotion scenarios (experimental 
study) and also in a subsequent control study presenting emotional pictures and 
emotional words. In the control study, negative compared to neutral pictures and words 
elicited stronger corrugator activity, indicating an embodied facial response to these 
emotional materials. However, negative versus neutral and also immoral versus moral 
items did not differentially influence fEMG activity during discourse comprehension. In 
contrast to the fEMG, EDA was generally insensitive to the emotional content of stimuli. 
Together, Kunkel et al. (under review) found no evidence for affective simulation in 
fEMG activity and EDA when participants merely read for comprehension and when 
the same relatively neutral target words were employed in morality and emotion 
materials, respectively.  
Given that embodied responses during comprehension were observed when 
some kind of emotion judgment was required to materials (Cannon et al., 2011; 
Krumhuber et al., 2018; Niedenthal et al., 2009), the aim of the present study was to 
investigate whether embodied responses are elicited by the emotional and moral 
materials of Kunkel et al. (under review) during discourse comprehension when 
participants perform an emotion-related judgement task. In addition to the fEMG and 
EDA, the ECG was recorded to identify potential changes in heart rate (HR) elicited by 
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scenarios describing everyday moral transgressions and situations with negative 
emotional content as compared to moral and neutral (or mildly positive) scenarios. HR 
to arousing emotional pictures is initially decelerating, indicating orienting and attention 
towards the stimulus, and then accelerating, reflecting preparation for action (e.g., 
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Moreover, Weis and Herbert (2017) 
observed in the first four seconds after the onset of a pronoun-noun phrase (e.g., “Meine 
Freude” [“my happiness”]) an increased HR for emotional than neutral phrases. In order 
to check the sensitivity of the psychophysiological measures, the discourse 
comprehension task was followed by the control experiment of Kunkel et al. (under 
review), in which participants judged the emotional picture and word stimuli.  
 Generally, we hypothesized that the emotional judgment task will increase the 
emotional salience of incoming linguistic input for both types of materials. The affective 
processing of these materials might hence also result in differential peripheral body 
responses. More specifically, we predict that the higher arousal value of immoral 
compared to moral and negative compared to neutral scenarios will be reflected in 
stronger phasic EDA activity. Moreover, since negative and immoral items are 
characterized by their negative valence, fEMG activity in the corrugator and levator 
muscles should be larger for immoral compared to moral and for negative compared to 
neutral scenarios, whereas fEMG zygomaticus activity should show a weaker or no 
differential valence effect. Finally, regarding the ECG, we predicted an HR decrease for 
immoral compared to moral and for negative compared to neutral scenarios.  
Method 
 Participants. 48 native German speakers from the University of Tübingen 
received course credits or payment for participating (Mage = 23.33 years, SDage = 3.98 
years, 42 females, 46 right-handed). 
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Materials and design. For the discourse comprehension experiment, materials 
were taken from Kunkel et al. (2018) and consisted of 80 items each for the morality 
and for the emotion scenarios (see Table 1 for examples; the full set is available from 
the first author). All scenarios consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of two or 
three sentences describing the context, and the second part was the target sentence 
containing the critical word. The same target sentence was used for moral and immoral 
materials, and the same held true for neutral and negative emotional materials in order 
to eliminate possible sentence-level and word-based effects (with the context varying 
across conditions, see Table 1). Moral materials described actions that would be 
perceived as either moral or immoral, whereas emotional materials would describe a 
neutral or a negative event. In addition, 40 filler items were used which contained no 
inconsistencies and were similar in length to the experimental items. See method section 
of Kunkel et al, (2018) for relevant item characteristics and rating data.  
Presentation and randomization of items and conditions across participants was 
identical to that of Kunkel et al. (2018). For two consecutive participants, two lists were 
randomly generated such that each morality scenario appeared across the two lists either 
in the moral or the immoral condition, and each emotion scenario appeared either in the 
neutral or the negative condition. Thus, for each participant, the 200-item list consisted 
of 40 moral and 40 immoral items, 40 neutral and 40 negative items, as well as 40 neutral 
filler items. All items were randomly presented.  
For the control experiment, materials were taken from Experiment 2 of Kunkel 
et al. (under review) consisted of 40 items each for pictures and words, which were 
matched for arousal and valence. See method section for Experiment 2 of Kunkel et al. 
(under review) for relevant item characteristics and rating data. Presentation and 
randomization was identical to Kunkel et al. (under review). 
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Table 1. Example for moral materials with context for moral and for immoral items, for 
emotional materials with context for neutral and for negative Items, as well as the 
respective target sentences containing the critical word (in italics). 
 
Moral 
Materials 
Moral Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem Chemiekonzern. Seit 
einigen Wochen gibt es Sicherheitsprobleme aufgrund 
fahrlässigen Verhaltens von Kollegen, sodass Menschen-
leben gefährdet sind. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works at a chemical company. For several 
weeks, there have been safety issues caused by colleagues’ 
careless behavior, putting human lives at risk.) 
 Immoral Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem Chemiekonzern als 
Sachbearbeiter in der Personalabteilung. Er ist ehrgeizig und 
will rascher aufsteigen als seine Kollegen. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works in human resources of a chemical 
company. He is ambitious and aims at being promoted faster 
than his colleagues.) 
 Target 
Sentence 
Im monatlichen Gespräch berichtet er seinem Chef deren 
Fehler. 
(In a monthly commitment talk he points out to his boss their 
mistakes.) 
 
Emotion 
Materials 
Neutral Sarah trainierte den ganzen Nachmittag im Fitness-Studio 
und geht zum Abschluss in die Sauna, wonach sie sich wohlig 
gut fühlt. 
(Sarah had been at the gym all afternoon before completing 
her work out with a visit to the sauna, after which she feels 
pleasantly well.) 
 Negative 
 
Sarah hat einen sehr anstrengenden Job. Sie muss dafür seit 
mehreren Monaten jeden Tag um 5 Uhr aufstehen und den 
ganzen Tag hart arbeiten. 
(Sarah has a very demanding job. For several months she has 
been getting up at 5 am and working very hard all day.) 
 Target 
Sentence 
Sie ist sehr erschöpft. 
(She is very exhausted.) 
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 Following the presentation of the final word a question was displayed on the 
screen: “Berührt dich das Gelesene?” [“Are you emotionally moved by the text?”]. 
Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 to 8: 1 = nicht berührt [not emotionally 
moved] to 8 = stark berührt [strongly emotionally moved]. 
 Procedure. After electrode application, participants were seated in an 
electrically shielded booth in front of a 21-in. computer monitor (100 Hz) at a viewing 
distance of 65 cm (maintained by a chin rest). Experimental materials (scenarios, words, 
pictures) were presented at the center of the screen in white 16-point Helvetica font on 
a black background using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) running under MATLAB (2018a), on Ubuntu 16.04 
LTS. Participants were instructed to avoid any head movements and to maintain fixation 
at the center of the screen during word presentation. Furthermore, they were instructed 
to read and watch attentively, and to answer the question by pressing the appropriate 
response key.  
 The experiment started with the instructions followed by a practice block 
containing three trials. Experimental trials were presented in a total of 20 blocks of 10 
items each, separated by a short break. Both instructions and breaks were controlled in 
their duration by the participants pressing the space bar. For a trial, the context was 
displayed for a minimum duration of 1,500 ms. When participants had read the context 
sentences, they initiated the word-by-word presentation of the target sentence by 
pressing the space bar, which started with the presentation of a fixation point for 1000 
ms. Then, each word was displayed centrally for 300 ms, with a 200-ms blank interval 
between successive word presentations. The question was asked immediately after 
presenting the final word, and was displayed until participants pressed a key to indicate 
their arousal rating. Keys ranged from one through eight on the computer keyboard.  
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 Participants were instructed in writing on the screen about the control 
experiment, which contained eight blocks of 10 experimental trials each, separated by a 
self-paced break controlled in its duration by the participant. Pictures and words were 
randomly presented within a block of trials. Every stimulus was displayed for 500 ms 
with a variable inter stimulus interval of six to eight seconds. The question was asked 
immediately after presenting the picture or word. 
 Psychophysiological measures. For fEMG activity, three pairs of surface 
electrodes were positioned on the zygomaticus major (smiling, cheek), corrugator 
supercilii (frowning, inside brow), and levator labii superioris (wrinkling/ raising top 
lip, nose), respectively. Surface electrodes were placed on the left side of the face 
following Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). Surface electrodes for ECG activity were 
placed on the left side of the hip and under the right collarbone. EDA electrodes were 
placed on the distal phalanges of the middle and index finger of the non-dominant hand. 
All psychophysiological measurements were recorded continuously from pairs of Ag-
AgCl electrodes using a BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system with a sampling rate 
of 1024 Hz. 
 Data analysis. An emotional judgement on an eight-point scale was required 
in the present experiment. As in Kunkel et al. (2018), it is again conceivable that 
participants may apply decision criteria that lead, at least sometimes, to judgements that 
are inconsistent with the morality and emotion classification of the materials. That is, 
some items preclassified as moral might be judged as emotionally moving, or some 
items preclassified as negative might be judged as not emotional moving, and vice versa. 
Therefore, to check whether participants’ responses were consistent to 
preclassifications, the response scale was divided into binary responses with ratings 
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ranging from 1 to 4 as not/less emotionally moving, and responses ranging from 5 to 8 
as emotionally moving.  
 Participants’ response behavior was analyzed by using linear mixed effects 
modeling, implemented by the lmer function within the lme4 R package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We fitted a model with condition as fixed effect 
and with random intercepts for both participants and items. We obtained p-values by 
likelihood ratio tests comparing the model with and without the fixed effect term of 
interest. Separate lmer models were performed for morality and emotion materials to 
determine the impact of condition for participants’ judgements. 
 All fEMG analyses were performed identical to Kunkel et al. (under review) 
using code adapted from FieldTrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011). 
fEMG pre-processing involved applying a band-pass filter of 20-500 Hz to the 
continuous data as recommended by Van Boxtel (2010). fEMG data were epoched 
around the onset of the critical word (-2 to 8 seconds). The differential activity between 
each electrode at the zygomaticus major, corrugator supercilia, and levator labii 
superioris was calculated separately. This differential activity at each muscle group was 
then rectified. Artifacts were defined as trials containing fEMG activity exceeding 250 
V within the 10 second epoch. Artifacts (< 1% of trials) were removed. Artifact-free 
trials were aligned to a 250-ms baseline prior to the onset of the critical word. The 
analysis epoch consisted of eight sequential time-windows of 250 ms duration beginning 
at critical word onset. EMG activity was expressed as a percentage of baseline activity. 
An additional outlier exclusion procedure involved converting the percentage change 
from baseline to a z-standardized score, separately for each participant, condition, 
muscle group, and time-window. Observations with a z-score value greater than 3 were 
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removed. This procedure removed approximately 1.5 % of data points from the 
subsequent analyses. 
 All EDA analyses were performed using the Ledalab MATLAB toolbox 
(Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010, available from http://www.ledalab.de). The continuous 
EDA signal was downsampled to 32 Hz and a low-pass filter (5 Hz) was applied. The 
resulting signal was decomposed by continuous decomposition analysis (CDA; Benedek 
& Kaernbach, 2010). This method extracts the phasic information underlying the skin 
conductance response and aims at retrieving the signal characteristics of the underlying 
sudomotor nerve activity. Integrated phasic EDA response within an epoch 1-8 seconds 
after the critical word were analyzed. A minimum amplitude threshold of 0.05 S was 
applied for the detection of EDA responses. 
 For the ECG, changes in HR were measured second-by-second in beats per 
minute (BPM) and were calculated as a change from baseline. The continuous ECG 
signal was epoched around the onset of the critical word (-1 to 8 seconds) and consisted 
of eight sequential time-windows of one second duration beginning at critical word 
onset. Baseline was set from -1 to 0 before the onset of the critical word. All fEMG, 
ECG, and EDA analyses were performed using custom MATLAB scripts.  
 We performed separate linear mixed effect modelling for fEMG, ECG and 
EDA responses with time window and condition as fixed effects. As random effects, we 
included intercepts for both participants and items. Again, significance was tested by 
using the Likelihood Ratio Test. The models are described in more detail in the 
respective results sections. For all analyses the significance level was set to alpha = 
.05. 
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Results 
 Behavioral measures. Immoral scenarios were judged as more emotionally 
moving than moral scenarios (4.62 vs. 3.32), and negative scenarios were judged as more 
emotionally moving than neutral scenarios (4.50 vs. 2.90). Furthermore, with regard to 
a binary response categorization, immoral items were more often rated as emotionally 
moving than were moral items (53.70% vs. 28.43%), and negative items were more often 
rated as being emotional moving than were neutral items (52.08% vs. 20.57%). For both 
materials, LME analysis corroborated these results given that the model including 
condition as fixed effect (condition + (1 | participants) + (1 | item)) fitted the data better 
than the model without condition as fixed effect, χ2s(1) > 65.46, ps < .001.  
 Control experiment. Mean fEMG activity was analyzed separately for pictures 
and words and for corrugator, zygomaticus, and levator muscle, respectively (cf. Figure 
1). The LME models included condition (neutral vs. negative) and time window (eight 
levels: 0-250, 250-500, …, 1750-2000 ms) as fixed effects and participants and items as 
random effects. For words and pictures, corrugator and levator activity fitted best to the 
LME model including the Condition × Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item), all 
χ2s(8) > 23.29, ps < .01, indicating an increased fEMG activity for negative compared 
to neutral items. For words and pictures, zygomaticus activity was not significantly 
influenced by condition, all χ2s(1) < 1.98, ps > .16. For zygomaticus activity, the model 
including time window (Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item) fitted the data 
better than the null model, all χ2s(7) > 36.46, ps < .001, indicating a continuous increase 
of zygomaticus activity for both conditions. 
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Figure 1. fEMG corrugator, levator, and zygomaticus response in the control experiment 
as a function of material (picture vs. word), condition (neutral vs. negative), and time 
window. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
 
 The statistical analysis of HR was calculated separately for pictures and words 
(cf. Figure 2). The full LME included condition (neutral vs. negative) and time window 
(eight levels: 0-1, 1-2, …, 6-7 sec) as fixed effects and participants and items as random 
effects. For words, the LME model including condition and time window as fixed effects 
(Condition + Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item) did not fit better than the 
model without condition, χ2(1) = 1.47, p = .22, indicating that HR was not sensitive to 
the emotional word condition. By contrast, for pictures the LME model including 
condition fitted the data better than that without condition, χ2(1) > 8.04, p < .01, 
indicating a stronger HR decrease for negative compared to neutral pictures. 
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Figure 2. ECG response in the control and discourse comprehension experiment as 
changes of BPM as a function of material (picture vs. word, emotion vs. morality), 
condition (neutral vs. negative, moral vs. immoral), and time window. Error bars reflect 
standard error of the mean. 
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 For integrated phasic EDA responses, the LME model including condition as 
fixed effect (condition + (1 | participants) + (1 | item) as compared to the model without 
condition showed a trend for pictures, χ2(1) = 2.78, ps = .10, due to a higher EDA 
amplitude for negative compared to neutral pictures (Figure 3).  There was no significant 
influence of condition for words, χ2(1) = 1.11, p = .29. 
 
Figure 3. EDA amplitudes in S for the control and discourse comprehension 
experiment as a function of material (picture vs. word, emotion vs. morality) and 
condition (neutral vs. negative, moral vs. immoral). Error bars reflect standard error of 
the mean. 
 
  
 Discourse comprehension experiment. Mean fEMG activity was analyzed 
separately for morality and emotion materials and for corrugator, levator, and 
zygomaticus muscle, respectively (cf. Figure 4). The full LME included condition 
(moral vs. immoral, neutral vs. negative) and time window (eight levels: 0-250, 250-
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500, …, 1750-2000 ms) as fixed effects and participants and items as random effects. 
For morality materials and for all three muscles, fEMG activity fitted best to the LME 
model (Condition × Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item)) compared to the model 
without condition as fixed effect, all χ2s(8) > 19.25, p < .05, indicating an increased 
activation for immoral compared to moral scenarios for all three muscles. For emotion 
materials, the LME model including condition and time window as fixed effect 
(Condition + Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item)) did not fit better than the 
model without condition, all χ2s < 2.11, ps > .15, indicating that fEMG was not sensitive 
to condition. For all three muscles, the model including Time window + (1 | participants) 
+ (1 | item) fitted best, all χ2s(6) > 188.97, p < .001, indicating a continuous increase of 
levator and zygomaticus activity and a continuous decrease of corrugator activity. 
 The statistical analysis of HR was calculated separately for morality and 
emotion materials (cf. Figure 2). The full LME model included condition (neutral vs. 
negative, moral vs. immoral) and time window (eight levels: 0-1, 1-2, …, 6-7 sec) as 
fixed effects and participants and items as random effects. For emotion materials, 
changes of HR fitted better to the LME model including condition and time window as 
fixed effects (Condition + Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item)) compared to 
the model without condition, χ2(1) = 4.14, p < .05, indicating that the HR decrease was 
stronger for neutral compared to negative sentences. For morality materials, the LME 
model (Condition × Time window + (1 | participants) + (1 | item)) compared to the model 
without condition as fixed effect indicated that HR produced a trend, χ2(7) = 13.98, p = 
.05, indicating that moral scenarios had a stronger initial decrease followed by a stronger 
increase of HR.  
 For integrated phasic EDA responses, the LME analysis showed for both 
morality and emotion materials no condition effect, all χ2s < 0.38, ps > .53. 
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Figure 4. fEMG corrugator, levator, and zygomaticus response in the discourse 
comprehension experiment as a function of material (emotion vs. morality), condition 
(neutral vs. negative, moral vs. immoral), and time window. Error bars reflect standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to examine embodied responses during discourse 
comprehension of incoming emotional information when participants perform an 
emotional judgement task. Participants were asked to rate whether they were 
emotionally moved by morality and emotion scenarios. We hypothesized that if 
emotional text comprehension involves affective simulations (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007), 
this should be indicated by increased fEMG activity, changes in heart rate as measured 
by ECG, or phasic EDA responses to both negative compared to neutral and immoral 
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compared to moral scenarios. Additionally, in order to assess the sensitivity of fEMG, 
ECG, and EDA measures, participants performed a control experiment with picture and 
word stimuli that typically evoke differential responses in these physiological measures. 
In the following, the results of the control experiment will be discussed first.  
EDA was not significantly sensitive to our manipulations of the control 
experiment as there was only a trend for an increased EDA amplitude for negative 
compared to neutral pictures. We hence conclude that even when an affective judgement 
is demanded, EDA is relatively insensitive in revealing an activation within the 
autonomic nervous system as elicited by emotional pictures and words. In line with the 
literature, ECG showed a stronger initial decrease of heart rate for negative than neutral 
pictures, indicating a stronger, presumably automatically mediated, orienting response 
after emotional stimuli (Bradley & Lang, 2000). Already during this initial decrease, 
stimulus valence differentially influenced ECG activity, that is, negative stimuli 
produced a stronger HR decrease than neutral picture stimuli. Accordingly, this result 
provides evidence for the view that particularly negative pictures produce a stronger 
embodied response, reflecting the more aversive nature of these stimuli. This was not 
the case for words, presumably because negative words are less arousing than negative 
pictures (e.g., Weis & Herbert, 2017). Nevertheless, the ECG response appears to be 
sufficiently sensitive to reveal embodied responses to relatively strong emotional 
stimuli.  
With regard to embodied facial responses, the control experiment indicated that 
fEMG corrugator and levator activities were both stronger to negative than neutral items, 
hence effectively indicating an embodied repose in terms of negative affect (e.g., Larsen 
et al., 2003). In contrast, negative versus neutral pictures and words did not differentially 
influence fEMG zygomaticus activity. This particular result corresponds to those of Tan 
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et al. (2012) and of our previous experiment (e.g., Kunkel et al., under review), 
suggesting that zygomaticus activity is not sensitive to negative affect. Together, the 
control experiment suggests that particular fEMG corrugator and levator activity are 
reliable markers of embodied responses to negative emotional stimuli, whereas EDA 
and ECG measures appear less sensitive. 
This impression was also supported by the results of the discourse 
comprehension experiment. Thus, the zero-effects in the analysis of EDA provide no 
evidence for the occurrence of autonomic arousal to emotional stimuli that differ in their 
arousal value during emotional discourse comprehension. Moreover, whereas the 
analysis of the ECG indicated an initial decrease of HR followed by a later increase for 
both materials, it was only for emotion materials that the change in HR was influenced 
by the different scenarios. That is, HR decreased less strongly initially and was hence 
generally higher for negative compared to neutral scenarios. This result corresponds to 
that of Weis and Herbert (2017), who observed a stronger HR increase to emotional than 
neutral phrases. Like these researchers, we assume that the HR change for emotional 
materials reflects their higher emotional arousal in anticipation of action (see also 
Bradley et al., 2001). The absence of a differential HR response to immoral versus moral 
items might be due to their lower arousal value, as previously found in the rating study 
of Kunkel et al. (2018). In contrast to HR, fEMG was nod differentially influenced by 
negative versus neutral items during emotional discourse comprehension. This zero-
effect is unexpected and would need to be replicated in future studies before being 
interpreted as indicating the absence of a valence-based embodiment effect. 
Crucially, fEMG revealed evidence in favor of embodied responses to relatively 
neutral target words during the comprehension of moral content. That is, as expected, 
levator and corrugator activities were sensitive to moral transgressions, showing 
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stronger activity for immoral compared to moral scenarios. More specifically, we take 
these fEMG effects to indicate that moral transgressions elicit negative affect. These 
results extend those of previous studies concerned with moral decision making (Cannon 
et al., 2011; Krumhuber et al., 2018). Cannon and colleagues (2011) used short audible 
statements describing either moral or immoral behavior and Krumhuber and colleagues 
presented text vignettes describing social-cultural norm-consistent or inconsistent 
behavior. However, these materials differed across conditions with regard to word- and 
sentence-based characteristics. In contrast, the present materials minimize word- and 
sentence-based influences on the affective processing of moral content. Hence, our 
fEMG findings provide more clear-cut evidence in favor of embodied affective 
responses during discourse comprehension of moral scenarios.  
However, and in contrast to our expectations, zygomaticus fEMG activity was 
stronger for immoral compared to moral items. Since increased zygomaticus activity is 
usually taken to indicate positive affect and moral transgressions are assumed to elicit 
negative affect, as supported by rating study results (Kunkel et al., 2018) and present 
levator and corrugator findings, one may wonder how this specific fEMG result can be 
interpreted. First, it is important to note that in the case of isolated emotional word 
stimuli, zygomaticus activity was found to be a largely insensitive indicator of negative 
valence (e.g., Larsen et al., 2003; Tan et al., 2012). With this in mind, one possibility is 
that the present larger zygomaticus activity for immoral than moral items reflects cross-
talk from muscles that are associated with negative effect (e.g., Unz & Schwab, 2005; 
Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2007). In support of this idea, we found present levator 
and zygomaticus activity to be positively correlated (r = 0.53). Moreover, and in line 
with this assumption, Lang and colleagues (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993) 
found zygomaticus activity to picture stimuli rated as disgusting. Also, it has been 
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suggested that when more complex scenes are described, zygomaticus activity might be 
interpreted as reflecting a wry, sarcastic, or smirking expression (‘t Hart, Struiksma, Van 
Boxtel, & Van Berkum, 2018). Hence, it appears difficult to unambiguously infer a 
specific valence from zygomaticus activity. Together with the clear-cut fEMG results 
from the control experiment, we therefore suggest that the simultaneously increased 
activation of levator, corrugator, and zygomaticus for immoral compared to moral 
scenarios indicates an embodied response due to the negative valence of immoral items. 
Of course, future studies should investigate further the boundary conditions under which 
the zygomaticus is co-activated with the corrugator and levator during emotional and 
moral discourse comprehension. 
 Previously, we used the same morality and emotion materials in a reading-for-
comprehension task (Kunkel et al., under review) and found no reliable EDA and fEMG 
effects indicative of embodied responses to incoming emotional language. We therefore 
speculated that the zero-effects in fEMG and EDA measures might be due to the fact 
that participants performed an emotion-unrelated task (Bradley et al., 2001). Based on 
the present results, this assumption can be clearly rejected as far as EDA is concerned. 
Across our studies and across both control and comprehension experiments, EDA was 
by and large insensitive to emotional versus neutral or immoral versus neutral stimuli. 
We therefore conclude that at least for the materials used by us, which might be 
characterized by less severe arousal differences as compared to those used in former 
studies (e.g., Bradley et al., 2001; Larsen et al., 2003), EDA can be ruled out as a 
sensitive marker of embodied emotional responses. The picture is different regarding 
fEMG and ECG measures, which were reliably influenced by negative compared to 
neutral stimuli in the control experiment, and which were also differentially sensitive to 
immoral versus moral and to negative versus neutral scenarios, respectively. Here, future 
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studies on discourse comprehension should continue measuring theses 
psychophysiological variables in order to better understand the factors that modulate 
their joint or differential occurrence. For instance, other explicit tasks (e.g., valence or 
amorality judgment tasks) than the one used here might also enhance the emotional 
salience of morality or emotional scenarios (e.g., Cannon et al., 2011; Niedenthal et al., 
2009). Moreover, not only the arousing value or the valence of the situation per se might 
be critical for triggering an embodied response during discourse comprehension as 
indicated by ECG and fEMG, respectively, but also how the situation is affectively 
evaluated and perceived (cf. ‘t Hart et al., 2018; Van Berkum, 2018a, 2018b).  
 In conclusion, the present fEMG findings extend previous work (Kunkel et al., 
under review) by providing evidence for a possible role of affective simulations during 
the discourse-based processing of morality materials when an explicit, emotional-related 
judgement task is demanded. Moreover, ECG findings suggested that also negative 
versus neutral emotional materials lead to differential responses of the body. Finally, 
given the different ERP patterns when participants judge the moral acceptability of 
behaviors described in the scenarios versus when they read for comprehension (Kunkel 
et al., 2018; Leuthold et al., 2015), for future studies would still need to investigate in 
which way embodied simulations during discourse comprehension depend on the 
specific task demands.  
 
  
  119 
References 
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Reviews of Psychology, 59, 617-
645. 
Bartholow, B. D., Fabiani, M., Gratton, G., & Bettencourt, B. A. (2001). A 
psychophysiological examination of cognitive processing of and affective 
responses to social expectancy violations. Psychological Science, 12, 197-204. 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2014). lme4: Linear mixed-effects 
models using Eigen and S4. R Package Version, 1, 1-23. 
Benedek, M. & Kaernbach, C. (2010). A continuous measure of phasic electrodermal 
activity. Journal of Neuroscience Methods, 190, 80-91.  
Bradley, M. M., Codispoti, M., Cuthbert, B. N., & Lang, P. J. (2001). Emotion and 
motivation I: Defensive and appetitive reactions in picture processing. Emotion, 
1, 276-298. 
Bradley, M. M., & Lang, P. J. (2000). Emotion and motivation. Handbook of 
Psychophysiology, 2, 602-642. 
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10, 433-436. 
Cannon, P. R., Schnall, S., & White, M. (2011). Transgressions and expressions: 
Affective facial muscle activity predicts moral judgments. Social Psychological 
and Personality Science, 2, 325-331. 
Dawson, M. E., Schell, A. M., & Filion, D. L. (2007). The electrodermal system. In J. 
T. Cacioppo, L. G. Tassinary, & G. G. Berntson (Eds.), Handbook of 
psychophysiology (3rd ed., pp. 159-181). New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Dimberg, U. (1990). Facial electromyography and emotional reactions. 
Psychophysiology, 27, 481–494.  
  
 120 
Filik, R., Hunter, C. M., & Leuthold, H. (2015). When language gets emotional: Irony 
and the embodiment of affect in discourse. Acta Psychologica, 156, 114-125.  
Fridlund, A. J., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Guidelines for human electromyographic 
research. Psychophysiology, 23, 567-589. 
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have 
moral intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20, 98-
116. 
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., Gutowski, K. A., Lucarelli, M. J., & Davidson, R. J. 
(2010). Cosmetic use of botulinum toxin-A affects processing of emotional 
language. Psychological Science, 21, 895-900.  
Havas, D. A., Glenberg, A. M., & Rinck, M. (2007). Emotion simulation during 
language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 436-441.  
Kleiner, M., Brainard, D., Pelli, D., Ingling, A., Murray, R., & Broussard, C. (2007). 
What’s new in Psychtoolbox-3? Perceptio, 36 ECVP Abstract Supplement.  
Krumhuber, E. G., Tsankova, E., & Kappas, A. (2018). Examining subjective and 
physiological responses to norm violation using text‐based vignettes. 
International Journal of Psychology, 53, 23-30. 
Kunkel, A., Filik, R., Mackenzie, I. G., & Leuthold, H. (2018). Task-dependent 
evaluative processing of moral and emotional content during comprehension: An 
ERP study. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 18, 389-409. 
Kunkel, A., Mackenzie, I. G., Filik, R., & Leuthold, H. (under review). Implicit 
evaluative processing of moral and emotional content during discourse 
comprehension. 
  121 
Lang, P. J., Greenwald, M. K., Bradley, M. M., & Hamm, A. O. (1993). Looking at 
pictures: Affective, facial, visceral, and behavioral reactions. Psychophysiology, 
30, 261-273. 
Larsen, J. T., Norris, C. J., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2003). Effects of positive and negative 
affect on electromyographic activity over zygomaticus major and corrugator 
supercilii. Psychophysiology, 40, 776-785. 
Leuthold, H., Kunkel, A., Mackenzie, I. G., & Filik, R. (2015). Online processing of 
moral transgressions: ERP evidence for spontaneous evaluation. Social, 
Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 10, 1021-1029.  
Niedenthal, P. M. (2007). Embodying emotion. Science, 316, 1002-1005.  
Niedenthal, P. M., Winkielman, P., Mondillon, L., & Vermeulen, N. (2009). 
Embodiment of emotion concepts. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 96, 1120-1136.  
Oostenveld, R., Fries, P., Maris, E., & Schoffelen, J. M. (2011). FieldTrip: open source 
software for advanced analysis of MEG, EEG, and invasive electrophysiological 
data. Computational intelligence and neuroscience, 2011, 1. 
Pelli, D. G. (1997). The VideoToolbox software for visual psychophysics: Transforming 
numbers into movies. Spatial vision, 10,437-442.  
Sanford, A. J., & Emmott, C. (2012). Mind, Brain and Narrative. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Tan, J.-W., Walter, S., Scheck, A., Hrabal, D., Hoffmann, H., Kessler, H., & Traue, H. 
C. (2012). Repeatability of facial electromyography (EMG) activity over 
corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major on differentiating emotions. 
Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing, 3, 3-10. 
  
 122 
Tassinary, L. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Vanman, E. J. (2007). The skeletomotor system: 
Surface electromyography. In: Cacioppo JT, Tassinary LG, Berntson GG (eds). 
Handbook of psychophysiology, 3rd edn. Cambridge University Press, New 
York, pp. 267–302. 
‘t Hart, B. T. H., Struiksma, M. E., Van Boxtel, A. H., & Van Berkum, J. J. (2018). 
Emotion in Stories: Facial EMG Evidence for Both Mental Simulation and 
Moral Evaluation. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 613. 
Thompson, D., Mackenzie, I. G., Leuthold, H., & Filik, R. (2016). Emotional responses 
to irony and emoticons in written language: evidence from EDA and facial EMG. 
Psychophysiology, 53, 1054-1062. 
Unz, D. C., & Schwab, F. (2005). Viewers viewed: Facial expression patterns while 
watching TV news. Emerging Communication, 7. 
Van Berkum, J. J. A. (2018a). Language comprehension, emotion and sociality: aren’t 
we missing something?” in Oxford Handbook of Psycholinguistics, edsM. G. 
Rueschemeyer and S.-A.Gaskell (Oxford: OUP). 
Van Berkum, J. J. A. (2018b). Language comprehension and emotion: Where are the 
interfaces, and who cares. Chapter Handbook of Neurolinguistics. 
Van Boxtel, A. (2010). Facial EMG as a tool for inferring affective states. In A. J. Spink, 
F. Grieco, O. E. Krips, L. W. S. Loijens, L. P. J. J. Noldus, and P. H. Zimmerman 
(Eds.), Proceedings of measuring behavior (pp.104-108). Wageningen, The 
Netherlands: Noldus Information Technology.  
Weis, P. P., & Herbert, C. (2017). Bodily Reactions to Emotional Words Referring to 
Own versus Other People’s Emotions. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1277. 
  
  123 
Acknowledgments 
The work reported in this paper was supported by a grant of the German Research 
Foundation (DFG) awarded to HL (LE 1035/4-1). 
Reprint requests should be sent to Angelika Kunkel, Department of Psychology, 
Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Schleichstr. 4, 72076 Tübingen, Germany, or via 
e-mail: angelika.kunkel@uni-tuebingen.de. 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Study 3: Kunkel, A., Mackenzie, I.G., Filik, R., & Leuthold, H. (under
review). Implicit evaluative processing of moral and emotional content
during discourse comprehension
Authors involved:
• Prof. Dr. Hartmut Leuthold (HL)
• Dr. Ian G. Mackenzie (IGM)
• Prof. Dr. Ruth Filik (RF)
• Angelika Kunkel (AK)
List of author contributions
• Study conception and design: HL and AK
• Programming: IGM
• Acquisition of data: AK, bachelor students, and student assistant
• Analysis: IGM, AK, and HL
• Interpretation of data: HL, AK, IGM, and RF
• Writing paper: AK, HL, IGM, and RF
124
 125 
 
 
 
Implicit evaluative processing of moral and emotional content during discourse 
comprehension 
 
 
Angelika Kunkel, Ian Grant Mackenzie 
Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Germany 
Ruth Filik 
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom 
Hartmut Leuthold 
Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen, Germany 
 
 
 
 
Address correspondence to:  
Angelika Kunkel 
Department of Psychology 
Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen 
Schleichstrasse 4 
72076 Tübingen 
Germany  
 
Email: angelika.kunkel@uni-tuebingen.de 
Phone: +49 (0)7071 29-75590 
 
 
 
 
 126 
Abstract 
Recently, using event-related potentials (ERPs), we showed that when participants read 
about daily moral transgressions, the task that they performed determined the processing 
of incoming linguistic information (Kunkel, Filik, Mackenzie, & Leuthold, 2018). 
Specifically, when explicit moral judgments were required a larger anterior negativity 
indicated increased cognitive processing for immoral than moral scenarios, whereas for 
emotional judgments a larger late posterior positivity (LPP) indicated increased affective 
processing. The present two experiments examined which brain processes and embodied 
responses contribute to discourse comprehension if no task is required. Target sentences 
from negative vs. neutral emotional scenarios and from moral vs. immoral scenarios 
were presented using rapid serial visual presentation while ERPs (Experiment 1), and 
facial electromyogram (fEMG) and electrodermal activity (EDA, Experiment 2) were 
recorded. In Experiment 1, the LPP (300-500 ms) was larger for negative and immoral 
compared to neutral and moral scenarios. In Experiment 2, fEMG and EDA results were 
not sensitive to experimental manipulations in either morality or emotion materials, 
whereas participants showed clear fEMG effects in corrugator activity to standard 
emotional pictures and words. We conclude that for the present task and materials, 
discourse comprehension involves the top-down affective evaluation (LPP) of incoming 
linguistic moral and emotional information but not the embodied simulation of emotion 
(fEMG, EDA). 
 
 
Keywords: Moral, emotion, affective evaluation, LPP, discourse comprehension, 
fEMG, EDA, embodiment 
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A fundamental aspect of the mind’s functioning is that objects or events are initially 
evaluated and categorized with regard to their valence as either good or bad (e.g., 
Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Zajonc, 1984), before being reanalyzed by explicit and slower 
evaluative cognitive processes (cf. Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007). Recently, using event-
related potentials (ERPs), we showed that when participants read about daily moral 
transgressions or emotional events, and explicitly judged their emotional content as 
inferred from the discourse context, a larger late positive potential (LPP) was found to 
immoral than moral as well as negative than neutral scenarios (Kunkel, Filik, 
Mackenzie, & Leuthold, 2018). In line with previous ERP studies (for reviews, see 
Fischler & Bradley, 2006, Hajcak, Weinberg, MacNamara, & Foti, 2012), we took this 
LPP effect to indicate the increased affective processing of incoming linguistic 
information during discourse comprehension. However, it is currently unclear which 
brain processes contribute to emotional discourse comprehension if no explicit task is 
required, and also whether embodied responses are involved. Therefore, in the present 
study we conducted two experiments to investigate (a) whether, in a simple passive 
reading task, both morality and emotion scenarios would still elicit such discourse-based 
affective evaluations, as indicated by the LPP, and (b) whether these evaluations would 
be grounded in embodied emotional responses, as shown by facial electromyographic 
(fEMG) and electrodermal activity (EDA).  
 The LPP has been found to sensitively reflect the automatic processing of the 
emotional content of pictorial stimuli (e.g., Gable, Adams, & Proudfit, 2015; Hajcak, 
MacNamara, Foti, Ferri, & Keil, 2013; Ito & Cacioppo, 2000; for a review see Hajcak, 
MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010) and also of linguistic input such as emotional words, 
sentences, and texts (for reviews, see Citron, 2012; Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Hajcak et 
al., 2012). LPP effects are known to depend on the emotional features of the critical item 
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(e.g., valence, arousal) and to be more pronounced when participants judge the 
emotional content rather than an emotion-irrelevant stimulus dimension (e.g., in a 
semantic classification) (cf. Fischler & Bradley, 2006). For instance, word-based 
emotion effects in the LPP were found to be stronger in an affective judgment task than 
a passive reading task (Holt, Lynn, & Kuperberg, 2009; see also Fields & Kuperberg, 
2016). Moreover, Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt (2001), asked 
participants to intentionally infer either positive or negative character traits from a 
passage of text (e.g., that someone is a friendly person). A larger late centroparietally 
distributed ERP positivity (450-1150 ms), or LPP, was observed after final affective 
words in the test sentence that described trait-inconsistent (“. . . gave his wife a slap”) 
rather than trait-consistent behavior (“. . . gave his mother a kiss”). However, it has also 
been found that if a neutral rather than an emotional context preceded the target sentence 
during a comprehension task, a larger N400 component for emotion-congruent than 
incongruent conditions preceded the LPP (Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et 
al., 2009), reflecting the semantic processing demands during meaning construction (for 
a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Also, in ERP studies using contexts that were 
strongly constraining, a larger N400 was obtained for discourse-incongruent than 
congruent emotional words in the target sentence (e.g., León, Díaz, de Vega, & 
Hernández, 2010; Leuthold, Filik, Murphy, & Mackenzie, 2012). Crucially, in the above 
ERP studies on emotional comprehension, except for Leuthold et al. (2012), the critical 
words in the target sentence differed across emotion conditions, thereby precluding a 
straightforward interpretation of ERP effects in terms of discourse-based emotion 
inferences.  
 To our knowledge, Kunkel et al. (2018) were the first to investigate whether 
the emotional meaning of identical target sentences, and hence identical critical words, 
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are differentially processed when different emotions were inferred on the basis of only 
moderately constraining contexts. That is, emotional discourse comprehension was 
examined under conditions that excluded possible influences of differing emotion words 
(e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009) and also of emotional 
congruency effects due to the use of emotionally constraining contexts (e.g., León et al., 
2010; Leuthold et al., 2012). More specifically, Kunkel et al. employed prototypical 
morality and emotion scenarios for which the protagonists and situations were 
introduced by the context sentences (for examples, see Table 1). Morality scenarios 
described actions that would be perceived as either morally acceptable, like helping a 
friend in need, or morally unacceptable, like adultery. For the sake of brevity, we use 
the labels moral and immoral scenarios in the following. Emotion materials described 
either a neutral (or mildly positive) compared to a negative event or situation.  
 For both morality and emotion materials, the context varied between the 
respective material-specific conditions. It was followed by the rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP) of the target sentence, which was identical for moral versus 
immoral scenarios and for negative vs. neutral scenarios. Thus, the critical word of the 
target sentence was embedded in a meaningful context and disambiguated the situation 
in terms of either a moral vs. immoral or neutral vs. negative outcome. Crucially, one 
major advantage of this procedure is that resulting ERP effects reflect discourse-based 
influences on information processing rather than influences related to the target word. 
Participants performed different judgment tasks while ERPs were recorded. In the first 
experiment, participants were asked to judge the described behavior as morally 
acceptable or unacceptable in the case of morality scenarios or as emotionally moving 
or not in the case of emotion scenarios. In the second experiment, participants made 
emotion-related judgments for both types of scenarios. The ERP results for emotion 
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materials showed a long-lasting LPP emotion effect from 300-700 ms in both 
experiments, suggesting a more intense affective evaluation of negative than neutral 
items. For the moral judgment task, immoral items elicited a larger anterior negativity 
than moral items about 500-700 ms after critical word onset, which was assumed to 
reflect the differential semantic processing of moral and immoral materials. However, 
morality scenarios elicited an LPP effect in the 300-500 ms time window when 
participants judged the emotional content of these scenarios, indicating that immoral 
items underwent more intense affective processing than moral items. Together with 
offline valence and arousal rating results and the analysis of binary judgments for the 
respective materials, these findings accord with the view that moral-laden, and 
specifically immoral materials, contain emotional information to which participants 
have quick access. 
 In relation to this, it is important to note that an ERP study conducted by 
Leuthold, Kunkel, Mackenzie, and Filik (2015) demonstrated that affective evaluations 
contributed to the processing of very similar morality scenarios during discourse 
comprehension when no explicit judgments were required. Unlike Kunkel et al. (2018), 
participants read the everyday morality scenarios simply for comprehension. As a 
control, morality scenarios were randomly intermixed with world knowledge violation 
scenarios (knowledge-consistent vs. inconsistent: e.g., a target sentence of “She receives 
as a dish a plate full of snails and white bread.”), following a context that would make 
this statement either consistent or inconsistent with the participants’ knowledge of the 
world. The ERP results for morality scenarios yielded an LPP effect starting at about 
320 ms after the presentation of the critical word, similar to that observed by Kunkel et 
al. (2018) with emotion judgments. By contrast, world knowledge-inconsistent trials 
showed a larger N400 compared to consistent trials. Leuthold et al. (2015) concluded 
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that immoral items underwent more intense affective rather than semantic processing, 
that is, they assumed that the behaviors described in morality items were implicitly 
categorized as either good or bad.  
 Together, the studies of Kunkel et al. (2018) and Leuthold et al. (2015) suggest 
that incoming linguistic information is affectively evaluated in relation to the specific 
discourse context, and seemingly even so when no explicit judgment task is involved. 
However, it has been proposed that the global context such as task demands and the use 
of emotion-related versus emotion-neutral linguistic stimuli influence whether an 
affective versus semantic-cognitive analysis is prioritized (e.g., Delaney-Busch & 
Kuperberg, 2013; Lai, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2012). Thus, it is conceivable that in 
Leuthold et al.’s (2015) study, the affective dimension of morality materials was 
relatively prominent due to the intermixed presentation of emotion-neutral world-
knowledge materials. In contrast, Kunkel et al. (2018) presented emotion versus 
morality materials in different experimental halves, also when the same emotion 
judgments were required to both types of materials. The more sustained LPP emotion 
effect and larger emotion effect in terms of both valence and arousal for emotion than 
morality materials in the offline rating study (Kunkel et al., 2018) might suggest a higher 
affective salience for emotion than morality materials. Therefore, it remains an open 
issue whether morality materials would still undergo an implicit affective evaluation as 
indicated by the LPP (cf. Leuthold et al., 2015) in a passive reading-for-comprehension 
task with randomly intermixed morality and more salient emotion materials. Moreover, 
it is unclear whether emotion materials are implicitly evaluated in this task context, 
because previously an LPP effect for these materials was obtained when participants 
explicitly judged their affective content (Kunkel et al., 2018). 
 132 
Assuming that immediate affective evaluations of language input contribute to 
emotional text comprehension, one might then further ask whether such comprehension 
is grounded in language-induced experiential simulations. That is, according to the 
embodied simulation account, the meaning of a stimulus is grounded in ordinary past 
sensorimotor experiences (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Gibbs, 2003; Glenberg & Robertson, 
1999; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). Thus, to comprehend a piece of text, it is assumed 
that a concrete representation of a sensory or motor experience is re-activated or, in other 
words, that such an experience is simulated during the processing of linguistic input. 
Crucially for the present purposes, research in embodied cognition has also provided 
evidence that emotional comprehension involves the (unconscious) reactivation and 
simulation of previously experienced emotions during meaning construction 
(Niedenthal, 2007). Using fEMG to reveal facial muscle movements related to certain 
emotional expressions (cf. Dimberg, 1990; van Boxtel, 2010), Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, (2009) demonstrated embodied effects when participants 
made affective judgments about the meaning of emotional words presented in isolation. 
More specifically, they found that positive- and negative-valenced words elicited 
stronger activation in facial muscles involved in smiling (e.g., zygomaticus major) and 
frowning (e.g., corrugator supercilii) than neutral words. No such facial EMG effects 
were obtained when participants performed an emotion-unrelated task. On the basis of 
these results Niedenthal and colleagues concluded that emotion words trigger language-
based simulations in the emotion system but only if required by the task.  
 With regard to text comprehension, studies using behavioral approaches have 
provided evidence supporting the embodied processing of sentences describing 
emotion-laden events (Filik, Hunter, & Leuthold, 2015; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 
2007; Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010). To our knowledge, 
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there are only two studies to date reporting the involvement of affective simulations 
during discourse comprehension using peripheral psychophysiological measures 
(Bartholow et al., 2001; Thompson, Mackenzie, Leuthold, & Filik, 2016). As described 
earlier, Bartholow et al. (2001) examined the processes underlying intentional (explicit) 
trait inferences. In addition to their LPP findings, they reported stronger early fEMG 
activity (100-300 ms) from the corrugator supercilii to final affective words that 
described trait-inconsistent than trait-consistent negative behavior, whereas such an 
fEMG effect was absent for words describing positive behaviors. Although Bartholow 
and colleagues did not discuss their findings in the context of embodied cognition, their 
fEMG results nevertheless appear to suggest that an embodied response is rapidly 
elicited while readers evaluate an emotionally salient (negative) behavior of another 
person. More recently, Thompson et al. measured fEMG activity and also phasic EDA 
responses, as a measure of stimulus-induced arousal (Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007), 
while participants read statements conveying either ironic or literal criticism or praise 
(following a sentence that set up the context). In terms of facial EMG activity, they 
found evidence for reduced frowning (corrugator supercilii) and enhanced smiling 
(zygomaticus major) for ironic compared to literal criticism, but enhanced frowning and 
reduced smiling for ironic compared to literal praise, suggesting that irony weakens the 
emotional impact of language input. Moreover, phasic EDA responses were stronger 
when a meaning-disambiguating emoticon was present than not. These findings 
demonstrate the suitability of facial EMG and phasic EDA in revealing the embodied 
grounding of emotional comprehension during a passive reading task.  
In summary, the first open issue is whether emotion and morality scenarios 
undergo an (implicit) affective evaluation at the level of brain processing when 
presentation is randomly intermixed within a passive reading for comprehension task. 
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The second open issue is whether discourse-based emotional comprehension involves 
experiential affective simulations or embodied responses. 
 
Objectives of the present study  
The aim of the present two experiments is to investigate in the absence of an explicit 
judgment task (a) whether similar to previous studies (Kunkel et al., 2018; Leuthold et 
al., 2015) incoming linguistic information is affectively evaluated as indicated by the 
LPP during emotional discourse comprehension (Experiment 1) and (b) to examine the 
potential embodied responses as indicated by fEMG and EDA (Experiment 2). For both 
experiments, we will use the same text materials as in Kunkel et al. (2018) but adopt the 
task and trial presentation procedure used by Leuthold et al. (2015). That is, ERPs, 
fEMG, and EDA will be recorded in a reading for comprehension task, in which 
scenarios describing everyday morality or emotional situations are randomly intermixed. 
ERP, fEMG amplitudes and EDA responses elicited by scenarios describing everyday 
moral transgressions will be compared to those elicited by moral scenarios, and 
situations with negative emotional content will be compared to those with neutral or 
mildly positive content. This will allow us to assess whether the respective materials 
differ with regard to their affective evaluation and associated (embodied) simulations 
within the emotion system. Generally, we hypothesized that for both types of materials, 
the emotional content of language input is affectively processed at the level of brain and 
peripheral body responses. The specific predictions will be discussed separately for each 
experiment.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we examined the ERP in order to reveal affective (brain) processes 
during emotional discourse comprehension. First, we expect that similar to Kunkel et al. 
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(2018), negative compared to neutral scenarios will elicit a relatively long-lasting (300-
700 ms) emotion effect as indicated by the LPP. Of course, it is possible that the LPP 
effect will be of smaller amplitude or not last as long lasting since no explicit affective 
judgments are demanded (cf. Fields & Kuperberg, 2016; Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Holt 
et al., 2009). Specifically, if morality materials are affectively evaluated even when 
embedded within the context of potentially more salient emotion materials, we expect 
to replicate the LPP findings of Leuthold et al. (2015). 
 
Method 
 Participants. 33 native German speakers from the University of Tübingen 
received course credits or payment for participating. Data from five participants were 
excluded, due to excessive sweat artifacts (N = 2), excessive alpha activity (N = 2), or 
not having German as a first language (N = 1). For all analyses, we used the dataset from 
the remaining 28 right-handed participants (Mage = 23.86 years, SDage = 4.66 years, 22 
females). 
 Materials and design. Materials were taken from Kunkel et al. (2018) and 
consisted of 80 items each for the morality and for the emotion scenarios (see Table 1 
for examples; the full set is available from the first author). All scenarios consisted of 
two parts. The first part consisted of two or three sentences describing the context, and 
the second part was the target sentence containing the critical word. The same target 
sentence was used for moral and immoral materials, and the same held true for neutral 
and negative emotional materials in order to eliminate possible sentence-level and word-
based effects (with the context varying across conditions, see Table 1). Moral materials 
described actions that would be perceived as either moral or immoral, whereas emotional 
materials would describe a neutral or a negative event. In addition, 40 filler items were 
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Table 1. Example for moral materials with context for moral and for immoral items, for 
emotional materials with context for neutral and for negative items, as well as the 
respective target sentences containing the critical word (in italics). 
 
Moral 
Materials 
Moral Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem Chemiekonzern. Seit 
einigen Wochen gibt es Sicherheitsprobleme aufgrund 
fahrlässigen Verhaltens von Kollegen, sodass 
Menschenleben gefährdet sind. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works at a chemical company. For several 
weeks, there have been safety issues caused by colleagues’ 
careless behavior, putting human lives at risk.) 
 Immoral Herr Zimmermann arbeitet in einem Chemiekonzern als 
Sachbearbeiter in der Personalabteilung. Er ist ehrgeizig und 
will rascher aufsteigen als seine Kollegen. 
(Mr. Zimmermann works in human resources of a chemical 
company. He is ambitious and aims at being promoted faster 
than his colleagues.) 
 Target 
Sentence 
Im monatlichen Gespräch berichtet er seinem Chef deren 
Fehler. 
(In a monthly commitment talk he points out to his boss their 
mistakes.) 
 
Emotion 
Materials 
Neutral Sarah trainierte den ganzen Nachmittag im Fitness-Studio 
und geht zum Abschluss in die Sauna, wonach sie sich wohlig 
gut fühlt. 
(Sarah had been at the gym all afternoon before completing 
her work out with a visit to the sauna, after which she feels 
pleasantly well.) 
 Negative 
 
Sarah hat einen sehr anstrengenden Job. Sie muss dafür seit 
mehreren Monaten jeden Tag um 5 Uhr aufstehen und den 
ganzen Tag hart arbeiten. 
(Sarah has a very demanding job. For several months she has 
been getting up at 5 am and working very hard all day.) 
 Target 
Sentence 
Sie ist sehr erschöpft. 
(She is very exhausted.) 
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used which contained no inconsistencies and were similar in length to the experimental 
items. Furthermore, true/false questions which were not related to emotional or moral 
content were used to check for comprehension (e.g., “Herr Zimmermann geht tauchen.” 
[Mr. Zimmermann goes diving.] for the morality example provided in Table 1). Relevant 
item characteristics and rating data are presented in Table 2 (for more details, see Kunkel 
et al., 2018).  
 The presentation and randomization of items and conditions across 
participants was identical to that of Leuthold et al. (2015). For two consecutive 
participants, two lists were randomly generated such that each morality scenario 
appeared across the two lists either in the moral or the immoral condition, and each 
emotion scenario appeared either in the neutral or the negative condition. Thus, for each 
participant, the 200-item list consisted of 40 moral and 40 immoral items, 40 neutral and 
40 negative items, as well as 40 neutral filler items. All items were randomly presented. 
 Procedure. After electrode application, participants were seated in an 
electrically shielded booth in front of a 21-in. computer monitor (100 Hz) at a viewing 
distance of 65 cm (maintained by a chin rest). Experimental materials were presented at 
the center of the screen in white 16-point Helvetica font on a black background using 
the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) 
running under MATLAB (2017a), on Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. Participants were instructed 
to avoid any eye, head, and jaw movements and to maintain fixation at the center of the 
screen during word-by-word presentation. Furthermore, they were instructed to read the 
stories attentively, and to answer comprehension questions by pressing the appropriate 
response key. The experiment started with the instructions followed by a practice block 
containing three trials. Experimental trials were presented in a total of 20 blocks of 10 
items each, separated by a short break. Both instructions and breaks were controlled in
 Table 2. Characteristics and rating data of morality, emotion, picture, and word materials. 
 
       Morality                             
Emotion 
 Pictures       Words 
 Moral (SE) Immoral (SE) Neutral (SE) Negative (SE) Neutral (SE) Negative (SE) Neutral (SE) Negative (SE) 
Word Frequency 59.46 (9.72)  58.31 (6.98)    13.78 (2.58) 13.61 (2.64) 
Word length 8.66 (0.21)  7.51 (0.19)    6.15 (0.28) 6.40 (0.37) 
Valence 5.44 (0.13) 2.60 (0.09) 5.07 (0.12) 2.39 (0.07) 5.04 (0.11) 2.37 (0.06) 0.00 (0.00) -2.59 (0.04) 
Arousal 3.79 (0.13) 4.34 (0.11) 3.51 (0.13) 5.00 (0.12) 3.40 (0.12) 6.10 (0.10) 2.42 (0.09) 4.28 (0.06) 
Morality 5.99 (0.04) 2.52 (0.03)       
         
Note. Means and standard errors (in brackets) of the rating data were calculated for each material and control stimulus set and condition. Word frequency (per 
million) and word length concern the critical words and words of the BAWL-R. For valence and arousal ratings different scales are used. For morality and emotions 
materials, valence and arousal ratings concern the whole scenario inclusive target sentence rated on an 8-point scale (1 = very negative, not touched, 8 = very 
positive, strongly touched). Only morality materials were rated for the degree of morality (1 = very immoral, 8 = very moral). Valence and arousal ratings for words 
were taken from the BAWL-R (Võ et al., 2009), with valence rated on a 7-point scale (-3 = very negative, 3 = very positive) and arousal rated on a 5-point scale (1 
= low arousal, 5 = high arousal). Arousal and valence ratings for pictures were taken from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005), both rated on a 9-point scale (valence, 1 
= negative, 9 = positive; arousal, 1 = high arousing, 9 = not arousing). 
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their duration by the participants pressing the space bar. For a trial, the context was 
displayed for a minimum duration of 1,500 ms. When participants had read the context 
sentences, they initiated the word-by-word presentation of the target sentence by 
pressing the space bar, which started with the presentation of a fixation point for 1000 
ms. Then, each word was displayed centrally for 300 ms, with a 200-ms blank interval 
between successive word presentations. For each item, an emotion-unrelated true/false 
question was constructed. In 20% of randomly selected trials, the corresponding 
question was asked immediately after presentation of the final word, and was displayed 
until participants pressed the ‘x’ or ‘m’ key on the computer keyboard to indicate their 
‘true’ or ‘false’ response. 
 Electrophysiological measures. Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was 
recorded continuously from 72 Ag-AgCl electrodes using a BIOSEMI Active-Two 
amplifier system with a sampling rate of 512 Hz for EEG and electrooculogram (EOG). 
All EEG/ERP analyses were performed using available MATLAB toolboxes (FieldTrip: 
Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011) and custom MATLAB scripts. Following 
high-pass filtering (0.1 Hz, 12 dB/oct), EEG data were checked for artifacts and 
corrected, following a procedure similar to that described in Dudschig, Mackenzie, 
Strozyk, Kaup, and Leuthold (2016). There remained on average 96.11 % trials (out of 
40; range = 26-40, median = 39) per condition; trial numbers did not differ between 
conditions, all ts(58) < 0.70, ps > .48.  
 Data analysis. The analysis epoch started 200 ms prior to the onset of the 
critical word and lasted until 1,500 ms after it. Off-line, all EEG channels were 
recalculated to an average reference1 with channels F9, F10, M1, M2, IO1, and IO2 
                                                 
1 An average reference was chosen due to noisy mastoid electrodes for one third of the participants. The 
same pattern of ERP amplitude results, however, was found when using an average mastoid reference. 
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excluded from this calculation. For artifact-free trials, the signal at each electrode site 
was averaged separately for each experimental condition, time-locked to the onset of the 
critical word, low-pass filtered (30 Hz, 36 dB/oct), and aligned to a 200-ms baseline 
prior to the onset of the critical word. Similar to our previous studies (cf. Kunkel et al., 
2018; Leuthold et al., 2015), mean ERP amplitudes were determined for the following 
time ranges: 200 to 250 ms, 300 to 500 ms, and 500 to 700 ms. Since we were principally 
interested in emotion-related LPP modulations, similar to the posterior region of interest 
(ROI) of Kunkel et al. (2018), ERP signals were averaged across centro-parietal 
electrodes only (CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz, P2, POz) to create a single region of interest 
(ROI). 
 For this single ROI, mean ERP amplitudes for emotion and morality materials 
were determined and subjected to separate repeated measures analyses of variance 
(ANOVA) with the factor condition (moral vs. immoral or neutral vs. negative). 
Separate statistical analyses were performed for morality and emotion materials since 
the critical target sentences for the two types of materials differed in wording, making a 
direct comparison of ERP effects triggered by emotion versus morality materials 
problematic. The significance level was set to alpha = .05. 
 
Results 
 200-250 ms. There were no significant effects in this time interval, all ps > .13.  
 300-500 ms. The analysis of morality materials revealed a significant condition 
effect, F(1, 27) = 6.95, p < .05, ηp2 = .20, due to a larger positivity for immoral than 
moral sentences (2.07 vs. 1.54 V). The condition effect was also significant for emotion 
materials, F(1, 27) = 5.82, p < .05, ηp2 = .18, due to larger positivity for negative than 
neutral sentences (2.22 vs. 1.62 V).  
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 500-700 ms. For morality materials, this analysis yielded a trend for the 
condition effect, F(1, 27) = 3.14, p = .09, ηp2 = .10, due to a slightly larger positivity for 
immoral than moral sentences (2.74 vs. 2.40 V). For emotion materials, the condition 
effect was significant, F(1, 27) = 5.88, p < .05, ηp2 = .18, due to a larger positivity for 
negative than neutral sentences (3.27 vs. 2.69 V). 
 In addition, to reveal whether there are task-dependent ERP amplitude 
differences, we first calculated average-reference ERP waveforms for Kunkel et al.’s 
(2018, Experiment 2) data and determined ERP amplitudes for the posterior ROI and 
same time intervals as in the present Experiment 1 for both emotion and morality 
materials. Then, we combined the respective ERP amplitude data sets and conducted 
separate ANOVAs for morality and emotion materials including the between-subjects 
factor of task (affective judgment vs. reading) and the repeated measurement factor 
condition (neutral vs. negative and moral vs. immoral). 
 200-250 ms. In this time window, only the analysis of emotion materials 
revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 54) = 11.41, p < .01, ηp2 = .17, and 
a Task x Condition interaction, F(1, 54) = 4.19, p < .05, ηp2 = .07, due to a larger 
positivity for negative than neutral sentences in the affective judgment task only (1.02 
vs. 0.24 V), F(1, 27) = 14.19, p < .001. 
 300-500 ms. The analysis of morality materials revealed a larger positivity for 
immoral than moral sentences (2.07 vs. 1.64 V), F(1, 54) = 9.07, p < .01, ηp2 = .14, and 
this morality effect was not modulated by task, F = 0.45, p = .51. For emotion materials, 
there was a larger positivity for negative than neutral sentences (2.64 vs. 1.62 V), F(1, 
54) = 38.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. The significant Task x Condition interaction, F(1, 54) 
= 6.58, p < .05, ηp2 = .11, indicated a stronger emotion effect for the judgment than the 
reading task (negative minus neutral = 1.45 vs. 0.60 V). 
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 500-700 ms. It was only for emotion materials that the condition effect, F(1, 
54) = 35.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, and the Task x Condition interaction were significant, 
F(1, 54) = 5.62, p < .05, ηp2 = .09. The interaction indicated a stronger emotion effect 
for the judgment task than the reading task (1.36 vs. 0.58 V). 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 1, participants read randomly intermixed morality and emotion scenarios 
for comprehension without an explicit judgment task. In line with our expectations, a 
larger LPP amplitude was obtained for negative compared to neutral scenarios and for 
immoral compared to moral scenarios, with the LPP effect starting at about 300 ms for 
both types of materials. Crucially, we replicated the LPP effect for morality materials 
when embedded amongst emotion-related scenarios instead of emotionally-neutral 
world knowledge violations (e.g., Leuthold et al., 2015). Therefore, the affective 
evaluation of morality scenarios appears to be independent of the global context 
(emotion-related vs. emotion-neutral) but dependent on task demands (moral vs. 
emotion judgment) (cf. Kunkel et al., 2018). The present LPP effect indicates that 
incoming information is emotionally (or motivationally) more salient for immoral 
compared to moral scenarios and is more rapidly 
affectively processed during discourse comprehension. Interestingly, there was no 
differential LPP effect for the passive reading versus the affective judgment task. Thus, 
it appears that when no explicit moral judgments are required, the language processing 
system is generally biased towards the processing of the more salient emotional rather 
than the less salient cognitive content of morality scenarios.  
 
 
 143 
Figure 1. Upper panel: Condition-dependent grand average ERP waveforms elicited at 
the centro-parietal ROI (averaged across CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz, P2, POz), time-locked 
to the onset of the critical word for morality and emotion materials. Positivity is plotted 
upwards. Lower panel: Spline-interpolated topographic map of mean ERP difference 
waveform for the 200-250 ms, 300-500 ms, and 500-700 ms time window. Top panel: 
morality condition (immoral minus moral). Bottom panel: emotion condition (negative 
minus neutral). 
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This assumption is further corroborated by the presence of an LPP effect for emotion 
materials. Crucially, the larger LPP for negative than neutral items between 300 and 700 
ms replicated the LPP effect observed by Kunkel et al. (2018) when explicit affective 
judgments were required. In accord with previous research (e.g., Fischler & Bradley, 
2006; Holt et al., 2009), the LPP effect was of smaller magnitude for the passive reading 
than the affective judgement task. Still, the present LPP findings suggest that negative 
scenarios, due to their emotional salience, are affectively evaluated even if not 
demanded by the task, further corroborating the view that language input is affectively 
evaluated by default. Moreover, we found no evidence for the presence of an N400 effect 
preceding the LPP. That is, a larger N400 was observed in previous discourse-based 
comprehension studies if the target sentence’s critical emotion word was incongruent 
(positive or negative word) rather than congruent (neutral) with the neutral discourse 
context (Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009). A similar N400 effect 
was obtained when discourse contexts were strongly constraining (e.g., León et al., 
2010; Leuthold et al., 2012).   
 In summary, and in accord with similar previous research (Kunkel et al., 2018; 
Leuthold et al., 2015), we take the LPP to reflect the discourse-based affective 
evaluation of incoming linguistic information. Yet, it remains unclear whether the 
comprehension of emotional language input is grounded in language-induced affective 
simulations. The next experiment aims at investigating potential embodied responses 
elicited by the same morality and emotion scenarios.  
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 measured peripheral psychophysiological signals (fEMG, EDA) while 
participants read the same morality and emotion scenarios as in Experiment 1 in order 
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to examine affective simulations during emotional discourse comprehension. That is, as 
in a previous study on irony comprehension of Thompson and colleagues (2016), we 
analyzed phasic EDA activity, providing an index of sympathetic arousal of the 
underlying sudomotor nerve activity (Dawson et al., 2007), and fEMG activity to reveal 
involuntary facial muscle movements, which have been related to the simulation of 
specific emotions (Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2009). More specifically, fEMG 
activity from the corrugator supercilii (frowning) is taken to sensitively indicate negative 
but also positive affect, whereas fEMG zygomaticus major (smiling) activity indicates 
positive affect while being insensitive to negative affect (e.g., Larsen, Norris, & 
Cacioppo, 2003; Tan et al., 2012).  
 If the emotional content of incoming linguistic information triggers affective 
simulations, given that immoral compared to moral and negative compared to neutral 
scenarios are characterized by higher arousal value, we might expect this effect to be 
reflected in phasic EDA activity. Moreover, since negative and immoral items are 
characterized by their negative valence, fEMG activity in the corrugator muscle should 
be larger for immoral compared to moral and for negative compared to neutral scenarios. 
However, fEMG zygomaticus activity might show a weaker or no differential valence 
effect given that neutral and moral items are only slightly positive-valenced, as indicated 
by the offline rating study reported in Kunkel et al. (2018; see also Table 2).  
 Following the discourse comprehension task, participants performed a control 
experiment in which emotional and neutral words as well as pictures were presented in 
order to check the sensitivity of fEMG and EDA measurements. Negative and neutral 
pictures and words were selected from available databases (cf. Method section) in such 
a way that mean arousal and valence scores generally corresponded for picture and word 
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stimuli. Participants were asked to attentively process these stimuli and to answer 
occasional true/false questions.  
 
Method 
 Participants. Forty native German speakers from the University of Tübingen 
received course credits or payment for participating (Mage = 22.32 years, SDage = 3.44 
years, 28 females, 32 right-handed). 
 Materials and design. For the discourse comprehension experiment, the same 
materials as in Experiment 1 were used. For the control experiment, materials consisted 
of 40 items each for pictures and words, which were  matched for arousal and valence 
(cf. Table 2). 20 items each for neutral and negative pictures were taken from the 
international affective pictures system (IAPS, see Appendix; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2005). Arousal and valence ratings on 9-point scales (valence, 1 = negative and 9 = 
positive; arousal, 1 = high arousing and 9 = not arousing) were taken from Lang et al. 
(2005). Negative pictures were rated as more negative than neutral pictures (2.37 vs. 
5.04), t(19) = 20.42, p < .001, and as more arousing (6.10 vs. 3.40), t(19) = 15.30, p < 
.001.  
 20 items each for negative and neutral words were taken from the Berlin 
Affective Word List Reloaded (BAWL-R; Võ et al., 2009) and matched for frequency 
and length. Only nouns were selected by their valence and arousal ratings taken from 
the BAWL-R (cf. Appendix), with valence rated on a 7-point scale (-3 = very negative, 
3 = very positive) and arousal rated on a 5-point scale (1 = low arousal, 5 = high arousal). 
Negative words were rated as more negative than neutral words (-2.59 vs. 0.00), t(19) = 
64.74, p < .001, and as more arousing (4.28 vs. 2.42), t(19) = 19.45, p < .001.  
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 Procedure. After electrode application, participants were seated in an 
electrically shielded booth in front of a 21-in. computer monitor (100 Hz) at a viewing 
distance of 65 cm (maintained by a chin rest). Experimental materials (scenarios, words, 
pictures) were presented at the center of the screen in white 16-point Helvetica font on 
a black background using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) running under MATLAB (2017a), on Ubuntu 16.04 
LTS. Again, participants were instructed to avoid any head movements and to maintain 
fixation at the center of the screen during word-by-word presentation. Furthermore, they 
were instructed to read and watch attentively, and to answer control questions by 
pressing the appropriate response key.  
 The procedure of the emotional discourse comprehension experiment and the 
random presentation of morality and emotion items was identical to Experiment 1. 
Following this experiment, participants were instructed in writing on the screen about 
the control experiment, which contained eight blocks of 10 experimental trials each, 
separated by a short break controlled in its duration by the participant. Pictures and 
words were randomly presented within a block of trials. Every stimulus was displayed 
for 500 ms with a variable inter stimulus interval of five to eight seconds.  
 For each item a potential emotion-unrelated true/false question was 
constructed (e.g., “Das Tier auf dem Bild ist ein Schaf” [“The animal depicted is a 
sheep”]; “Das Wort besteht aus drei Silben” [“The word consists of three syllables”]). 
In 20% randomly selected trials, the corresponding question was asked immediately 
after presentation of a picture or word until participants indicated their ‘true’ or ‘false’ 
response by pressing the left or right arrow key on the computer keyboard. Response 
keys were changed compared to Experiment 1 since EDA was recorded from the 
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participants’ non-dominant hand, therefore, the keys were operated by the index and 
middle finger of the dominant hand.  
 Psychophysiological measures. fEMG activity was recorded continuously 
from two pairs of Ag-AgCl electrodes using a BIOSEMI Active-Two amplifier system, 
one each for the zygomaticus major (smiling, cheek), and corrugator supercilii 
(frowning, inside brow) with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. Surface electrodes were placed 
on the left side of the face following Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986).   
 EDA was continuously recorded from 2 Ag/AgCl electrodes using a BIOSEMI 
Active-Two amplifier system with a sampling rate of 1024 Hz. The electrodes were 
placed on the distal phalanges of the middle and index finger of the non-dominant hand. 
 Data analysis. All fEMG analyses were performed using code adapted from 
FieldTrip (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen, 2011) and custom MATLAB scripts. 
fEMG pre-processing involved applying a band-pass filter of 20-500 Hz to the 
continuous data as recommended by van Boxtel (2010). fEMG data were epoched 
around the onset of the critical word (-2 to 8 seconds). The differential activity between 
each electrode at the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii was calculated 
separately. This differential activity at each muscle group was then rectified. Artifacts 
were defined as trials containing fEMG activity exceeding 250 V within the 10 second 
epoch. Artifacts (< 1% of trials) were removed. Artifact-free trials were aligned to a 250-
ms baseline prior to the onset of the critical word. The analysis epoch consisted of eight 
sequential time-windows of 250 ms duration beginning at critical word onset. EMG 
activity was expressed as a percentage of baseline activity. An additional outlier 
exclusion procedure involved converting the percentage change from baseline to a z-
standardized score, separately for each participant, condition, muscle group, and time-
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window. Observations with a z-score value greater than 3 were removed. This procedure 
removed approximately 1.5 % of data points from the subsequent analyses. 
 All EDA analyses were performed using the Ledalab MATLAB toolbox 
(Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010, available from http://www.ledalab.de). The continuous 
EDA signal was downsampled to 32 Hz and a low-pass filter (5 Hz) was applied. The 
resulting signal was decomposed by continuous decomposition analysis (CDA; Benedek 
& Kaernbach, 2010). This method extracts the phasic information underlying the skin 
conductance response and aims at retrieving the signal characteristics of the underlying 
sudomotor nerve activity. Integrated phasic EDA response within an epoch 1-8 seconds 
after the critical word were analyzed. A minimum amplitude threshold of 0.05 S was 
applied for the detection of EDA responses. 
 fEMG and EDA responses were statistically analyzed by means of repeated 
measures ANOVAs as described in more detail in the respective results sections. In the 
fEMG analyses, where appropriate, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values and epsilon 
adjustments were applied. 
 
Results 
 Control experiment. Mean fEMG activity was analyzed by means of separate 
repeated measures ANOVA for pictures and words and for corrugator supercilii and 
zygomaticus major muscles, respectively. The ANOVAs included the variables 
condition (neutral vs. negative) and time segment (8 levels: 0-250, 250-500, …, 1750-
2000 ms). For words, fEMG corrugator activity was larger for negative than neutral 
words (102.00% vs. 99.99%), F(1, 39) = 7.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .16. The main effect of time 
interval was significant, F(7, 273) = 3.50, p < .05,  = .38, ηp2 = .08, indicating a 
continuous decrease of fEMG activity over time. The Condition x Time interval 
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interaction was not significant, F = 0.71, p = .58. There were no significant effects for 
fEMG zygomaticus activity, all ps > .11. 
 For pictures, fEMG corrugator activity was larger for negative than neutral 
pictures (109.44% vs. 105.08%), F(1, 39) = 16.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. The main effect 
of time interval was significant, F(7, 273) = 8.83, p < .001,  = .43, ηp2 = .18, indicating 
an initial increase and late decrease of fEMG activity. Furthermore, the Condition x 
Time interval interaction was significant, F(7, 273) = 5.19, p < .01,  = .46, ηp2 = .12, 
indicating an increasing condition effect between 250 and 2000 ms, all Fs > 4.77, ps < 
.05. For fEMG zygomaticus activity, the main effect of time interval was significant, 
F(7, 273) = 4.18, p < .05,  =31, ηp2 = .10, indicating a continuous increase of fEMG 
activity. However, the main effect of condition and the Condition x Time interval 
interaction were not significant, all ps > .68. 
 The statistical analysis of integrated phasic EDA responses corresponded to 
that of the fEMG data except that the variable time segment was dropped. Integrated 
phasic EDA responses differed neither between negative and neutral words (0.31 vs. 
0.34 S), F(1, 39) = 0.65, p = .43, nor between negative and neutral pictures (0.28 vs. 
0.28 S), F(1, 39) = 0.21, p = .65.  
 Discourse comprehension experiment. Mean fEMG activity was analyzed by 
means of separate repeated measures ANOVA for morality and emotion materials and 
for corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major muscles, respectively. The ANOVAs 
included the variables condition (moral vs. immoral, neutral vs. negative) and time 
segment (8 levels: 0-250, 250-500, …, 1750-2000 ms). The significance level was set 
to alpha = .05. 
 
 
 151 
Figure 2. fEMG corrugator and zygomaticus response in the control experiment as a 
function of material (picture vs. word), condition (neutral vs. negative), and time 
window. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
 
  
 For morality materials, fEMG activity revealed no significant condition-
related main or interaction effects, all ps > .12. For both fEMG corrugator and 
zygomaticus activity, only the main effect of time interval was significant, Fs(7, 273)  
6.60, ps < .01, s  .27, ηp2s  .14, indicating across time intervals a decrease and 
increase of fEMG activity, respectively (cf. Figure 3). 
 For emotion materials, the analysis of fEMG activity revealed no significant 
condition-related main or interaction effects, all ps > .53. As found for morality 
materials, only the main effect of time interval was significant for both fEMG corrugator 
and zygomaticus activity, Fs(7, 273)  10.24, ps < .01, s  .33, ηp2s  .21, due to a 
decrease and increase of fEMG activity across time intervals, respectively (cf. Figure 3). 
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 The ANOVA for integrated phasic EDA responses revealed no significant 
EDA differences between negative and neutral scenarios (0.36 vs. 0.36 S), F(1, 39) = 
0.02, p = .88, or between immoral and moral scenarios (0.33 vs. 0.35 S), F(1, 39) = 
0.42, p = .52. 
 
Figure 3. fEMG corrugator and zygomaticus response in the comprehension experiment 
as a function of material (emotion vs. morality), condition (neutral vs. negative, moral 
vs. immoral), and time window. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except that fEMG and EDA instead of ERPs 
were measured in order to examine embodied responses to morality and emotion 
materials. Additionally, participants performed a control experiment to assess the 
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sensitivity of fEMG and EDA measures to negative and neutral stimuli that differed with 
respect to arousal and valence scores for both picture and word sets (cf. Table 2).  
Crucially, in the control experiment, fEMG corrugator activity was larger for 
negative than neutral words irrespective of the analysis time window, whereas for 
pictures, this valence effect increased from 250 ms after stimulus onset up to 2000. In 
line with the study of Larsen et al. (2003), these findings suggest that the measurement 
of corrugator activity can be employed to infer the embodied response associated with 
the processing of negative compared to neutral stimuli even if participants merely attend 
to the stimuli by occasionally performing an emotion-unrelated task. In contrast, 
negative versus neutral words and pictures did not differentially influence fEMG 
zygomaticus activity in accord with similar previous reports demonstrating that 
corrugator activity but not zygomaticus activity sensitively reflects the differential 
processing of negative versus neutral pictures and words (e.g., Larsen et al., 2003; Tan 
et al., 2012). Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings of Niedenthal et al. (2009), 
corrugator activity was modulated by stimulus valence even though participants judged 
emotion-unrelated stimulus aspects. Therefore, we assume that the recording of fEMG 
corrugator activity is sufficiently sensitive to examine whether negative versus neutral 
scenarios as well as immoral versus moral scenarios also elicit embodied responses 
during emotional discourse comprehension.  
However, and in contrast to two previous studies concerned with discourse-
based emotional inferences (Bartholow et al., 2001; Thompson et al., 2016), negative 
versus neutral and also immoral versus moral items did not differentially influence 
fEMG activity of either the corrugator or zygomaticus muscles. That no reliable effect 
on fEMG zygomaticus activity was found is understandable given the results of the 
control experiment and reports in the literature, suggesting the relative insensitivity of 
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the zygomaticus to negative affect (e.g., Larsen et al., 2003; Tan et al., 2012). Since 
there was no sign of an fEMG corrugator effect, we are left to conclude that discourse-
based emotional inferences for the present task and materials are unlikely to involve 
affective simulations.  
The analysis of EDA did not provide any evidence for the occurrence of 
embodied responses to emotion stimuli differing in their arousal value. That is, in the 
comprehension experiment there were no differential EDA responses to the different 
emotion and morality materials. This zero-effect accords with findings of Thompson et 
al. (2016), who showed the phasic EDA response not to be influenced by emotional 
discourse comprehension. Also, the control experiment demonstrated that the emotional 
content of pictures or words did not automatically elicit such an activation within the 
autonomic nervous system. Previous research, however, indicated that EDA responses 
increased in magnitude with the degree of arousal of unpleasant or pleasant pictures that 
participants were asked to affectively judge (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 
2001). Hence, we speculate that the present zero-effect in EDA is due to the only 
moderately different arousal values of our language materials and the fact that 
participants performed an emotion-unrelated task.  
 
General Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to advance our understanding of discourse-based 
emotion comprehension using a passive reading for comprehension task. Specifically, 
in a first experiment we investigated whether randomly intermixed emotion and morality 
scenarios underwent an (implicit) affective categorization at the level of brain 
processing. Based on the assumption that both emotion and morality materials are 
affectively evaluated even when the task did not demand so, we expected an enhanced 
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LPP for negative compared to neutral and also for immoral compared to moral scenarios 
(Experiment 1). A second experiment addressed the issue of whether discourse-based 
emotional inferences lead to embodied responses. We hypothesized that if emotional 
comprehension involves affective simulations (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007), this should be 
indicated by increased fEMG activity or EDA responses (Experiment 2) to both negative 
and immoral items compared to neutral and moral items. 
 Crucially, in Experiment 1 we obtained ERP evidence in accord with the 
assumption that incoming linguistic information is implicitly evaluated concerning its 
emotional content. First, LPP amplitude was larger for negative compared to neutral 
scenarios between 300-700 ms after the onset of the critical word in the target sentence. 
This particular finding replicates the LPP effect reported by Kunkel et al. (2018) when 
participants performed affective judgments to emotion materials that were presented in 
isolation rather than intermixed with morality materials. It is important to note that since 
the target sentences were identical for negative and neutral scenarios, the present LPP 
effect cannot be attributed to lexical differences of critical target words but rather 
demonstrates a discourse-based influence even when the task did not explicitly demand 
explicit affective judgments. Moreover, given that discourse contexts were only 
moderately constraining and critical words did not differ in cloze probability or their 
semantic relatedness (cf. Kunkel et al., 2018), it seems unlikely that the LPP effect is 
due to word-based expectancies. Therefore, we take the larger LPP to negative than 
neutral items to reflect the implicit affective categorization of linguistic input.  
 A second important ERP finding concerns the larger LPP between 300-500 
ms, and as a trend between 500-700 ms, for immoral than moral items. This finding 
replicates the similar LPP effect reported by Leuthold et al. (2015) for a comprehension 
task in which morality materials were intermixed with emotion-neutral world knowledge 
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materials. Thus, it appears that immoral compared to moral scenarios contain more 
salient emotional information that is rapidly accessed and evaluated during discourse 
comprehension, at least when explicit moral judgments are not required (cf. Kunkel et 
al., 2018). It should be remembered that immoral and moral conditions used identical 
critical words and did not reliably differ regarding cloze probability and semantic 
relatedness. Therefore, as for emotion materials, we would rule out word-based lexical 
and also expectancy effects as an account of the LPP effect to morality items. Instead, 
we assume that morality items undergo an implicit affective categorization also when 
these items are presented together with affectively more salient emotion materials, 
extending the similar LPP findings of Leuthold et al. (2015) when morality items were 
intermixed with emotion-neutral world knowledge materials. Together, the LPP findings 
from Experiment 1 accord with those reported in our previous studies, in which 
participants read for comprehension (Leuthold et al., 2015) or explicitly evaluated the 
emotional content of language input (Kunkel et al., 2018), corroborating the view that 
incoming linguistic information is affectively evaluated by default. 
 Moreover, it is also worth mentioning that no N400 effects were observed. In 
previous discourse-based comprehension studies on emotion processing, a larger N400 
was obtained when discourse contexts were strongly constraining and expectancies 
about a forthcoming emotion word were violated (e.g., León et al., 2010; Leuthold et 
al., 2012). This is also true for an ERP study conducted by Van Berkum, Holleman, 
Nieuwland, and Otten (2009) that was concerned with the processing of moral-laden 
statements. When such statements were inconsistent rather than consistent with the 
personally held values of participants (e.g., “If my child were homosexual, I’d find this 
hard/easy to accept”), a slightly larger N400 occurred followed by a larger LPP. 
Similarly, larger N400 and LPP components were observed to positive or negative 
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words following an incongruent (neutral) discourse context when participants read for 
comprehension (Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009). These N400 
findings suggest that violation of emotion-related expectancies about forthcoming 
emotion words lead to incongruency effects that are associated with a higher demand 
for semantic processing. Having said this, one might wonder why Bartholow and 
colleagues (2001) in their study on intentional trait inferences during discourse 
comprehension found only a larger LPP but not N400 to emotion-related trait violations. 
We assume that the instruction to form explicit trait inferences might have changed task 
characteristics in such a way in this study that the processing of the emotional content 
of language input became prominent. Thus, compatible with our interpretation, the LPP 
observed by Bartholow and colleagues might reflect the discourse-based affective 
evaluation of trait-consistent and inconsistent scenarios.  
With regard to our second research question, namely, whether discourse-based 
emotional comprehension involves affective simulations, the study of Bartholow and 
colleagues (2001) is relevant as well. They reported stronger fEMG corrugator activity 
immediately after presentation of the final affective word that described a trait-
inconsistent rather than trait-consistent negative behavior. For words describing positive 
behaviors, such a trait-consistency effect was absent, in contrast to their LPP findings. 
In contrast, the present Experiment 2 revealed no reliable fMEG differences in either 
corrugator or zygomaticus activity and also not in phasic EDA responses, despite the 
fact that negative versus neutral and also immoral versus moral scenarios differed with 
regard to their rated valence and arousal. In the light of the findings of the control 
experiment, which revealed that fEMG corrugator activity reliably reflected the emotion 
word effect when participants performed an emotion-unrelated judgment task, it appears 
unlikely that the absence of an emotion-related effect on fEMG corrugator activity in 
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the comprehension experiment is due to insufficient sensitivity of this measure in 
revealing embodied responses. Rather, the findings in Experiment 2 appear to suggest 
that affective simulations are not involved during discourse-based processing of 
morality and emotion scenarios.  
Of course, as Thompson and colleagues (2016) found both fEMG corrugator and 
zygomaticus activity to be modulated by the emotional processing of language input 
during irony comprehension, and also Bartholow et al. (2001) found larger fEMG 
corrugator activity to discourse-related emotion word violations, one might wonder 
which factors would explain the absence of fEMG effects in Experiment 2. Given the 
differences regarding tasks, procedures, and language materials used, it is difficult to 
come up with a straightforward explanation for the mixed outcomes across studies. 
However, we speculate that the salience of the emotional content of language materials 
might play a crucial role. For instance, it could be argued that emotional salience 
mattered in Bartholow et al.’s study, since they employed a task that might have 
promoted the explicit affective processing of discourse scenarios. Thus, it is an 
important goal for future research to test whether (embodied) affective simulations are 
activated if demanded by the task. For instance, if participants were asked to perform 
explicit affective judgments as in Kunkel et al. (2018), one might expect that embodied 
responses are elicited during the processing of negative or immoral compared to than 
neutral and moral items, indicating the involvement of affective simulations in 
emotional discourse comprehension.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the present ERP findings extend previous work (Kunkel et al., 2018; 
Leuthold et al., 2015) by providing clear ERP evidence for the implicit affective 
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evaluation of incoming emotional information even when no explicit affective judgment 
task is required. In addition, such an affective evaluation of moral transgression items 
was demonstrated also when embedded within other emotionally salient but morality-
unrelated materials. Finally, we found no evidence for a possible role of affective 
simulations during the discourse-based processing of emotion and morality materials. It 
remains an important task for future studies to investigate whether embodied simulations 
during discourse comprehension depend on the salience and task-relevance of the 
emotional content of language materials.  
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4 Discussion
Experimental research has shown that emotions play an important role in moral judge-
ments (for a review see Avramova & Inbar, 2013). The exact function and the time point
when they become relevant during the judgement process has not been clarified. The ERP
study by Leuthold et al. (2015) provided initial evidence for affective processing during
moral language comprehension. They examined the mental mechanisms during reading
for comprehension of everyday morality scenarios. Assuming that moral violations are
related to world knowledge violations that trigger an N400 at the discourse level (Filik
& Leuthold, 2008; Hagoort et al., 2004), Leuthold et al. (2015) additionally presented
vignettes of world knowledge violations in order to test for the presence of the N400 effect.
In contrast to their expectations, ERPs showed a larger positivity for immoral as compared
to moral scenarios. Leuthold et al. (2015) related this positivity to the LPP component
which was taken to reflect an implicit evaluative categorisation process of incoming moral
information (cf. Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito & Cacioppo, 2000). The present doctoral thesis
was motivated by theories of emotional language comprehension research and the study of
Leuthold et al. (2015). Its aim was to venture into the research gap by trying to define the
specific role of affective processing during moral language comprehension. In the following
section, I will refer to three research questions the present doctoral thesis aimed to answer:
First, does moral information undergo affective processing? Second, does moral content of
incoming linguistic information trigger embodied processing? Third, does moral informa-
tion processing differ from the processing of emotional information? Before tackling these
questions in detail, I will summarise the studies conducted to answer these questions.
4.1 Summary of studies
In three studies it was tested whether incoming moral information undergoes an implicit
affective evaluation. The paradigm of Leuthold et al. (2015) was used, yet, instead of pre-
senting world knowledge vignettes, scenarios describing emotional events were employed.
All three studies, investigated the processing of scenarios describing everyday moral content
and scenarios describing emotional situations. It is important to note that the emotional
and moral meaning of each scenario became apparent only after the target sentence was
integrated into a preceding, ambiguous context. Participants were asked to perform ex-
plicit judgements (Study 1 and 2) or read for comprehension (Study 3). In order to assess
on-line processing of moral and emotional content, behavioural (RT, accuracy) and psy-
chophysiological measures (ECG, EDA, facial EMG, ERPs) were analysed. The major
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aim was to reveal the neural mechanisms as well as embodied responses to morality and
emotion scenarios in discourse comprehension.
Study 1 investigated in two ERP experiments the nature and time course of evaluative
processing of short moral and emotional scenarios with regard to brain processes. Partic-
ipants judged whether they found the described moral situation either morally acceptable
or not and the emotional situation as either emotionally moving or not (Experiment 1),
or made only emotional judgements to both types of scenarios (Experiment 2). As in pre-
vious studies using a similar approach (Leuthold et al., 2015; Van Berkum et al., 2009), it
was assumed that moral and emotional materials trigger affective evaluations irrespective
of the task. Critical words were expected to trigger an enhanced LPP for immoral as
compared to moral scenarios as well as for negative as compared to neutral emotional ma-
terials, irrespective of the judgement task. However, the results of Study 1 indicated that
only for emotional judgements the same LPP effect was found for both types of scenarios
(Experiment 2). When making moral judgements on morality materials (Experiment 1),
an anterior negativity for immoral as compared to moral items was found.
Study 2 served to investigate emotion simulation indicated by embodied changes in
facial EMG, phasic EDA, and ECG triggered by the same morality and emotion scenarios
from Study 1. The fEMG measurement included activity changes of the corrugator and
levator muscle, indicating a negative affect, and of the zygomaticus muscle, indicating a
positive affect (Larsen et al., 2003). Participants judged whether they found the described
moral and emotional situation emotionally moving or not like in Experiment 1 of Study
1. To test the sensitivity of all three peripheral psychophysiological measures, a control
experiment was conducted where participants were presented with emotional versus neutral
pictures and words. Based on previous studies (for a review see Bradley & Lang, 2000), we
expected clear emotional responses at least to visual stimuli. Phasic EDA was not sensitive
to control and experimental manipulations. For pictures, the heart rate measure showed
the expected pattern with a stronger initial decrease for negative as compared to neutral
pictures (Bradley & Lang, 2000). Also for words of the control experiment and morality
materials, an initial decrease of heart rate could be observed, but not differentiated between
conditions. Moreover, in contrast to our expectations for emotion materials, heart rate
decreased stronger for neutral than negative scenarios. As could be expected with regard
to the fEMG, negative compared to neutral control items triggered increased activation
of the corrugator and levator muscles. For morality materials, levator and corrugator
were sensitive to moral transgressions in line with findings by Cannon et al. (2011) and
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Krumhuber et al. (2018). Crucially, zygomaticus activity was stronger for immoral as
compared to moral scenarios. For emotional materials, fEMG was not sensitive to the
valence of emotional scenarios.
Study 3 was inspired by the results of Study 1, where the processing of incoming moral
information differed depending on the task participants performed. It was still unclear
what happens if participants merely read morality and emotion scenarios for comprehen-
sion without an explicit moral or emotional judgement task. Hence, Study 3 was moti-
vated by the assumption that the global context could influence whether an affective versus
semantic-cognitive analysis is prioritised (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Lai et
al., 2012). The global context can be considered here as the task demands or the use of
emotion-related versus emotion-neutral linguistic stimuli among which morality scenarios
are embedded. It was unclear whether emotion materials are still implicitly evaluated in a
task context where materials were not explicitly judged according to their affective (Study
1 and 2) or moral content (Study 1). Moreover, Leuthold et al. (2015) presented moral-
ity scenarios in an emotion-irrelevant context, for which world knowledge materials and
morality materials were presented in an intermixed manner. Thus, it is also unclear how
morality materials are processed in a global emotion-related context where emotion and
morality materials are intermixed. In two experiments, participants performed a passive
reading-for-comprehension task with randomly intermixed morality and emotion materials
while ERPs (Experiment 1), fEMG and EDA (Experiment 2) were recorded. Again, for
Experiment 2, we additionally conducted a control experiment with the same pictures and
words of Study 2 in order to test the sensitivity of the peripheral psychophysiological mea-
sures. The ERP results of Experiment 1 indicated an LPP effect for both, immoral and
moral scenarios as well as for negative and neutral scenarios. The results of Experiment 2
revealed no reliable fMEG differences in either corrugator or zygomaticus activity and also
not in phasic EDA responses, although corrugator activity was larger for negative than for
neutral words and pictures in the control experiment.
4.2 Processing of moral and emotional materials
4.2.1 The processing of emotional information
In order to answer the first research question and to see whether moral information under-
goes affective processing, it is necessary to first know how emotionally loaded materials are
processed. Based on existing evidence (cf. Fischler & Bradley, 2006; Hajcak et al., 2010),
the present doctoral thesis assumes that linguistic information, describing emotionally-
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relevant events, is affectively processed and evaluated. It is important to note that, to my
knowledge the present studies investigated for the first time whether the emotional mean-
ing of identical target sentences is differently processed when emotions need to be inferred
from the context. That is, emotional discourse comprehension was examined under condi-
tions that excluded possible influences of differing emotion words (e.g., Delaney-Busch &
Kuperberg, 2013; Holt et al., 2009), and also of emotional congruency effects due to the
use of emotionally constraining contexts (e.g., Leo´n et al., 2010; Leuthold et al., 2012).
A first key ERP finding is that in three experiments (Study 1 and 3), the same LPP
effect was replicated for emotional negative compared to neutral scenarios under differ-
ent circumstances: when items were presented blockwise during an emotional judgement
task, as well as when items were presented intermixedly within morality items during a
reading-for-comprehension task. The observed LPP effect for negative compared to neutral
scenarios is taken to reflect the discourse-based influence in emotional language compre-
hension rather than resulting from lexical or emotion related differences between target
words. This is because the target sentences were identical for negative and neutral sce-
narios. The LPP effect in conjunction with the absence of an N400 effect accords with
the view that participants focused on the processing of the emotional rather than the se-
mantic content (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Lai et al., 2012), indicating the
enhanced affective evaluation of negative than neutral scenarios. In this respect, Study 1
and 3 extend previous ERP studies investigating discourse-based emotion effects.
One might argue, however, that the LPP is related to the P300 component, which has
been taken to reflect working memory operations (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988). It is still
an open issue whether, and in which way, the LPP is related to the P300 component. The
P300 is typically associated with participants’ attention to stimuli (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-
Jones, & Cohen, 2005) and its amplitude is known to be inversely related to the prior and
also the subjective probability of a given stimulus event, task demands, and its significance.
The late ERP positivity found in the present studies does not, however, simply reflect
stimulus novelty, low-level perceptual differences (since identical target words were used),
or violations of expectation (target words do not differ with regard to cloze probability
and semantic relatedness) (Hajcak et al., 2010). In accordance with previous research
on emotional stimulus processing (Fields & Kuperberg, 2012), and displaying a different
ERP pattern for world knowledge vignettes (Leuthold et al., 2015), I take the long-lasting
positivity for negative scenarios to relate to the LPP rather than the P300 component,
indicating the affective evaluation of stimuli (Cacioppo et al., 1993; Ito & Cacioppo, 2000).
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A second goal was to answer the questions whether the processing of emotional materials
is embodied and hence reflected by peripheral psychophysiological measures. That is, it was
examined whether discourse-based comprehension of emotional language involves affective
simulations. The control experiments of Study 2 and 3 indicated that negative compared
to neutral words and pictures do not influence fEMG zygomaticus activity differently. This
is in line with similar reports showing that zygomaticus is sensitive to positive stimuli only
(e.g., Larsen et al., 2003; Tan et al., 2012). By contrast, corrugator and levator activity
was larger for both negative than to neutral words and pictures. These results indicate the
recording of corrugator and levator activity is sufficiently sensitive to examine embodied
responses to negative stimulus input. Therefore, it should also be sensitive to embodied
responses elicited during emotional discourse comprehension of negative versus neutral
scenarios as well as immoral versus moral scenarios. Hence, the analysis of corrugator
and levator activity can be employed to reveal embodied responses associated with the
processing of negative or neutral stimuli, even if participants merely attend to the stimuli
by occasionally performing an emotion-unrelated task as in Study 3. Phasic EDA was not
sensitive at all to experimental manipulations, neither in the control experiment nor in the
comprehension experiment. With the exception of the ECG results in Study 2, emotion
materials revealed no reliable embodied responses.
In summary, the emotion text materials were indeed appropriate to trigger implicit
affective evaluations with regard to brain processes, but not with regard to embodied
simulation of concrete emotional states. For the present emotion materials, the results of
peripheral psychophysiological measures provide no support for the view that the same
embodied processes that are engaged while experiencing emotions were also involved in
understanding emotions during language comprehension.
4.2.2 Does moral information undergo affective processing?
With regard to brain processes, this research question can not be answered in a straight-
forward manner. If morality materials are affectively processed, one would expect an LPP
effect as found for emotion materials, because both types of materials would require the
same mental mechanism. That is, the LPP should be larger for emotionally more salient
immoral scenarios like for negative emotional scenarios.
As expected on the basis of a previous study using a similar approach and materials
(Leuthold et al., 2015), an LPP effect was elicited by immoral compared to moral scenarios.
This was found in an emotional judgement task (Study 1) as well as in a passive reading-
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for-comprehension task (Study 3). Moreover, behavioural rating and experimental data
showed that participants judged immoral items as more emotionally moving than moral
ones. Together, these results indicate the evaluative-affective categorisation of incoming
moral information during discourse comprehension. Accordingly, the LPP effect could
reflect the higher emotional intensity of our immoral scenarios. Alternativly, this effect
could be driven by the motivational salience of the items (Hajcak et al., 2010).
Experiment 2 of Study 1 demonstrated that, other than for moral scenarios, the LPP
for immoral scenarios was absent if participants explicitly focused on the moral content
of incoming information when moral acceptability judgements were demanded. Instead,
readers were more engaged in cognitive processing, as indicated by an anterior negativity
for immoral scenarios. In other discourse comprehension studies, such an anterior nega-
tivity has been taken to index language-related working memory demands, that is, when
alternative but likely text inferences have to be maintained or integrated simultaneously
within the situation model (Baggio, Van Lambalgen, & Hagoort, 2008; Xiang & Kuper-
berg, 2015). Similarly, when explicit moral judgements are required, it appears possible
that the integration of either the likely (anticipated) moral action or the unlikely immoral
action then differentially taxes working memory (for similar reasoning, see Xiang & Ku-
perberg, 2015). Thus, it is conceivable that working memory load and the demands on
integrating linguistic information into the situation model is higher in the case of im-
moral than moral items, giving rise to the enlarged anterior negativity. The assumption
that the present anterior negativity effect is related to working memory functions implies
that cognitive-semantic processing plays a major role when explicit moral judgements are
required.
Also behavioural evidence indicates the task-dependent processing of morality materials.
Thus, responses were slower for moral than emotional judgements, whereas the speed of
emotional judgements was the same for moral and emotion materials. On the one hand,
this result accords with the idea that a more complex and therefore time-consuming cog-
nitive decision process underlies moral decision making than it is the case for emotional
decision making. On the other hand, it also indicates that the way readers process infor-
mation about the persons and events described in the text, the information they focus on
and evaluate, depends on their specific goals. In addition, faster judgement responses to
emotionally negative and immoral scenarios than to neutral and moral scenarios might be
attributed to the fact that the former items are more salient.
In sum, the second key ERP finding of the present doctoral thesis concerns the task-
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dependent processing of incoming moral information. An emotional judgement and a
reading-for-comprehension task triggered affective processing of moral information as in-
dicated by an LPP effect. The moral judgement task shifted the focus to the cognitive-
semantic aspects of moral content indicated by the anterior N400. This provides clear
evidence for the assumption that the processing of morality scenarios depends on the spe-
cific circumstances: cognitive processing when explicit moral judgements are required, and
affective processing when the moral content is either implicitly processed during reading
for comprehension or when the emotional content of morality scenarios is in focus. This
finding accords with other discourse comprehension studies in which the LPP, and hence
affective processing of linguistic input, is modulated by various variables, including the
specific discourse context and task demands (e.g., Delaney-Busch & Kuperberg, 2013; Lai
et al., 2012; Xiang & Kuperberg, 2015). It further accords with fMRI evidence that cogni-
tive processes are more dominant when the task requires explicit moral judgements rather
than merely the passive processing of moral content and vice versa (Sevinc & Spreng,
2014).
4.2.3 Does moral content of incoming linguistic information trigger embodied
processing?
We examined the embodied processing of incoming moral and emotional content in two
studies. ECG was sensitive to emotion materials, but was not reliably influenced by
morality conditions. Phasic EDA was not sensitive to the present morality materials either.
Given that EDA and ECG are established methods to measure emotional arousal (Bradley
& Lang, 2000) it appears that present morality and emotion materials are presumably not
very arousing during discourse comprehension.
By contrast, facial EMG yielded interesting results. As mentioned above, in both stud-
ies (Study 2 and 3) the control experiment showed that participants were sensitive to
negative affect as indicated by increased corrugator and levator activity for negative com-
pared to neutral words and pictures. Whereas, it was expected that immoral scenarios
trigger negative emotions, corrugator activity was not or only slightly, though reliably,
influenced by our experimental manipulations. This is surprising given that recent fEMG
studies observed increased corugator activity when participants read or heard about moral
transgressions and performed an emotional rating task (’t Hart, Struiksma, Van Boxtel,
& Van Berkum, 2018; Cannon et al., 2011). Instead, levator activity was increased for
moral transgressions when participants performed an emotion-related task in Study 2,
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which in turn is in line with previous research (Cannon et al., 2011; Krumhuber et al.,
2018). Krumhuber and colleagues found that only levator but not corrugator was sensi-
tive to vignettes describing social-cultural norm violations compared to neutral vignettes.
The authors took levator activity to indicate disgust when participants read about the
described behaviour, suggesting that norm transgressions entail a moral component. Also
Cannon and colleagues (2011) found that levator was sensitive to moral transgressions of
the purity and fairness foundations, indicating disgust. Critically, according to the authors,
they asked participants to make a moral judgement (“How negative or positive was this
behaviour?”). In my opinion, this kind of judgement is not a moral one, but an emotional
judgement, which is more in line with that of Study 2.
In addition, in Study 2, the zygomaticus was sensitive to experimental manipulations
contrary to our expectations, showing stronger activation for immoral compared to moral
scenarios. Assuming that zygomaticus activity indicates positive affect (Larsen et al.,
2003), one may wonder why we found stronger activation of the zygomaticus given that
immoral behaviour is assumed to trigger negative emotions. It is important to note, how-
ever, that in previous studies presenting visual stimuli, zygomaticus activity was ambiguous
in neutral and negative emotional states (Tan et al., 2012). Also in case of complex linguis-
tic stimuli zygomaticus was not a reliable indicator of valence (Larsen et al., 2003). For
instance, smiling activity could be also interpreted as wry, sarcastic, and smirking which
can be hardley interpreted as a complaisant positive affect (’t Hart et al., 2018). Given
that corrugator and levator activity in the control experiment was increased to emotional-
negative stimuli, the increased and simultaneous activation of zygomaticus and levator
and corrugator for immoral compared to moral scenarios might suggest that the present
zygomaticus activity results from cross-talks of nearby muscles that are associated with
negative effect (Cannon et al., 2011; Tassinary, Cacioppo, & Vanman, 2007).
Together, the current increased activation of levator and corrugator fit with the assump-
tion that moral transgressions elicit negative emotions which are simulated during reading.
Moreover, it appears that an emotional judgement task enhanced the emotional salience
of morality scenarios. In line with our ERP findings, embodied processing depended on
the task participants had to perform. Extending Niedenthal et al. (2009), not only em-
bodied processing of isolated emotional words but also emotional discourse comprehension
depends on whether the task is related to the processing of the emotional content. We did
not find evidence for the assumption that facial embodiment has a causal role in emotional
language processing, at least as concerns the present materials (but see Havas et al., 2010;
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Niedenthal et al., 2009), because embodied processing was absent when having no explicit
judgement task. The assumption of a causal role of emotion simulation in language com-
prehension and its boundary conditions needs to be investigated in future research. To
this end, the time course of embodied effects, especially whether the activation of fEMG
either precedes or follows the judgement needs to be investigated. If the embodied re-
sponse follows the judgement, this would also argue against the assumption that emotion
simulation has a causal role, but could be taken as an epiphenomenon.
4.2.4 Implications of the present findings at the level of brain and body
The results of the present studies indicate that at the level of brain and body, the way
incoming moral information is processed depends on the task participants perform. Moral
information is not affectively judged per se, but involves a cognitive component, which
dominates if demanded by the task. That is, if incoming moral information needed to be
evaluated with regard to moral acceptability, cognitive processing dominates over affective
processing.
This conclusion does not fit with SIM’s assumption that automatic intuitions always
precede cogntive processing in moral judgements (Haidt, 2001). However, it appears to
accord with Greene’s dual-process theory of moral judgement, which is more flexible than
SIM, since it assumes that both affective and cognitive processes are involved in such judge-
ments (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). As outlined earlier, Greene and colleagues examined
the brain processes underlying people‘s moral judgement behaviour with regard to moral
dilemma situations that differ in the degree of personal immediacy. Automatic affective
processes and controlled cognitive processes work as two dissociable and antagonistic sys-
tems in moral judgements. Under some circumstances, emotional processes are faster and
precede cognitive processing. However, Greene and colleagues made no assumptions about
what exactly triggers a stronger negative emotional reaction. One idea was that the per-
sonal immediacy (personal, impersonal) affects whether affective or cognitive processing
dominates. By now, evidence supported the involvement of cognitive processing (Greene
et al., 2008; Suter & Hertwig, 2011), but explanations for the impact of emotions has been
lacking.
Greene’s theory was based on judgement behaviour in sacrificial moral dilemma situa-
tions. As mentioned in Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.2), Greene’s materials suffer from several
limitations. They were neither validated nor tested in regard to their material-specific
linguistic effects. It is an important goal of the present doctoral thesis, that two stan-
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dardised and text-based stimulus sets were employed to investigate emotional and moral
cognition. For both sets, we offer a comprehensive description of psycholinguistic aspects
and rating data (see Method section of Study 1). Emotion materials were employed to
examine emotional language processing during discourse comprehension using moderately
constraining contexts and identical target words. Together with the similarly constructed
emotion materials, cognitive as well as emotional determinants of moral information pro-
cessing could hence be investigated. Using these well constructed and everyday scenarios,
we were able to provide evidence for the idea that affective and cognitive processes work
as two separate systems, but the specific interplay is yet an open question.
4.2.5 Does moral information processing differ compared to the processing of
emotional information?
Numerous researchers have already asked whether moral evaluations depend on the same
general, unspecific mechanisms as other social judgements, or whether moral evaluations
build on domain-specific mechanisms (cf. Cushman & Young, 2011; Waldmann et al.,
2012). Based on the results of the present doctoral thesis, this question can not be finally
answered. First, the major aim was to examine whether moral information undergoes
affective processing and whether such processing is task-dependent. To this end, emotional
language processing was investigated. Second, morality and emotion materials differ with
regard to the wording of the critical sentences and are not matched regarding all potentially
relevant word-level or discourse-level dimensions. This means, that it was not appropriate
to subject ERP amplitudes for both materials to one common statistical analysis in order
to directly compare material-specific ERP effects. Hence, it was decided to indirectly
compare the respective material-specific ERP effects providing a first ground on research
of emotional language comprehension.
In this respect, it is useful to distinguish between brain and embodied processing. With
regard to brain processes, both materials were similarly affectively processed when partic-
ipants performed an emotion-related task and when they merely read for comprehension.
This was also supported by behavioural data that showed faster judgement responses to
emotionally negative and immoral scenarios than neutral and moral scenarios, presumably
because the former scenarios are more salient. This fits with the assumption that emo-
tional stimuli capture attention and facilitate subsequent processing (Zajonc, 1984). In
the case of an explicit moral judgement task, the moral content became more salient and
the processing of incoming moral information changed accordingly. Again, behavioural
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findings indicated that participants followed task instructions by answering the respective
moral judgement questions in the majority of cases as expected. More importantly, the
processing was influenced by both the task and the specific moral and emotional content
of materials. Immoral items were judged as less acceptable (Experiment 1) and more emo-
tionally moving (Experiment 2) than moral ones and negative items were judged as more
emotionally moving than neutral ones. Following the behavioural evidence together with
the LPP versus anterior negativity effects, it seems that different aspects of incoming moral
information were relevant depending on the task demands. This leads to the assumption
that the processing of moral information involves a cognitive component which is only
relevant under some circumstances. That is, participants were more engaged in cognitive
processing when demanded by the moral judgement task.
With regard to facial emotion simulation, a similar pattern was found. If there were no
explicit task demands (i.e. when merely reading for comprehension), both materials were
similarly processed and showed no embodied responses. If emotional judgements were
demanded, where participants rated how emotionally moved they were, only morality
materials provided evidence for the involvement of emotion simulation during language
comprehension.
In an implicit (passive reading) task the processing of incoming emotion and morality
information is similar, whereas, it differs for an explicit task (emotional compared to moral
judgement task). Does the latter finding speak for a domain-specific processing of moral
information? To answer the question about domain-specific moral mechanisms, it must be
clarified which specific cognitive processes are involved in moral judgements with regard
to the anterior negativity. This ERP component may reflect working-memory processes
which would speak in favour of general cognitive processing (cf. Baggio et al., 2008; Xi-
ang & Kuperberg, 2015), but it may also reflect a specific cognitive process regarding the
moral domain. In my opinion, based on the results of the present studies, moral informa-
tion processing engaged in general (working memory) mechanisms of social information
processing. This is consistent with Greene et al. (2001) who found, increased activation
in brain areas that are related to working memory operations during cognitive processing.
Thus, what pays off specifically for morality is a stronger cognitive component in a moral
judgement task compared to pure emotional scenarios. This anterior negativity and the
circumstances under which this it is activated remains to be investigated.
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4.3 Outlook: Open questions and further research directions
Although the present ERP results of Study 1 indicated the task-dependent processing
of moral content, the cognitive component of moral information and its specific nature
remains to be investigated. It is a major limitation of the present studies that they
focused mainly on the affective aspects of moral information processing. As mentioned
above, the anterior negativity might reflect cognitive processing but this is an isolated
results which needs to be replicated. It should be an aim of further research to examine the
functional significance of this ERP component and whether it reflects the domain-specific
processing of moral content. This could be achieved by manipulating the emotional salience
of morality materials (e.g., varying arousal) or by varying between different cognitive tasks
(e.g., “Do you think this behaviour is conforming to the law?”).
Another aspect of cognitive processing in moral information processing was concerned
in a recent study of ’t Hart et al. (2018). Participants read scenarios describing a moral
or immoral protagonist, to whom happens a good or bad thing while recording fEMG
corrugator activity. ’t Hart and colleagues differentiated between two critical events. For
example, if a narrative involves a protagonist acting immorally (first critical event), in-
creased corrugator activity reflected negative affect. Whereas the subsequent critical event,
for example something good happens to the immoral protagonist, leads to conflicting af-
fect between language-driven simulation (positive) and fairness-based moral evaluation
(negative). According to the authors, the pattern of corrugator activity depends on the
moral status of the protagonist, which influences subsequent information processing. The
results of ’t Hart et al. (2018) are in line with the affective language comprehension model
(ALC) most recently developed by Van Berkum (in press), which approaches the inter-
faces between language comprehension and emotion. It is based on the assumption that
an emotional evaluation does not only take place in the mere comprehension of lexical
meaning, but also, when readers evaluate this linguistic input with regard to their own be-
liefs. Van Berkum differentiates between meaning comprehension and evaluation, in which
evaluation is the emotional reaction to representations that become available after under-
standing what is described in the narrative. The evaluation process implies controlled,
cognitive processing of incoming information. According to the ALC, we could differenti-
ate between two phases within the moral judgement process. First, the perception of an
agent acting in a certain way, and second, the evaluation of the agent’s action on the basis
of the context-based situation model. As proposed by ’t Hart et al. (2018), the results
of Study 3 would then suggest that, only morality scenarios describe anything which is
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worthy to cognitively evaluate. However, both Van Berkum (in press) and ’t Hart et al.
(2018) make no assumptions about how these two processes exactly interact and remains
to be investigated.
Another study concerning the relevance of cognitive processing of incoming moral in-
formation is given by Yang et al. (2013). By using ERPs, they identified that physical
compared to moral disgust occurred at different phases. The evaluation of moral informa-
tion was processed prior to that of physical disgust. Therefore, Yang et al. (2013) argued
that the processing of moral content precedes to those of emotional content. Also, fMRI
evidence showed that the neural networks activated by basic disgust feelings compared
to disgust elicited by moral transgressions covered distinct brain regions (Schaich Borg,
Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Moll et al., 2002, 2005).
A further limitation concerns the type of judgement task which was chosen for Study
2. As Niedenthal et al. (2009) proposed, embodied processing depends on the task which
should be related to emotional content. Their fEMG effects were absent when participants
judged emotional words in an lexical decision task. This has not yet been tested for
fEMG, EDA and ECG measures for morality materials. Study 2 provided evidence, that an
explicit task enhances the emotional salience of morality scenarios with regard to embodied
responses, but it is unclear, whether they are still present if participants perform a moral
judgement task as in Experiment 1 of Study 1. For emotion materials, an emotional
judgement task did not affect the emotional salience of materials with regard to embodied
responses anyway.
Based on the present three studies, I can only speculate about the exact relation between
brain processes and physiological embodied responses. In the first case, the simulation of
emotions during the processing of incoming information starts with the reactivation of
experienced-based representations in the brain (Damasio, 1994). The brain sends a signal
to innervate the concerned muscle and embodied responses would follow brain processing.
Alternatively, both brain and embodied processes appear simultaneously. The time course
of ERPs and fEMG responses needs to be clarified to substantiate assumptions about the
causal role of embodied processing of incoming information. If responses in facial EMG
follow the moral judgement, emotion simulation could be taken as an epiphenomenon.
Thus, it should be an aim of future studies to combine all psychophysiological methods in
a single experiment to investigate the various signals with regard to the exact time course
of brain and embodied responses.
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Conclusion
Immoral actions of others that clash with our moral beliefs are very likely to be experienced
as emotionally aversive. This thesis provides evidence that we are able to rapidly evaluate
or judge behaviour as good or bad, as positive or aversive, or as right and wrong. The
processing of morally laden language has emerged as a new domain in emotional language
comprehension. To make a judgement about the valence of someone’s action incoming
information is affectively processed. To consider a moral judgement, cognitive processes
are needed. How incoming linguistic moral information is processed depends on a number
of factors like the contextual information, the circumstances that contribute to a moral
decision, and the task which participants have to perform. To conclude, emotional and
cognitive processing both contribute to moral information processing.
The main achievement of the present doctoral thesis is that it extends previous stud-
ies investigating discourse-based effects in emotional and moral language comprehension.
The present work provides a new set of text-based scenarios to study emotional and moral
cognition. I assume that these text materials recruit the affective system and are mo-
tivationally relevant. In the present thesis, I have provided evidence for discourse-based
meaning construction of emotional content as well as for discourse-based meaning construc-
tion of moral content. The meaning construction of moral information is task-dependent.
Future research would need to take into account the potential impact of task demands
when elucidating the nature of the potential cognitive and affective processes contributing
to moral evaluations and decisions.
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